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                                                            ABSTRACT  
 
Modern Physical Education (PE) administered systemic models of teaching crafts. It 
atrophied the play element in human nature, and shaped a single-lens attitude to the 
treatment of bodies.  Framing minds, it veiled the conditions of learning processes and 
thus “instituted” the sovereignty of subjective concerns. It created many unexplained 
“gaps” between abstract concerns and pragmatic issues.  
 
Following language’s poststructural analysis, PE’s professional communication 
practices were exposed to alternative methodological refocusing from conforming to 
move to personalise the agent’s experience in moving to learn.   
 
In the wake of poststructuralism came Whitehead’s Physical Literacy (PL) which I adopt 
as “leitmotif” to reform PE’s teacher preparation and schooling practices. PL addresses 
children up to 14 years. For older pupils, PL’s language needs to constitute versions of 
human purposes voiced by the introduction of a new development called “Movement 
Literacy” (ML). ML acknowledges that language and movement are very different forms 
of “self-expression”. By itself however, self-expression is inadequate when it comes to 
learning how to learn.  Critical dialogue needs to be brought in to facilitate meaningful 
innovation in the PE world. By employing the philosophies of phenomenology and 
hermeneutics I make a case that expression in languaging movement [subjecting the 
agent’s account to hermeneutic treatment] is expression for others, and in exchange 
with others the expression is redefined, and changes the way one sees and talks about 
movement and about oneself.  
 
In its reflective practice, reverentially, ML will also unpack pedagogy’s hidden protocol, 
hoping to reclaim PE’s authentic purpose. It connects secular matters with sacred 
implications by reconciling the polemic differences between “techne” [purpose] and 
“phronesis ” [prudence].  With limited reference to Eastern “selflessness” ML advances 
teaching, through pedagogy and andragogy as a life-time mission.  Not providing 
answers, the thesis offers a manifesto attempting to facilitate new questions such as: 
how can language and movement communicate? and how can movement educators 
“minister” to their learner’s sense of well-being?  
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Chapter One      Unstitching and Re-spinning PE into Life     
 
Introduction 
 
This dissertation’s opening Chapters show why modern Physical Education (PE) 
specialists were institutionally prepared to become “movement proponents” but not 
educators. Quantitative aspects of learners’ movement were promoted through the 
application of scientific knowledge. PE’s schooling responded to the question, “How 
do I exercise?” Historically and rationally, its rationale advanced from physical 
instruction, to training and eventually to physical education. The dissertation’s first 
half demonstrates that whilst modern PE’s institutional curricula adequately 
addressed methodical teaching management, nevertheless, it failed to educate its 
apprenticing professional specialists into appreciating what it means to be 
pedagogically “fit”.   
 
The dissertation’s second half shows how and why, at the turn of this century, the 
profession began to enter another transformative phase; that of Whitehead’s (1992-
2002) Physical Literacy (PL). PL was a response to change occurring outside the 
profession during the closing half of the twentieth century. It was a change attributed 
to intense linguistic analysis known as poststructuralism. Throughout the thesis I 
interchange poststructuralism with postmodernism, since both philosophical and 
linguistic movements pose a very different question for the PE profession.  
Consistently, PL asks “Why should I exercise?”  Following this reorientation of its 
rationale, PE began to be addressed under the auspices of its meaning for its 
advocates and participant clients.  
 
This change occurred as the profession’s gradual response to the on-going 
academic, intellectual debate between rationalism and postmodernism during the 
1980s and 1990s (Fernandez-Balboa 1997, Falhberg and Falhberg 1991). The 
outcome of this debate influenced the profession to question its educational 
credibility and professional validity, as well as to re-examine both its professional 
institutional preparation programmes and the manner its schooling curriculum, which 
is a form of socially organised knowledge, could be exercised. Physical Literacy 
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according to Whitehead (1992), describes the motivation, “physical” competence, 
knowledge and understanding that individuals develop in order to maintain physical 
activity at an appropriate level throughout their life. It was her response to change 
PE’s systemic practices through the use of more inter-relational communications 
between teacher and learner by encouraging critical pedagogical practices and the 
adoption of new modes of thinking. PL, for Whitehead, held promise for a more 
personally attentive approach to address contemporary modes of learning about 
one’s own “physical” competence and aspire to enhance and strengthen human 
movement experiences for a wider constituency.  
 
Physical Literacy 
 
I adopt and further explain Whitehead's Physical Literacy (PL) in Chapter 3 as a 
postmodern innovative leitmotif informed approach and renewed foundation for PE’s 
institutional curriculum planning. More specifically, physical literacy helps to counter 
modern PE’s 1950s to 1980s dualistic thinking about mind and body as an 
impediment, limiting the process of learning. PL aspires to promote “meaning 
making” experiences nurturing one’s selfhood, the twofold adherence of one’s body 
to the domain of things and to that of self, or the essential qualities that make one 
person distinct from all others. The self is the idea of a unified being that is the 
source of consciousness. Moreover, this self is the agent responsible for the 
thoughts and actions of an individual to which they are ascribed. 
 
Physical Literacy attends to learners and more as individuals than was the case 
during the 1950 to mid 1980s by deliberately cultivating and consciously encouraging 
PE teachers to share their compassion for learning about movement and their 
inhabitants with their learners.  With the advent of PL the professional’s daily 
practices began to explore the forensic communicative realm of partnership in 
judgment with their learner-interlocutor (Berliner 1986; Bain 1990; Beckers 1996; 
Harris 1983).  
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Movement Literacy 
 
Drawing largely from its foundation in PL and involving the described experiential 
event of movement, I introduce Movement Literacy (ML) in Chapter 3 as my 
innovative aspiration to extend PE’s professional practice from pedagogy into 
andragogy [on page 5].  
 
A modus operandi, ML is not an application understood as the act of putting 
something to a special use. ML involves unequivocal conversational dialogue 
between PE teachers and Key Stage 4 students [beyond years 10-12] able to 
introspect and interchange views during classroom talk and its allied extra curricular 
sport “discussion”.  ML’s practitioners co-deliberate on their own and each other’s 
account of what PE encounters may meaningfully offer them. ML is also concerned 
to nurture: 
(a) the professional’s nous or reason especially regarded as governing all things 
within the education field such as knowing when to create and “apply” the most 
suitable of  learning “conditions” which, under the rigor of hermeneutc critique, help 
to  nurture a PE professional’s vocational posture and circumspect  behaviour and  
(b) unequivocal and ambiant relations with one’s participant learner-movers, and 
vice-versa.  
 
ML’s professional educators’ eventual onus is to locate a better understanding of the 
nature of our humanity. By cultivating a more resilient openness towards one’s self 
dependence and self-initiated identity, these professional educators may re-convene 
modern PE’s lost earthly, ecological posture. ML aspires to help all PE learners to 
cope with linking cognitive issues with felt concerns, infusing factual knowledge 
about motion with curiosity about emotion.  
 
In effect, this study profiles three core phases and modes [and moods] of 
professional communication from formal class/mass monologue teaching’s 
transmission and imposed authority into  
(i) the transactional phase of Physical Literacy [founded on phenomenology] 
conveying pedagogy as an initiation into  
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(ii) the realm of discursive practice inviting collegiality, and eventually into 
(iii) informal transformational andragogy involving collaborative learning on “how 
to learn” and changing perception of one’s personhood when inter and intra- 
personal dialogue can begin to flourish.  
 
That is, teaching undergoes transmission to pedagogical transaction and eventually 
involves andragogical transformation. 
 
Chapters 1-3 address Phase One. They trace systemic teaching as an initiation and 
an institutional prologue issuing instructions into the movement profession and its 
learners.  I argue that the formal act of teaching tends to direct information to the 
learner who is then lead towards following the “knower’s” version of PE, thereby 
harnessing educational learning conditions. I demonstrate the way modern PE’s 
communication delivery was anchored in the technical objective of “learning to 
move”. Chapter 3 offers a working definition of PL and a diverse description of ML’s 
aspiring function, a praxis which defies its end-condition or outcome as being definite 
and innovative notion that andragogy is also further explained.  
 
Chapters 4-5 trace progressive modes of communication into the intermediary phase 
of pedagogy [nursing correspondents into the subtle dynamics of dialogue]. This 
means enticing and reflecting on personal experience, and thus calls on a 
phenomenological approach which is a way of escorting or opening out the learner’s 
private, inhabited encounters. Pedagogical practice enables PE specialists to begin 
to corroborate and co-validate or question how one interprets one’s movement.  
 
In contrast to PE’s communication in Phase One, Phase Two follows a poststructural 
“turn”. Adopting hermeneutic phenomenology’s treatment of PE’s linguistic depiction 
in Chapters 6-7, PE’s communicative language can better help its correspondents to 
locate the culturally rich origin of human movement and identify its lost rituals 
connected to sacred or sentient meanings. 
 
The third communicative phase is then more explicitly addressed in Chapters 6-8. 
They explain ML as a procedure deeply invested in respecting sublime levels of 
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inter-relational protocol. ML tries to evoke an appeasing social context between its 
interlocutors wherein the leaven of learning is mutually shared between each 
participant correspondent, when both acknowledge that they are mutually dealing 
with unpredictable and unfinished outcomes. Judiciously, ML also deals with 
speaker/learner realising alterations of the “self” during discursive dialogue. In 
Chapters 7 and 8, ML is proposed as  “leitmotif” for re-planning Physical Educators 
Institutional preparation programmes. ML’s radical innovation may also offer a 
cathartic way of reconstituting one’s constellation of self through engaging in intimate 
PE knowledge “settings” which may create indifference, or enthralling ways about 
what movement “does” to us. Movement encounters may come to matter to us, not 
simply in biophysical terms, but also in the construct of our self image. They also 
hold the tendency to dislocate one’s sense of self-assurance so that PE specialist 
interpreters need to know movement’s effect and affect for each learner.  
 
In Chapter 8 and the study’s unfinished closure I explain how the application of ML’s 
reflexive praxis is advanced through pedagogy to indulge in a sublime form of 
learning by engaging in “andragogy” which is an engagement in a culture of critical 
dialogue. ML informed professionals, I propose, can therapeutically “search” in the 
mover’s authored “event “ for tangential evidence of lack of “self-value”, and morally 
restore one’s “self-image” by clarifying the notion of “self” and “other than self”. ML 
communicates PE’s Key Stage 4 concerns with “moving to learn” about one’s life 
skills. Conversing with 15 year old students, qualified movement literates need to be 
or become well versed in “languaging-movement” to converse with their more senior 
teenage learners and more accomplished movers in what Knowles refers to as 
“andragogy” (1980, 1984).  
 
Andragogy 
 
Andragogy may be practiced by PE career movement literates especially with its Key 
Stage 5 pupils. As well apprenticed learners, they are facing a crucial transition 
between schooling and the outside world and have become intimately acquainted 
with human inspired forms of movement. Andragogy aspires to forefront various 
sources of human agency when both speaker and listener in partnership can freely 
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attend to both the speaker agent’s negative and positive movement benefits in the 
give and take of a critical culture of discourse and dialogue. In the study’s ML 
collation of its tenuous visions for future PE interpreters (pages 212-13), I list most of 
andragogy’s characteristic features which movement professionals need to 
appreciate and employ to entice openness to matters of certain significance and thus 
play a crucial role to unwrap both its correspondent’s development of personhood.  
 
Languaging movement 
 
By “languaging movement”, I refer to moments when the PE specialists must know 
when to evoke [elicit meaning] from the “resident” agent’s post movement account. 
PE specialist need to know when to offer a friendly but critical ear to movement’s 
“insider commentator/participant” who, inevitably, is destined to remain the sole actor 
in one’s performed PE event. Unlike Modern PE, contemporary learners are 
encouraged to talk about their enactment in a confidential setting and in a 
companion- like designed set of circumstances. Languaging movement means 
posing questions about experiential movement’s revelations, and about the taken-
for–granted communicative ways in which its speaker-commentator makes sense of 
the world.  ML implies each correspondent helping to define/locate one’s social or 
relational situatedness with another speaker/listener. Intimately, it attends to 
linguistic communication’s nuances. It endeavours to enter into an ill-defined locality 
of meaning(s) bounded by enigmatic subtleties of how we embrace words which 
matter to us.  In PE we need to talk about ourselves and about our performed 
encounters. 
 
If perceived in this confessional sense, ML is understood as a benign enactment of 
critique, the very questioning of the assumptions of understanding of personal 
movement experiences. It may evolve as a more intricate and intimate transformative 
process which advances designated teaching styles to the more versatile and flexible 
realm of pedagogy and eventually, to an engagement in andragogy’s conversational 
strategies involving more mature and articulate movement learners. The idea behind 
ML is that it’s critical linguistic practices, rather than displace the self, reverentially 
endeavour to keep in touch with its correspondent’s featured sense of self. Crucially, 
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and benevolently, what ML attempts is to surface the “hidden-features”, the unaware 
unconscious “elements” of one’s self that its speaker has not yet realized, but which 
need to be made “known” to its movement performer.  Essentially, ML serves a 
number of discrete purposes of which the two major concerns are that of (1) 
transforming PE’s modernism’s (1950-1980) structural teaching through pedagogy 
(1980-2000) into contemporary 21st century andragogy and that of (2) healing PE 
movers who have become alienated from the act of moving. 
 
Vitally, ML begins to address not movement learners but rather, the learner in 
movement. I propose that, in tandem with PL, ML will become a necessary feature 
for all PE institutions universally to begin to examine and implement into their 
trainees’ personal and professional consciousness. Early in this thesis what I wish to 
make significant is that experienced PE specialists are placed in a privileged 
“educational” position. Human movement’s “patrons”, “consumers” and potential 
disciples are privileged in the sense that they can actually talk about such 
encounters; in particular, those who have encountered a strange, perhaps even 
profound sense of alienation when their attention becomes immersed or distracted in 
movement. For some, PE encounters can be exhilarating and engaging, but for 
others, it may transpire to be agonisingly lonely, disorienting, and confusing. I intend 
to convey ML as a pedagogy which consistently aspires to exercise linguistic 
improvisation and connoisseurship dealing with connotations and intimations of 
putting meaning in the world, but not “a meaning”. It is a praxis [the practise of a field 
study, as opposed to the theory] which involves an astute interpretation of a process 
of engaging thoughtful youths and adults with the hidden structure of learning 
experience. In Chapters 6-8, I explain ML as a way to help apprenticing professional 
movement specialists to develop their discrete level of pedagogical “fitness”. 
 
In Chapters 4 and 5, I shall identify and then link together modern PE’s (pre-1980s) 
models of teaching adopted from the field of education theory and practice, upon and 
from which PL evolved. I then suggest that PL’s PE philosophy can be employed as 
a 21st contemporary educational platform. In short, ML voices what we are made 
familiar in PL but rarely able to speak about in the context of PE: our human nature. 
When speaking of our human nature in general, we all too casually refer to those 
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distinguishing features of human characteristics. Such observed characteristics 
include the way we walk and talk, and the way we play, or conduct ourselves whilst 
climbing, dancing, or playing games. However, it is with detecting the unobserved, 
“domesticated” and “inner” embodied nature of another that ML aspires to unveil. It 
traces another’s uttered suggestions which give clues about its speakers’ particular 
way(s) of thinking, such as can be hinted at in the degree of attentiveness that 
another appears to pay to one’s comments. ML may develop as a practice which 
seeks out signs of another’s feelings, perhaps glimpses of their intuitive or rational 
embodied sensations and emotions, especially emotions that are not divorced from 
matters of consciousness and articulated reasoning which is a hallmark of 
personhood. It is not impossible for a Movement Literate sensitively to interview the 
mover, or its agency [understood as the capacity of an agent as a person to act in 
the world by deliberated means] in order to discover the alleged reason why this 
performance was conducted, or interpret tangential meaning(s) in the reflected 
“commentary” about what the participation felt like for its mover.  
 
Dealing with such personally intimate concerns, though “avoided” by modern PE 
proponents, is a key focus of interest for contemporary movement educationists. 
Contemporary movement professionals need to raise questions to find what the 
mover’s characteristics are; what causes them; how this causation works; and how 
fixed or flexible our “human nature” is. Such questions have ethical, political and 
theological implications for its correspondents. This is partly because human nature 
can be regarded as both a source of norms of conduct or ways of life, as well as 
presenting obstacles or constraints on living a good life. In other words, I conceive 
future PE specialists as professionally and personally duty bound to become 
engaged in increasingly forensic processes of decoding their clients’ and their own 
source of meaning, of unpacking their understanding of self, of not acting from a 
technologised desire to move, but  attributing the appeal to move to their own 
personal sense of reasoning. Tracking, trailing, and scouting for information, ML is a 
practice which is on the look out for overt and covert clues gathered from a range of 
perspectives which cross different theoretical and pragmatic disciplines.  
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Movement Literacy is an innovative mission, which I conceive as PE‘s most silent, 
animating lodestone transforming seemingly mundane experiences into something 
extraordinarily serious. I interpret human movement as a bridging and synergizing of 
the conditioned processing of learning about different human schemes of knowledge 
into life skills. Maintaining that we exist in an ever changing state of “happenings” 
which we tend to understand “paradigmatically”, ML may become important as a 
tentative way to unfold a conversation, to create and gather in new meanings often 
beyond our state of intent, willingness, or doing. 
 
My ML premise is that its participants’ agents may be placed by way of meeting 
one’s “transient” and “unattended-self”. Interminably, an ML informed specialist hunts 
for clues carried in the way a participant’s movement commentaries are 
communicated. Tracking, trailing, and scouting for information, ML gathers overt and 
covert clues from a range of perspectives to cross different theoretical and pragmatic 
disciplines. It creates a working meaning between its correspondents. The use of 
words provides the only means to make public similar meanings encountered 
between epistemological or cognitive knowledge and practical or lived-though 
wisdom. Paradoxically, however, ML presses on reflective silence in order to 
resurrect the severed voices which both regulate and change our lives.  
 
Movement Literacy ventures into the gap between the pursuit of theory and practical 
involvement. It aspires to connect explicit issues with implicit concerns. Through ML, I 
link abstract thoughtfulness with embodied encounters by manifesting a tactful 
professional practice in order to generate trust between its involved correspondents. I 
redeem PE’s generic appeal to playfully creating a desire to learn how-to-learn, in a 
compulsory curriculum subject. In effect then, ML is an attempt to provide a critical 
foundation for discourse in order to professionally extend its advocates’ and clients’ 
educational concerns and commitments.  It offers alternative ways of looking at 
human movement by countering modern PE’s traditional role of body management. It 
represents the body merely as an agent of social and cultural reproduction. 
 
What is important for contemporary PE’s apprenticing specialists to appreciate is that 
modern PE is now held responsible for shaping physical activities in schools and 
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communities in disempowering ways. Adversely, it influenced how its “movers” came 
to view their bodies, thus failed to apply physical activities to their lives, and use and 
understand the potential knowledge in this experiential field (Kirk 1986; Schön 1983; 
Sage 1989; Rintala 1991; and Crum 1993). 
 
ML is about drawing another’s attention not to what a PE specialist is but rather to 
what it is like to be a movement-educator from the “insider’s perspective”. I reveal the 
unspoken traditional discipline which I shall come to refer to variously as PE’s “rite de 
passage”, or its “human contract”. A human contract can be thought of as a kind of 
“self and another’s” just or ethical sound participation in life skills which are 
encountered in PE’s play-like activities, when one’s independence is viewed through 
the “good” one can do for another. Interminably, ML praxis unveils one’s own, as well 
as another’s hitherto unrealised facets of inner-self, one’s “otherness” by 
deconstructing the opposition between reason and feeling; not enticing alienation but 
rather eliciting benign kinship between its speakers and listeners, and vice-versa.  
 
As a child 
 
For example, as a child I did not think in terms of my body as an object. It was an 
integral part of me. But, I did not think of my body as playing a part as if it was linked 
to my conscious awareness. My intended thinking, that is, my deliberations, set aside 
my bodily concerns. I asked my body to perform for me, to allow me to swim. I swam 
more through the power of will and determined degree of desire. I told my body what 
it had to do. Today it tells me what to do. Throughout my four decades of trying to 
invite others into my world of movement, I have become more compelled to rely upon 
my corporeal messages which “talk” to me, but only in mute silence. My embodied 
state of being, ageing by the day, ever more sensitively monitors my changing state 
of being, reassuring me at times, cautioning me sometimes. Nevertheless, it always 
urges me to story-tell, especially with my grandchildren what little wisdom I have 
gathered on my way to becoming an elderly reader-interpreter of life’s text and its 
texture.  
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Teacher-training 
 
My lifetime’s vocational calling was to be one of PE’s many spokespersons. PE, if 
treated in a certain way, is not a peripheral curriculum subject. Rather, I view its 
rightful place as an education enterprise. This is because PE holds the capacity to 
unpack immanent messages for what is always a partial unveiling of a personal and 
communal meaning of life. Life remains a mystery, and yet blossoms at certain times 
to reveal glimpses of its obscure nature.  My contention is that life emerges within us 
and surfaces through our sentient schemes of understanding through movement’s 
coded experiences. I believe that, whilst engaged in movement’s transient 
encounters, our awareness of being is revealed and that we come to occupy a state 
of mind during which we can recall what befalls us in the use and experience of 
movement and language. 
 
I view PE’s movement disciplines as enterprises designed for its advocates to be 
able to place its movers by way of certain experiences that others may have 
encountered before them. New experiences lead them to want to speak about their 
PE encounters. This is what ML is about. It seeks to bridge what appears to be 
indistinguishable links. It muses on connections by bringing into our awareness our 
embodied sense of belongingness, only by interweaving explicit issues with implicit 
concerns. 
 
Movement encounters, be they for beginners or for accomplished movers, need to 
be articulated, and subsequently, subjected to critical decoding. And, importantly, as 
explained from Chapter 6 onwards, a movement literate becomes increasingly 
entwined in a perpetual process of contextualization and amplification, and much 
less with structural essentialisation. Eventually, a movement literate informed 
educator deals with suggestive concerns. ML seeks to avoid its learners falling into 
an unenlightened life by making room for movement enterprises to be interpreted in 
a new way, a way potent for the act of learning.  Its practices are intended to evoke 
all movers to encounter their own “embodied-belongingness” to life through the 
medium of words. That is, words in themselves can serve not to inhibit, not to 
condemn us into misunderstandings, nor “sentence” us to some form of personal 
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alienation, but to free us. ML seeks to link the expression of the event of moving with, 
and by means of the personal resources that allow its resident-author/commentator 
to witness and draw testimony from one’s own lived reservoir of experiences. ML 
evolves as a praxis to express one’s current mode of response to what seems to be 
happening to him or her during the act of moving. Beyond teaching’s management, 
the pedagogue’s primary role is to translate the learner’s “moving” descriptions into 
that of a communal theatre of concern.  
 
ML seeks to bring Whitehead’s (2002) Physical Literacy into its learners lives, to 
learn not just about movement but to learn something about life’s essential skills by 
clarifying a number of assumed theoretical premises that transforms PL’s 
philosophical ambition into a pragmatic practice. For example, ML embraces 
Mosston and Ashworth’s (1966-2002) systemic “spectrum” for teaching, but only 
because of the soundness of its managerial organisation and its overt aim to 
establish predetermined objectives. The spectrum is not without its critics (Sicilia-
Camacho and Brown 2008). For example, lessons are planned by the “teacher”, with 
the intent to improve the body’s serviceability. Plans are then implemented and 
subsequently critically embellished by rather “superfluous”, “prefabricated” and 
“inconsequential claims”, as was highlighted by John Andrews during the 1976 
Federation Internationale d’Education Physique conference in Taipei, Taiwan. I 
presented a paper there on PE lesson evaluations in England and Wales expressing 
my concern about lesson evaluation criteria. They were weighed too heavily towards 
observed causal accounts (with what went wrong during the lesson] and too little 
concerning issues which more directly affected its learners’ long term human 
condition and lived affairs in that PE lesson’s movement content.  
 
Iago   
 
I recalled the trauma both my student, whom I shall refer to as “Iago” and I, suffered 
for several weeks. I supervised his final school experience He claimed that his 
“pupils achieved social cohesion through games-playing” or, “pupils became 
responsible by observing another pupil’s throwing technique”. His lesson criticism 
offered untenable claims, far removed from that of a critique. Criticism implies 
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applying one’s judgment to the merit and faults of the lesson. Critique, very 
differently, is understood as fault finding and negative judgment but it also involves 
merit recognition. My concern about lesson evaluation was that whilst “Iago” was 
capable of implementing lesson methods, his strict adherence to methodical 
practices left him unprepared when it came to coping with the lesson’s unexpected 
turns of events and surprises.    
 
Unable to execute his lesson plan, “Iago’s” totalitarian presence quickly collapsed.  
“Iago’s” significance to the lesson, and its movers, was exaggerated by his sudden 
“absence”. The point I was stressing during the Taipei conference was that it is one 
thing to use another’s rationalised teaching methods, but it is quite another to be able 
to hold a sound philosophical/ methodological position when it comes to processing 
another’s conditions to learn about learning. Learning contours our life skills. For 
“Iago” there was a split between his lack of vocation and his professional aspirations. 
There was a gap between applying his “institutional methods” to what he perceived 
himself to be as a human being.  Harsh as it may seem, “Iago”, will serve throughout 
this thesis as a “modernist manifestation” of my concerns. It must be noted, however, 
that he was “trained” at St Paul’s College in the early 1970s, even before the 
institution adopted its module programme for teacher “preparation” studies, and prior 
to the infusion of postmodernist ideas into its career professional’s “temperament”.  
 
Modernism’s lost touch 
      
Chapters 2 and 3 illustrate how unprepared modern PE “teaching” took refuge under 
the cover of the unchallenged authority of the language of science. The essential 
effect of engaging scientific speech served to compose the profession’s self-
appointed, dualistic identity as both “Physical” [and] “Educational”. Under the 
bifurcation of two dimensions, the material and the abstract, PE wrestled with two 
seemingly incompatible realms of knowledge as if being “physical” was the most 
natural way to become educated.  Modern PE specialists used natural science based 
on a kind of empirical language as its prime mode of communication, but did not 
appreciate the crucial fact that “science” is neither more nor less than patient and 
detailed attention to the world. Natural science is integral to our understanding of it 
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[the world] and of our selves. But, the unavoidable consequence for PE’s client-
participants, however, was that they, as human beings, were not given such detailed 
attention. Movers were denied license to claim “ownership” for their own “subjective” 
experiences, [which bring “profit” with respect to the formation of character since 
experience is rendered in this thesis as the child of thought in action.] 
 
Parasite PE 
 
Whereas natural sciences tend to fragment into specialized, compartmentalized 
information and knowledge, human sciences present PE by way of gathering its 
“hidden knowledge”, by collating what other curriculum disciplines can say about 
movement. Modern PE’s field of “knowledge” was drawn from the external world. 
Very differently, contemporary PE begins with what the agent experiences, from an 
embodied sensuous posture, requiring its advocates to know how to elicit 
movement’s insider stories and hence to better know the story-teller. 
 
Story-telling is what PE needs. PE is designed to elicit different forms of life 
experiences through selecting certain traditional or cultic recreational activities that 
others have already valued and extolled. Currently, movement’s emissaries and 
participants need to retrace the fast disappearing pathways of its meaning by re-
creating those past ritualised links between the secular and the sacred  in which our 
ancestors learned how to communicate with each other and with their many deities. 
They coded meaning into movement. They preserved sentient beliefs by re-
presenting sacrosanct forms of earthly actions, transforming spiritual values into 
games in which the original, inexpressible values could be manifested through 
physical, symbolically rich gestures. They coded movement, they coded sounds. 
Today, we have to decode both. And this is why poststructuralism’s decoding of a 
language, as accounted for in Chapter 5, helps its emissaries and learners to keep in 
touch with their own moving accounts.  
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Polemic Paradigms  
 
From the 1970s onwards PE’s professional teaching “research” fell largely between 
two polemical paradigms; the “anatomized” and the “animated”; between what 
Nietzsche (1920) was to classify as Dionysian and Apollonian perspectives, between 
considering the functions and structure of the living, human organism, and, the 
material, causal effects [as well as the adverse affects] of experiencing human 
motion for its participants.  
 
The Apollonian perspective is primarily concerned with the spectator/observer view. 
It characterized PE as attending to its cognitive objectivity, as focused on the idea 
that knowledge does not reflect personal concerns, but is true for everybody. From 
this Platonic perspective, any criticism or rational logic engaged in by the observer is 
strictly guided by the systemic means of limiting one’s talk to a language which refers 
exclusively to the realm of experimental “proof” via scientific methods addressing 
material world.   
 
What Plato (in Adler, 1978) argued was that, as the body is resourced from the 
material world, the soul is from the world of ideas and is thus immortal. He believed 
the soul was temporarily united with the body and would only be separated at death, 
when it would return to the world of Forms. Since the soul does not exist in time and 
space, as the body does, it can , like deities, access universal truths. For Plato, as 
Davidson (1997) in his chapter “Gadamer and Plato’s Philebus” points out, ideas are 
the true reality [when real is the unnameable; that which resides beyond the reach of 
the signifier, the sound, image, written shape, object, practice, or gesture invested 
with meaning] , and are experienced only by the soul. The body is, for Plato (1961), 
empty in that it can not access the abstract reality of the world; it can only experience 
shadows. This view is determined by Plato's essentially rationalistic epistemology.  
 
The organization and presentation of “reality” within technocentric PE profoundly 
affected the worldview of all participants (Charles, 1979), claiming that, (a) the 
intrusion of technological consciousness tends to mould human reason almost 
exclusivey to the service of instrumental rationality, and (b) the “ends” or purposes of 
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instruments are not subjected to intensive rational analysis and scrutiny by those 
purporting to speak in the name of its incumbent’s interest. Rather, “ends” are either 
taken for granted, left from “private” determination, or articulated at a mundane level. 
Novice PE-career students were confonted with a hierarchy of single-disciplined 
academics invested with disseminating the dual power of knowledge and 
institutionally sanctioned authority, wherein lies the tension between economic 
imperative and democracy. An implication of this hierarchy of “power” characterised 
by mechanism’s components and reproduction was the separation of means and 
ends. Skills taught in PE lessons offered no personal relationship between a 
particular sequence of isolated actions and ends to which these actions were 
ultimately employed.  For example, combat skills were taught with only passing 
reference to a framework of values to govern their usage outside the sporting arena. 
There was little inclination to examine PE enterprises in relation to its generic 
purpose: that of empowering self-initiative and enhancing principled respect for one’s 
sovereign, communally influenced selfhood and well-being through movement.   
 
By distinct contrast, the Dionysian perspective is that which becomes the concern of 
the performer’s orientation, characterized by Western philosophy’s influential 
mediation of subjectivity [compared to Eastern confluent meditation]. That is, an 
experience which PE’s “teacher-technicians” would claim was simply an irrational 
analysis of the performance. Their mode of teaching was with modifying movement, 
through manipulating another’s body only. Teachers, in a sense, divorced 
themselves from communicating with the performer as a fellow human being. In all 
chapters, I show how “Iago”, nick-named “stiff” by his alumni, and not yet “blessed” 
with a convivial temperament to life, was amongst the first of student-teachers I 
supervised.  He conveyed teaching in the same way he perceived himself.  
 
The Apollonian/Platonic perspective stems from the notion that the spectator’s ability 
to remove him or herself from the actual experience in order to analyse the 
quantitative and ‘some’ of the qualitative aspects of the whole experience as it 
unfolds before him or her, represents what I characterise as Modern PE’s 
perspective on movement. They, like “Iago”, maintain an ‘outside-in’ view.  The 
Platonic orientation is possible only for the performer who is involved in what is 
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called the “lived-experience”. It is an ‘inside-out’ reflected/contemplated view, what is 
now called an “excentrated” view. Expressed differently, contemporary PE is more 
about liberating the private world of the mover. The act of moving and its hidden 
deeds need to be made known. 
 
I explain ML as evolving by way of committing oneself to a recurring style of self-
reflection. I conceive it in collective terms, as a bio-ethic pedagogy of life; a shift from 
an ego-pedagogy to that of an eco-pedagogy. Amongst its ambition is the pursuit of 
altruism, of moral qualities wherein the Dionysian perspective, “I”, is not left as an 
unquestioned presupposition. In short, ML’s practice becomes a praxis which 
includes asking oneself “What does it mean to be human?” This is an impossible 
task, you declare. But, it is not impossible to engage in this most ultimate of our 
sentient quests. Indeed, what may be revealed in its venture can serve to open out 
our shared understanding of language, of movement, of ourselves, our relationships 
with others, and with that of the “Big Other”: our cosmic existence.  
 
With intent, I adopt a Dionysian version of one’s subjective “I”, because in explaining 
its posture, its way of seeing and understanding the world, it can be compared and 
contrasted, with what I eventually wish to reveal in this thesis; these are the essential 
but covert or key ingredients which make pedagogy into a principled practice. It is a 
practice which is not directly referred to at the institutional level of PE career 
professional’s preparation, neither in the Western nor the Eastern world.  
 
Movement experiences, like language in its use of words and new genres, are 
invented as the use of old ones is discontinued. Movement means change. It is 
through movement and through language use that we come to identify ourselves at 
different moments in time, and in different spaces. Indeed, because we live through 
interminable states of instability, we learn to cope with different mood changes. We 
try to keep in touch with our different forms of life or our “Lebensform” which is a non-
technical term used by Wittgenstein (2001) to connote the sociological, historical, 
linguistic, physiological and behavioural determinants that comprise the matrix within 
which a given language both sustains and loses meaning. One’s culture, for 
example, is associated with shaping and flavouring our meanings. It can “cultivate” 
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one’s excellence of taste, or deny it. Culture can extend or constrain understanding 
of one’s own and another’s world through an integrated pattern of knowledge, belief, 
and actions, depending upon that culture’s capacity to perceive the world in terms of 
its symbolic thinking and its social learning, and, the set of shared attitudes, values, 
goals, and practices that characterizes its institutional organizations. 
 
Initially, this dissertation calls on PE professionals to undo modernism’s fixation with 
a linear hierarchy of learning, with conserving the professional’s authority and its 
canonizing of physical achievements. Its teaching was type-cast by adhering too 
strictly to criteria which were performable and observable, and traded this evidence 
to the public as a way of validating PE’s educational status. Pedagogy, however, is 
something one practices. It comprises acts that cannot be measured. They can only 
be realised on the basis of one’s learners’ responses to another’s initiative. Inherent 
in this ML effort is its aim to enhance both the movement potentials of individuals and 
their understanding of the personal, political, and social implications for moving. 
Contemporary movement proponents need to be able to “read” into movement, just 
as much as they need to “read” into language use. 
 
Educational “blood” infusion 
 
Modern PE’s convention to convey its curriculum content, its “regulated knowledge” 
and “skill-techniques”, employed only a science based, instrumental mode of 
communication. In so doing, however, it created a detachment from the pupils’ 
participant act to learn as a meaningful process. Pupils gained information about 
movement. But, they were not given an opportunity to talk of their moving 
encounters. Indeed, during the last 150 years, PE’s “educational” bloodline 
underwent a series of major changes (Crum, 1988). Nevertheless, the undue haste 
with which these changes occurred served only to by-pass the profession’s attention 
to its clients’ lived experiences during the act of movement. Teachers did; learners 
were done to. Even as late as the 1950s, the immanent focus of these hurried 
changes can be identified by the profession’s conventional use of such terms as 
“school drill”. This “drill” was designed to help in the “production and maintenance of 
health in body and mind” (1933:9, Board of Education)  
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Over a half a century later, as noted by Rink (1985; 1993) PE’s communication style 
continued to show evidence of teaching as a mode of instruction, pointing to the fact 
the relations between curriculum and instruction must be clearly defined and 
programmes must be oriented toward clearly stated goals. Lesson planning and end 
results called for compatible complements.  The standard of knowledge exercised 
here was not that of the learner’s but of the teacher’s. Even in the late 1970s PE’s 
“teaching” mode of language carried within it strong traces of words promoting a way 
to use “tools” for the analysis of instruction. Method “teaching” was the “in-word”.  
Many PE specialists supplemented their income by “coaching” sport-teams during 
their after-school evenings. There was no difference here. Both schooling and 
coaching was a matter of treating bodies alike.  
 
PE writers like Sparkes (1992), Fernandez-Balboa (1997), and Rink (1993) however, 
were predicting PE’s long term “orientation” as “having to come to rely” more upon 
drawing responses from its students. Rink encourages teachers to “use student’s 
words and expressions”, where expressions are to be thought of as an “attire” of 
thought, so that the student will expand on the “meaning” of his or her movement 
response. She encourages the “use of silence” to allow the student time to collect his 
or her “thoughts”.  Rink calls on the teacher to ask the student to “describe in detail 
what he or she was “thinking”, “feeling” or doing in the “event”. And, most 
importantly, she asks students, for their PE meaning (1985:316), by: 
 
          …bringing student responses back to what the [spoken about] ideas mean to the student. 
                                                                                                              [my emphasis] 
 
 
Promoting PE’s “value” in terms of its meaning, she calls for its professionals to 
“bring” the student responses “back” to what their own movement encounters may 
reveal to themselves. PE was beginning to return to its roots, to its “fleshy” sense of 
being. That is, back to the world of nature and the idea that Merleau-Ponty (1965) 
turned towards, that of conceiving the body as a “subjective being”, one which 
constructs representations of itself. In a way Merleau-Ponty’s notion of an embodied, 
subjective-being was taken up by Ricoeur’s (1981; 1992) aspiration to broaden the 
discourse of human science’s idea of rationality to include the bonding of bodies and 
persons. When it comes to interpreting language, amongst Ricoeur’s altruistic 
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ambitions was that its correspondents should be able to manifest care for 
participants by more fully acknowledging and appreciating each utterance, 
respecting each person as a “basic” or “particular being” in their own right. Ricoeur, 
through the protocol of employing appropriate words [observational statements] and 
judging when to appropriate silence, encourages us to qualify our sayings; to 
philosophize through our use of language [and our bodies] by means of critical 
hermeneutic interpretive clarification; to posit the “self” in order to be better 
positioned treat others empathetically. In short, Ricoeur encourages us to keep 
respect and nurture others’ self-respect, as we would wish them to treat us, to say 
something not casually but with care and sensitivity. 
 
Evolving thresholds of discovery 
 
This thesis sets out a simple map of some key ideological markers to enable the 
reader to see the profession, not in a vacuum, but as a politically voiced movement 
of diverse communities. It acts as a forum for opening “discussion” about our similar 
or different corporeal resources, embracing our call for equality and personal 
freedom to present movement under the auspice of its generic meaning. Education 
in PE is a designated process. It first teaches to train the body. Differently, 
pedagogy, the art of teaching, is engaged in for the sake of being placed in touch 
with various schemes of human understanding. A pedagogue enables one’s 
correspondents to be educated to enable one’s listeners to think of themselves, to 
shape their own personal images in their own manner, style, and become immersed  
in unpacking the meaning of their own questions. 
 
One of ML’s objectives is to unearth PE’s inherent but lost and now hidden meaning 
of which I shall exploit by juxtapositioning three differently valued themes in this 
thesis. These are (i) PE’s  established epistemology, a technical analysis of 
movement which offers a broad “anatomy” of its material events; (ii) the more recent 
value of poststructurism’s contemporary use of language in ML, which (iii) enables 
an ontological focus, or schemes designed to understand human-agency. ML 
endeavours to use language to link aspects of conscious, self-awareness to that of 
one’s unaware or unconscious sense of “otherness”.  ML, when taught and well 
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learned, searches for the “stranger within me” and my learners whom I seek to meet 
in myself and in others and to come to know anew, through all the ageing seasons of 
my life. 
 
PE teaching spectrum      
 
I acknowledge, rehabilitate and extend Mosston and Ashworth's (1966-2002) five 
editions of “Teaching Physical Education”. This series focused on shifts of teaching 
paradigms. It served as an incentive to categorize teaching styles by constructing a 
coherent linear, developmental progress of learning about movement, though not 
about the acts of learning. These re-modified teaching “spectra” were oriented 
towards establishing the ground rules for managing teaching. Differently, I bring the 
mover’s personalized experiences into the public arena of language. I move beyond 
their systemic spectrum of teaching framework. ML explains why individuals and 
groups should to talk about themselves as if they were movement’s commentators 
and as mature “movers” capable of engaging in andragogical dialogue (Chapters 7 
and 8). This involves expressing their internal motivation, and which in turn, provides 
testimony to their self-actualization.     
 
Rightfully acclaimed during its inception, Mosston and Ashworth’s initiation into PE’s 
teaching spectrum left the more intricate process of “teaching-to-learn” independently 
to that of each professional’s idiosyncratic nature. Each movement advocate was left 
to resolve “contradictions” in their own minds; to excavate and to deal with their own 
subjectivity. Their philosophical grounding of PE’s practices could not bridge the two 
“eras” between modernism’s transmission of knowledge and post-structuralism’s art 
of teaching to learn, which this dissertation addresses. The logic of their spectra 
could not reach the level of teaching as pedagogy in which pedagogy’s traditional, 
but unspoken guiding principles are presented in the last three chapters as the 
vitalizing architects of learning. Here I am referring to such foundational features of 
education as “techne” and “phronesis”. 
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Axial changes 
 
My thesis’ metanarrative or conceptual axle revolves around the evolution of 
postmodernism’s radical rethinking of language and its application to understanding 
PE.  Postmodernism, in particular, its poststructural linguistic analysis brought with it 
both a raft of advantages and disadvantages into reconvening different exercises of 
education-learning. Postmodern theorists embraced two main ideas: that of 
subjectivity [the personal is political] and that of knowledge as power (Foucault, 
1980). ML takes account of the use of tropes which are special for human 
movement’s discursive arena, where civic competence and the admission of different 
moral affirmations are brought to bear upon one’s process of learning. What 
Postmodernism informs PE is that language features concerned with personal 
identities, meanings, and relations are not to be seen as fixed and constant, but 
rather, as Lyotard (1979 p. xxiv) sums up:      
                                
          …finite, locally determined language games, each with specific pragmatic criteria of 
            appropriateness or valence. 
 
Can Movement Literacy help “Iago” to appreciate the complexity of both teaching 
and learning to educate rather than manipulate others?  ML sets the ultimate tone of 
PE’s professional institutional programmes as a sustained effort to infuse the 
meaning of movement by identifying its learning virtues. It identifies how teaching 
becomes a pedagogy, largely by contrasting techne with phronesis when the latter’s 
experience enables one to proceed from the impediment of using a fixed perception 
of teaching to begin to practice pedagogy’s hidden ethics designed to manifest 
movement’s human “contract”.  PE’s pedagogy is a fascinating way in which in the 
drama that is movement, our thoughts and feelings of ourselves and of others are 
first objectified, and then, partially returned to us afresh via language’s slippery 
nature.   
 
Others’ responses and protocol 
 
Others’ responses to my questions, or rather, to my questions to their questions, as 
is the way of both phenomenology and hermeneutics, form the general mode of 
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enquiry orientating this PE dissertation centered on the art of transposing abstract 
and tangential information into knowledge about life skills.  ML involves creating a 
pedagogic act which morally entices the client-learner to be introduced into the 
largely immanent traditions [protocol] of creating the most opportune conditions to 
help animate and cultivate our own knowledge as clinical PE specialists, and as 
caring persons.  
Protocol refers to the formal etiquette and convention of procedure, to the courtesies, 
or “good form” that lies within the heart of many human deeds, especially that of 
pedagogy. The notion of “protocol” has not yet been mentioned in this opening 
chapter. It is, however, with opening pedagogy’s protocol, its accepted but 
unquestioned practices, to which I orientate the reader’s attention. I am referring to 
the unwritten, but commonly understood code of human behaviour guiding a kind of 
treaty-like mutual agreement to a silent negotiation that emerges between oral 
correspondents, as if they were adhering to a Rousseau-like (1973) “social contract”, 
or “Principles of Political Right”: not one person is divinely empowered to legislate, or 
as Rousseau asserts, only the people, in the form of a sovereign, have that all 
powerful “right”.  
Importantly, the teaching “act” involves embracing such a code of behaviour. Indeed, 
it was towards this code that Mosston and Ashworth’s “Spectrum of Teaching” was 
eventually striving but never arrived at. The “Spectrum” could not incorporate its 
learners’ undisciplined knowledge into the classroom’s unpredictable matrix where 
“questioning questions” about PE’s meaning was left untouched. For whose sake, 
and the meaning(s) of movement were destined to remain out of reach of the 
Spectrum’s boundaries. My thesis intends to extend their “Spectrum” by closely 
examining education’s most begging of burdens: that of keeping open what passes 
between the experienced and the experiencing, the notion of how meanings control 
us, and how transient meanings inculcate us into following the persuasive discipline 
inscribed in them, often without our knowing.  
The fascinating feature here is that movement has always served to evoke 
something hitherto unknown from the realm of my inner-self. I have come to know 
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me, eventually, through my response to movement, and only much later in my career 
have I sought out what others have to say about and of movement.  
 
Fitting conditions and pedagogical fitness  
 
From the mid 1950s to 1970s, PE’s institutional preparation courses stalled at the 
point where its Ministerial approved content left its trainees stranded (Andrews, 
1976). Signs of good teaching, however, were much in evidence by PE student 
teachers who displayed sound, principled, and consistent testimony to their 
professional classroom composure. Flexibly exercising their lesson planning, they 
readily coped with unexpected “classroom incidents”. They had reached a 
professionally versatile stage when they could gather evidence and “feel” that a 
mover was “disturbed” whilst moving, or take note of a learner’s sense of unease 
with a certain situation. Promising movement advocates were spotted early by their 
“supervisors”. Their formal lesson planning was adjusted, and blended by their very 
presence, by their eagerness to give of “themselves”, to open relationships with their 
learners, in a way that “Iago’s” dispositional nature could not.   
 
This is what I portray through ML. It calls for an embodied skill, an improvisation of 
tact, when lives, tacitly, can be touched. This is when pedagogy becomes animated 
and begins to connect education practices with life, and eventually evolves into 
andragogy (Knowles, 2005). Briefly, andragogy is when one can “hear”, “feel”, and 
“respect” the essence or the full presence of another. Andragogy is when the most 
profound form of  learning occurs when its initiator is able to connect with its 
receptor, when, as Ricoeur (1992) would say , a connection is made with the 
“otherness”, the “unveiled self” of its listener, who in turn, notices the “otherness” of 
its speaker. ML comes to rely upon shaping the teachers disposition towards 
another’s education and self image. It is about nurturing compassion, benevolence, 
and even meekness. It counters arrogance and animosity. The dissertation’s closing 
phase shows the act of learning is beautiful and noble because it is a uniquely 
human enterprise. 
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In-habiting movement 
 
ML acts as a sign-post. It is orientated to fascinate all PE’s listeners to think more 
thoroughly about what the meaning of words [and their corruption] may, indeed, 
reveal in one’s self. It is about what residing in and doing movement can tell us; 
indirectly. Movement, I believe, holds the capacity to let us know something about 
ourselves and others. The moving agent is signalled into an awareness of an 
impressive phenomenon which is both obscure but also lasting in its impact. The 
paradox I shall look into (Chapter 2) is that of the realm of play. I shall reverse its 
treatment from something that is ordinary and mundane into something quite the 
opposite, into something that is serious and extraordinary. The primacy of playful 
experience in brought into perspective when I stress on its capacity to communicate 
similar, but not the same meaning between the knower mover, the PE advocate, and 
the naïve-mover, between the experienced and the inexperienced learner. My 
premise is that once correspondents can establish a working relationship, exchange 
pedagogic devices such as analogies and tropes, and especially employ metaphors 
between each other, then learning can occur. Yet, it is a learning that depends on 
unearthing PE’s traditional guiding pathways. Pathways offer signs helping us to 
follow how our predecessors have learned what it is like to be human and share their 
knowledge of the world. I promote ML partly as a way of making public the silent 
deed that can be attained through what is referred to as a “social contract”, which 
then is extended from a cultural relationship into a “human” contract: a mute, 
consensually shared form of understanding that which cannot be said. 
 
For example, what I gained from movement is what I want to share with others.  My 
wanting to be a PE teacher stemmed from my Redcoat days at Butlin’s Holiday 
Camp. I wanted others to share the very thrills that I encountered diving from rocky 
headlands into the swirling sea, running over the light and heavy texture of sand-
dunes, chasing the wind and battling against it.  I wanted to see the world, a world 
seen through other eyes, a mutual world, where each of us can reach out to care 
more for others. I am talking about what political philosophers have long referred to 
as the “social contract”:  the theory that individuals, by nature free and equal, agree 
to renounce part of their natural liberty by entering into civil society and constituting a 
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political authority to which they subject themselves for the sake of the advantages 
provided by civil society. Middle East’s most recent “Arab Spring” is the most telling 
of examples in how people value the ideal of a “social contract.”  The right to rule and 
the obligation to obey derive from the agreement; such an agreement is called a 
“social contract”, and establishing something like this “contract” becomes the 
dissertation’s foundational bed-rock. It anchors the processing conditions required for 
learning-to-learn to begin.  
 
Summary 
 
The thesis’s opening three chapters explain that one’s performance descriptions take 
the form of generalizations. In contrast, its remaining chapters point out the way in 
which one’s personal expressions fasten onto the individual and the particular when 
schooling’s movement technique is talked about less in quantitative data and more in 
imaginative, qualitative terms. In Chapters 2 and 3, I discuss how, by employing 
different paradigm lenses, one is lead to perceive different lesson priorities. For 
example, sometimes objective issues shape lesson planning. Other times, subjective 
concerns dominate teaching approaches. But there is no fixed hierarchy to determine 
how one exercises a lesson.  
 
Both chapters illustrate how unprepared modern PE “teaching” took refuge under the 
cover of the unchallenged authority of the language of science impotent to reveal 
what learning was like. The essential effect of engaging scientific speech served to 
compose the profession’s self-appointed, dualistic identity as both “Physical” and 
“Educational”. Under the bifurcation of two dimensions, the material and the abstract, 
PE wrestled with two seemingly incompatible realms of knowledge as if being 
“physical” was the most natural way to become educated.  
 
Modern PE specialists used natural science based on a kind of empirical language 
as its prime mode of communication, but did not appreciate the crucial fact that 
“science” is neither more nor less than patient and detailed attention to the world. 
Natural science is integral to our understanding of it [the world] and of our selves. 
But, the unavoidable consequence for PE’s client-participants, however, was that 
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they, as human beings, were not given such detailed attention. Movers were denied 
license to claim “ownership” for their own “subjective” experiences, [which bring 
“profit” with respect to the formation of character since experience is rendered in this 
thesis as the child of thought in action.] 
 
From Chapter 4 onwards, I seek to raise the reader’s awareness to the innovative 
possibilities of postmodernism’s deconstruction of the enigma and fallibility that I 
show language-experience to be. Also, I expose the beguiling ambiguity of 
movement’s encounters. I synergize movement with speech-acts. I hinge their co-
existent contribution to consensually understand our human affairs.  
 
In Chapters 5-7, however, I argue that, because of poststructuralism’s linguistic 
radicalising insight, contemporary PE’s communication can be exercised in such a 
way that its speaker can seek out certain moments when loss of self awareness may 
be encountered.  
 
Movement experiences are unaccountable for in terms of the austere nature of 
individual subjectivity, and which modern PE, as diagnosed in Chapter 5 through 
examining its “structuralist-bound” interpretation of language use, tended to 
undercut. My response to this problem is to turn to the perceptive reflection that 
arose from the poststructural linguistic movement which appeals strongly to the 
notion of reflection of the dialectic. I see speech and movement as being rooted in 
and continuous with a public language of total bodily gesture.  
 
Chapter 5 explains modern PE’s structural linguistics. It was a mode of 
communication which constrained treatment of the body by making it possible to 
nurture the belief that people could stand outside of the “natural” pragmatic realm of 
knowledge. Structuralism served to lock in one’s knowledge as contained and 
portrayed through a single frame of reference, but, in so doing it also locked out how 
others viewed the world.  I hold modern PE’s directive language to be the root cause 
for its communication practices becoming divorced from its mover’s subjective 
concerns. Modern PE was unable to convey movement’s silent meaning. Its 
instrumentalist’s isolating communicative practice was impotent to the process of 
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learning because it could neither address embodied resource of self-identity nor 
entertain other’s responses.      
                                                               
In Chapter 6, I explain how I find myself re-entering a “hermeneutic circle” of 
witnessing, responding to, reframing, and re-wording my world of adventure. My 
lifespan has now reached its penalty-shoot time and edges ever closer to hearing 
that final whistle blast. But, before this whistle blows, I want to share with others how 
I have come to discern subtle configurations of meanings for simple expressions that 
will do justice to the integrity, complexity, and essential being of life. 
 
In Chapter 7, I turn to Ricoeur’s (1992) thoughts about language, narrative and 
discourse. Ricoeur develops a hermeneutics of the self that charts both its 
epistemological path and ontological status. Ricoeur clarifies significant differences 
between applying cognitive description of the self and that of engaging in expressive 
accounts which link us to what Sheehan (1978) refers to as our “floating–self”.   
 
ML invites its participants to reconsider fundamental issues about movement and 
language usage and their potential consequences for the process of learning and 
understanding the human condition.  These four knowledge forms are presented as 
co-existent, each field contributing a different lens to enhance our understanding of 
human affairs. Furthermore, I join Western influential goals with Eastern confluencial 
styles of contemplation to reveal that pedagogy is an ethical practice for educating 
self-responsibility to value human flourishing. Pedagogy nurses our way into learning 
and is an educational enterprise, standing in stark contrast to a 10 year old pupil’s 
comment to me after my first lesson observation. Casually, he remarked that he felt 
he had no part to play in PE because “Nobody said nuffink about de learnin bit.”  
 
The study’s major plot is to convey ML as a dedicated way to alleviate as many 
impediments to learning as possible, whilst the sub-plot is to introduce professionals 
to PE’s communication protocol. 
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Chapter Two      A Historical Overview of PE         
Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I note how PE’s post-war excitement in the 1950s and 1960s, its 
appeal to novel teaching methods was productive in terms of creating new styles of 
classroom practices, based on educational theories, but problems did arise when 
they were exposed to the delightfully unpredictable cauldron that inspires learning 
between the teacher, the experienced “knower” and the learners, the innocent and 
inquisitive searchers for knowledge. I issue a recall for the vitalizing experience of 
play in our PE learning encounters, and draw on the thoughts of both Barthes (2007) 
and Ricoeur (1992), as well as Csordas (1999) and Abram (1996), whose unselfish 
thought about human movement, language, and one’s embodied perception 
embraces something more than a human world.  
 
This chapter sends out a crucial message to the movement profession to be wary of 
first impressions of others and to be patient and serene to establish a two-way, 
communicatively-clear, relationship between “knower” and “learner”. Play, because 
of the triviality of its nature which serves to hide the depth of its seriousness, is to be 
conceived not simply as a physical activity but also as holding the capacity to 
assimilate one’s attitude in its flights from concrete ideas, to bring into synergy the 
inner experience of the body, and the fact of the body as a “thing”. This chapter 
anticipates somatic [of the body] understanding as preceding all others, and persists 
while our symbolic forms of understanding develop (Abram, 1996). Somatic 
understanding shapes those symbolic forms of understanding in profound and subtle 
ways (Csordas 1994; 1999). 
 
A performer turned commentator 
 
PE’s communication is identified as a pointer, a directive in which its main arterial 
contour lines of thought sometimes run parallel, or cross over, and sometimes seem 
to be held at a distance apart. It is a communication between insights into (i) the 
philosophy of education [knowledge and its learning], (ii) language [constructing 
different versions of human purposes] and, (iii) the nature of our human condition, 
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the sentient agent who resides in movement. Rather than keeping modern PE’s 
different discourses and paradigm-inspired learning apart, ML begins to reconvene 
different discourses in a way that all its speakers can communicate with the lost 
voices of the past and the silenced and disenfranchised in modern PE.  
 
Broadly speaking, a paradigm is a philosophical or theoretical framework of a 
worldview, and many paradigms form the core of a belief system. Scientific inquiry 
dominated the 20th century PE (Martens, 1987), hence, the most striking elements of 
this positivitic world view imposed the belief that reality is best understood through 
the use of systematic, experimental methodologies (Dewar and Horn 1992; Sparkes 
1992). Its key doctrine was objectivity based on the concept that it is possibe to gain 
knowledge about the world by maintaining a detached, emotion and value-free 
posture regarding the study of PE as a scholarly discipline.  The use of paradigms 
established a strong foothold in movement studies (Harris, 1983). However, it led the 
profession to hold a naïve belief that the epistemological and methodologies of 
natural science could be: 
 
…transported unproblematiclly into social and cultural settings.                                                                           
[McKay,Gore and Kirk,1990:55]   
 
PE’s orthodox and almost exclusive reliance on quantitative paradigm were both 
limited and limiting in the sense that they were incapable of explaining human 
movement “behaviour” in relation to personal, social, cultural and contextual forces. 
Harnessing critical reflection, they rendered impotent the experiential process of 
learning. With the advent of qualitative paradigms in the 1980s and 1990s (Fraleigh 
1990; Kirk 1993; Vanderwerken and Wertz 1985), PE’s professional practices were 
exposed to interpretive paradigms as an addition to merely describing events/ 
happenings by analysing critical classroom interactions (Bain 1990; Krane 1994).  
Sport researchers like Placek and Locke (1986), Hoberman (1988;1992), and 
Osterhoudt (1991) were promoting critical and transformative theoretical 
perspectives into studying movement and began to direct their primary attention 
towards “understanding” the social philosophical nature of power relations that exist 
within a community setting. Such critical and transformative research aspired to 
reach beyond described sporting events and began to examine the use of expressive 
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knowledge [a strong, sympathetic and eloquent language inviting further thought] as 
a means to engage, induce and enhance the quality of movement experiences for its 
movers. 
 
The need for a close consideration of different contextual influences to help the 
profession to better understand human movement-behaviour, was interestingly 
reflected in Gergen’s (1987: 63) observation that: 
 
          …just as words cannot be understood out of a linguisitic context, the understanding of 
individuals requires comprehension of social context. 
 
 
Understanding the interactive nature of our culture related movement is one thing. 
This dissertation centres more on delving beyond the nature of our socially 
influenced movement disciplines. It considers what happens to the sentient being 
when one’s conscious awareness is seemingly immersed entirely in the act of 
moving. On the one hand, we can become beguiled and absorbed into, and within, 
the world of movement. On the other hand, the austere, embodied and interactional 
experience in one’s single-seated and single spectator theatre of movement needs to 
be outwardly delivered [excentrated] and made public, in terms of personal 
experience and one’s interaction with the world of language; otherwise, PE 
encounters are condemned to remain “meaning-less”.  
 
PE’s advocates must hear, critically examine, and transform the learner’s physical 
and spoken gestures, as they co-exist, co-subscribe, and bear witness to the 
speakers dispositional character. Only in this way, by examining the learner’s 
expressed account of movement in the discipline of a dialogic discourse can the 
ambition of PL then be clarifed as a benign way to open-out each other’s private 
“ghetto” of existence. A “ghetto” of which “Iago” was oblivious. To learn from PE, its 
participants cannot remain mute performers. Rather, they need to become 
movement’s narrators.   
 
The critical issue I highlight here is that the singular resourced self-experience of 
movement, in itself, does not guarantee that movement interpreters can then 
enhance the quality of movement experiences for its learners. PE’s advocates must 
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be able to hear, critically examine, and transform the learner’s gestured and spoken-
through attitudes and practices, which may serve to re-orient and improve PE 
enterprises towards a more democratic and inclusive mode of learning. Learning is a 
complex process involving many overt and covert relational interchanges between 
one human and another, between a human and an inanimate object, and between 
different forms of knowledge.   One key objective in this thesis is to focus in on the 
bare essential ingredients that inexperienced PE student teachers need to be made 
aware of, not as a “quick-fit” tool-kit, but rather as necessary “fall-back” principles 
upon which one can turn to in order to resource one’s thoughts, ideas, and direct 
one’s actions in unpredictable situations; a kind of Automobile Association rescue 
reliance for the bewildered education apprentice.  
 
Clearly, one’s mode of communication skills will be a vitalizing feature for beginner 
movement interpreters, who need to be precise in their “instructions”, and vesatile, 
compassionate, and altruistic when it comes to treating their movers’ personal 
concerns. In Modern PE (post war- pre 1970s) its proponents, myself included, 
tended to  think of one’s class as an “audience”. I followed “Ministerial” guidelines 
and serviced my “institutionalised” thinking to orient my planning and my lesson 
conduct. Differently, today the audience, the learners are given their say in the way 
they, the clients of movement, feel they can be best “treated”.  
 
Only in this way, I argue, and only by examining the learner’s expressed account of 
movement in the discipline of a dialogic discourse can PL be volitionally nurtured for 
its learner as a commitment to a daily “movement” routine. In an important way, I 
seek to reorganize the established power relations between PE’s established 
quantitive parent disciplines, and its more recent infusion of qualitiative “disciplines”, 
in order to widen PE’s teaching “spectrum” to embrace pedagogy and, eventually 
andragogy, which I perceive as a benign way to open-out each other’s private 
“ghetto” of existence. By “ghetto”, I mean that when we do play, we tend to drop our 
guard; we become ourselves as unrestrained and unresticted persons. Our “public” 
self is given free access to meet our “private” inner being. This is a priviledge, as I 
shall explain in the thesis’s closing chapters, when our public self perception may, or 
may not come into harmony with our own sense of “comfort”, our relaxed state of 
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being. And, it is with helping movement learners to better cope with this perplexing 
experience that one encounters in PE enterprises, between the “illusion” of technique 
learning and what they “think” they learn from experience.  
 
Play is a privileged ghetto 
 
The point of anything, so Barthes (2007) claims, is to open one’s “privileged” ghetto 
of knowledge by grappling with its multi-rooted meaning. For example, in a 
complicated way, but much simplified in this dissertation, Barthes believes that, 
linguistically, the author is never more than the instance of writing. In effect, as we 
speak, as we feel at a certain moment in time, is how we perceive or make of 
ourselves, we adopt a certain preferred image in which we wish others to perceive 
us. 
 
Movement Literacy involves creating a connecting series of crossovers, switchbacks 
and interchanges as a way to help PE’s future profession to maintain a middle line, 
half way between science and nature. It sustains a link between nature and our 
human affairs, connecting what we say with what we do. It aspires to harmonise 
others’ gestures and deeds with those of our own. It reaches beyond Mosston’s first 
“teaching spectrum”, by investing a primacy in the experience of play and the 
experience of language use.  
 
The necessary retrieval of play 
 
The act of playing has suffered serious atrophy during the past few decades (Deem 
1986; Grondin 2001; Feezell 2004; Torres 2003). It is a non-instrumental form of 
activity. Play can be perceived to be a lighthearted way to express emotions. It also 
holds a serious side. This is because the nature of one’s play symbolises one’s 
striving, one’s restless dissatisfactions with one’s conditions, one’s strenuous and 
uncertain efforts to attain the best one can. Riven by one’s contradictions, by desire 
and its frustrations, one struggles to articulate one’s self in words, in the language of 
gesture, or both. In other words, play can be interpreted as an act with rich potential 
for surfacing evidence illuminating the ontological nature of the being of its agency.    
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In Chapter 6, I clarify distinctions between conscious and unconscious issues. For 
instance, some aspects of play may have “fixed rules”, and are engaged in, in an 
“orderly manner”. But then, how does Caillois (1958:123) explain that play “proceeds 
within its own proper boundaries?”  Play itself, seems to be portrayed as having “no” 
boundaries, and yet is described as proceeding within its “own” boundaries. Caillois 
never tries to wedge open his ideas about play, and very little in terms of its potential 
consequences for the player. In his examination of play, Caillios (1958:124) is 
tentative about its nature and purpose. Huizinga (1944: ii) is similarly cautious, 
claiming that play is essentially a:  
 
  …separate occupation, carefully isolated from the rest of existence and generally occurring 
within precise limitations of time and space…In any event, the domain of play is a universe 
apart. Closed and protected, a pure space.                                                         [my emphasis] 
 
 
Play; a “universe apart?”, “closed and protected?”, a “pure space?”. As Caillois would 
have it, I shall portray play in a very contrary way. That is, as “universal”, as “open 
and unprotected”, and, not as “pure physical space”, but rather, in terms of a certain 
powerful sense of presence, usually encountered in the space of “silence”. For 
Caillois, play is encountered in “boundaries”, but then that was his intent. He wanted 
to dissect life into convenient “categories. He “framed”, or attempted to set definable 
edges to play. Differently, play as I conceive it, is something that befalls us at any 
time and as a completely unrestrained, or incredibly fluent and porous “happening”.  
 
With Caillois (1944), and Huizinga (1980), we can agree that fixed rules belong to 
games. However, when it comes to viewing play, Huizinga’s earlier text “The Waning 
of the Middle Ages” considers play located as a kind of nursery preparation for the 
more demanding fixtures that apply to the playing of a game. Caillois tries to set 
aside his understanding of play. He identifies play as a separate “occupation”. Yes, 
play occupies us in a certain way. But it is an occupation that he clearly sets aside in 
contrast to occupational work. It is an occupation which, according to Huizinga, is 
carefully “isolated” from the rest of existence, “closed” and “protected”, indeed, even 
conceived as “a pure space”.  
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The isolation Huizinga may have had in mind was due to his understanding that play 
occupies us in the sense that it engages our ideas, our thoughts and our imagination; 
where small things attract us because through imagination, large things can 
materialize in them, as Bachelard (1964; 1969) leads us to believe. But, at the same 
time, Caillois’ “isolation” or separation of play from that of our day-to-day 
experiences, reflected a Cartesian view of an “ego-centered” individual mover, and, 
thus, referred to a person who held a unitary notion of one’s “logical-self”. A version 
of the self, that is, conceived as unattached, or displaced from the body, a self that 
modern PE teachers also came to view as a unitary entity, [or, as expressed in more 
contemporary terms, an “I” with no reference to an “other”]. For both Caillois and 
Huizinga there existed only one, solitary version of the moving self.  
 
However, there is little doubt that following play, one may encounter a profound 
sense of well-being. But then, what of Caillois’ idea about play in terms of its 
separation of time and space? Although we can conceptualise a universe in which 
the utilitarian and nonutilitarian are totally compartmentalised, in which work and play 
are distinct realms which never interpenetrate, nevertheless, we often experience 
work and play as if we were constantly on the transient borders of each. We play 
during work, no doubt. But we continue to question if we “work” during play.  
 
When involved in the act of playing, in its undertaking, what seems to be removed, or 
temporarily put aside, is our own conscious awareness of what we are doing. Why 
we play does not occur to us, when we are playing. But, more importantly, what can 
the potential consequences of “playing” hold out for its resident-dwellers?  Play, I 
argue, reminds its players that, as human beings, they are more than rational 
thinkers.  Play is testimony to the fact that human beings are meaning-seeking 
creatures. It keeps the world fresh and interesting and helps keep its players unique 
and unpredictable. Play produces “givers” and allows its players to reap the many 
benefits of uncalculated, spontaneous commitment. It preserves human 
capriciousness and helps individuals to appreciate their unique possibilities. Most 
importantly, play allows meaning to matter, without asking about its value. We 
experience values and celebrate them simply because they speak to us.  And it is 
with this silent feature of play, with the suspension of one’s presumed or prejudiced 
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and displayed attitude and the adoption of a beginner-like open, unbiased, and 
playfully receptive mind that I wish to pursue in the closing chapters. This is because 
play, in its primordial unfettered sense, is a medial enterprise between a presence 
and an absence which offers a clue to ontological explanation, the “event” of being 
that occurs in “happenings/incidents”, because it blurs the distinction between life 
and no-life. 
 
Movement into language 
 
Modern PE proponents tended not to talk a language of “relationship”. They did talk 
of matters like bending words into things to serve their own use, as in the directing 
and manipulation of another’s body, or its parts. Rarely, however, did they talk of a 
language in terms of their own relationship with movement, like the relationship we 
have with the world. We need to listen to ideas emerging from language’s usage, 
rather than speak through it, which, in effect, is to impose ideas on language. In the 
early 1970s PE institutions had not yet fully embraced philosophy’s examination 
about the notions of reflection and logic. Then, it was a profession that was 
unencumbered from the realm of lingering doubts. It had not yet responded to 
Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) analytical philosophy of perception. Merleau-Ponty, whose 
work is featured in Chapter 4 onwards, wanted to illuminate descriptions of our 
relationship with our own bodies in perception and action. He attempted to re-attach 
the felt concerns of the person’s subjective being to the world of nature and to our 
human affairs. He wanted to redeem the perceived endorsement of movement for 
and with others, to embrace our embodied being not as an austere and isolated 
phenomenon, but as a talked about account.  This is part of what ML seeks to 
achieve. PE is about doing movement, and yet, rarely is PE discussed as a curricular 
subject’s contribution to education.  
 
So, what is PE? 
 
One can describe PE pedagogy. Its physical health function is unquestioned. 
Nevertheless, all its constituents must re-explore what lies behind it, within it, and 
what stays with us having gone through its enactment and its consequences. We can 
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do so by using words to describe what it may be like for both its comparing 
correspondents when action and words are interchanged during a conversation. But 
what guarantee is there that one’s meaning is what the other also takes it to be?  
This dissertation is not about me speaking of my own voice alone, but of my many 
voices blending in with those of more authoritative standing than mine. I wish to help 
students like “Iago” to be able to become sensitive to, aware of, and be in touch with 
“how”, “when”, and “why” a class can co-exist as human beings under the convivial 
guidance of one’s personal and professional way of being, of acting, and of 
speaking. I deconstruct “Iago’s” rigid disposition to unravel the hidden paradox that 
creates a fault-line, a conceptual “gap” between PE’s proponents interpreting their 
curriculum-subject not in the mundane image of play, but rather, in its seriously 
exotic playfulness of words. 
 
For example, whilst addressing movers as an audience in a formal “teaching-mode”, 
the context calls for its speaker to decide which style of communication best fits the 
situation. Addressing the entire class invites a “blanket-approach” because the 
teacher’s intent is to issue information which is applicable to them all. Alternatively, 
the professionals need to be aware of when to change one’s language style and 
when to focus more on conversing with an informal gathering that constitutes a group 
within the class. One’s accumulated experience and one’s nous “knows” when to 
change the mode and the mood of the language in order to treat person-to-person 
relationships. Commandeering language use is more often applied to the lower 
schooling PE pupils. It “hails” the class together as a unit. For the more 
accomplished and older aged “performers”, however, a quieter, more intimate and 
changed language style is necessary to invite, or signal some reciprocal response 
from others in a less formal, more cordial and collegial conversational engagement. 
Such a nous “Iago” lacked either because of his dispositional nature, or because he 
had not yet been made aware of the professional teaching skills that lie beyond his 
landscape of understanding. Nor did I understand enough to help him. 
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In-house adjustments 
 
How best one can create a space both during and out of lesson time for 
conversations to generate mutual interchanges of values, beliefs, and ideas about 
life, comes with experience, sometimes extensive experience (Andrews, 1976). An 
analogy can be drawn here between promoting modern PE and that of advancing the 
more nuanced understanding of human movement that is the contemporary PE of 
this century. I refer to the internet revolution. Its digital yet global form of e-
communication, has, with the recent Arab Spring (Times: April 201I) demonstrated 
the profound effect of public speech, and its denial, in some countries. Modern PE 
tended to deny its lower schooling pupils discussion about movement, until, that is, 
the arrival of Mosston and Ashworth’s series of teaching “spectrum”. However, with 
the advent of pupil to pupil discussion, comparing each other’s efficient or indifferent 
technique, what remained unaddressed was the actual personal meaning of 
movement and its relation to or alienation from its performing clients. PE’s 
experiences were not made understandable. 
 
On a much smaller scale, but serving this very purpose, ML entertains such a 
revolution, in the sense that it seeks to encourage a robust level of freedom of 
speech amongst its participants, and those who interpret movement as an overture 
to life and its living.  As an educational enterprise, my untried and untested ML’s 
ambition is that of trying to re-portray PE more as a mission, a calling which sets out 
its project in the astute use of words. It is a way of engaging movers, be they whilst 
hiking, sailing, or dancing, by their advocates, to express and manifest their 
professional and ethically correct mode of caring for one’s novice learners of 
movement and of life. It nurtures independence when its correspondents 
acknowledge that their own priority is to think about and manifest more care for the 
other, rather than for oneself. 
 
Voicing concerns 
 
No matter what love may be, it can be intense. It may be “incomparably-wonderful”, 
but, like human movement, its experience remains hidden beyond the boundaries of 
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words. In our expression of movement, in the gathering-in of words, in our uttered 
sentences we are also structuring an edifice of ourselves, in addition to what we 
mean when describing movement. Our expressions construct a kind of helpful image 
of ourselves, as well as the encountered vision that we have in movement that we 
wish to convey to others.   
 
How an aspiring and apprenticing PE specialist begins to change one’s role from that 
of a “teacher” to a “pedagogue” centres on one’s capacity to engage others in 
conversation. Teaching is a telling process, pedagogy is a talking event. Pedagogy is 
an invitation to speak. But then it is much more than merely conversing with another. 
As I show in Chapters 6 onwards, to speak is to fight, to protect, to maintain, and 
even to advance one’s mode of existence. At the same time, it is also, paradoxically, 
a fight to preserve our sense of playfulness. Playing and fighting together is a 
paradox. Nevertheless, it is one that I intend to sustain and promote logically in 
response to postmodernism’s philosophical movement, which evolved in reaction to 
modernism, the tendency in contemporary culture to accept only “objective truth”.  
Postmodernist thought is an intentional departure from the previously dominant 
modernist approaches. The term “postmodernism” comes from its critique of the 
“modernist” scientific mentality of “objectivity”, and which characterized PE’s science 
reverence during the last century. Amongst its many radical innovations was that of 
poststructuralism’s linguistic analysis, qualifying the distinction between that of a 
conscious self and an unconcious “otherness” which are implicity interchnaged in the 
sometimes benign and sometimes painful skirmishes of speech. Describing 
movement is one thing. Living through it is quite another.  
 
Mosston’s initial “spectrum” described movement. But so far as embracing its 
experiences, the “spectrum” did not extend to this depth. And this is where I foresee 
ML as providing a helpful guideline. “Iago”, for all our discussions, could not respond 
to my asking him, why, at the end of the day, PE should be one, if not the most 
highly valued of all curriculum subjects. Whatever his classroom issues turned out, 
the final court of appeal for resolving his lessons not merely stemmed from the 
limitations of his institutional “training”, but evolved from the manner in which he 
“perceived” his professional role. 
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For example, Barthes (1972; 1975; 1986) is one of the most accomplished of 
emotional and literate commentators on the world of sport, and its contemplation. His 
excitement as elicited from the world of sport, and his eagerness to capture and 
share the very essence of his fascinated excitement with others, tells us much about 
literature’s capacity to unravel the nature of our being   In 1968, Barthes wrote an 
essay called “The Death of the Author”. His argument depends on the fact that the 
signifier “I” is a “shifter”: it moves from speaker to speaker as each lays claim to it.  
Its linguistic terms, the author is never more than the figure produced by the use of 
“I”, just as we constitute ourselves subjects of the sentences we speak by the same 
means. If I say “I am exhausted”, I may be all sorts of other things too, but as far as 
the meaning of my words are concerned, I am no more at that moment than an 
exhausted person. “Linguistically”, the author is never more than the instance in 
writing, so Barthes insists. 
 
Barthes wants us to read the written text itself, not something else that we imagine 
would provide a clue to it or a guarantee of the correctness our interpretation. He is 
not arguing for subjectivism, the view that the text’s personal associations for me, 
and an individual reader, whatever they happen to be, will do as an account of its 
meaning. Instead, his reader in not an individual, not a real person at all, but the 
“space” in which all the quotations that make up the writing are inscribed without any 
of them being lost. Such a “space” does not exist, except as an ideal type; a 
timeless, utopian, model reader. In practice, some of us will see some of the 
possibilities, some others, and the text itself keeps its secrets about which is “right”. 
Indeed, it becomes unclear just what “right” would mean [though it is still possible, if 
we do not know the words, or we pay insufficient attention to them, or we miss a 
citation, or mistake the genre, to be wrong].   
 
I shall show that the underside, unspoken about, virtue of PE’s designated 
movement is actually about communication, or, to be more correct, to relating the 
hidden modes, its long ritualized but now immanent features of communication 
between oneself and others. This is what PE’s pedagogy should be about. It should 
be concerned with opening the conditions for one to learn about not quite the 
meaning, but rather, a collaborative meaning one endeavors to covey to another.  
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A key message I wish PE professionals to convey to their clients is that PE 
experiences can offer its practitioners a mode of learning by way of creating arena-
like spectacles. The early origins of the Olympics, for instance, served as a religious 
function collecting its congregation into sharing something of a passionately and 
emotionally rich experience. This is what Barthes does. He stimulates readers by 
exciting them from his viewpoint about the Tour-de France. He is of the opinion that 
such sport-like activities can become symbolic actions, regardless of whether or not 
there are spectators to allegorise the activity as he does.  
 
In Chapter 7, Ricoeur (1992) shows that a powerful sense of seduction arises from 
the way words are employed, manipulated, and uttered. The speaker engages in a 
series of something deliberated and sometimes unintended linguistic moves, tacking 
in one direction and then another, always searching for clues to confirm whether or 
not the listener is following this or that line of thought. My student “Iago’s” use of 
language, for example, resembled that of a laser beam. It was exclusively concerned 
with what he had in mind, to adhere to his words, to conform with his questions and 
expected response. In addition, “Iago” could not appreciate the fact that there are 
many movement “disciplines”, both outdoors, in the ring, and in the pool, when the 
PE pupils ardently wish to act in absolute solitude. Movement teachers do need to 
know when to say something, when to accompany one’s listener’s thoughts, or, 
when best to indulge in silence. They need to be able to cross many of PE’s playful 
or “Ludic Rubicon” by mulling over the classroom situation almost instantaneously, 
whilst keeping company in the refuge of one’s own thoughts and expressions.  
 
Pedagogy is like this. It is a form of art and a form of play. Both appeal to our 
aesthetic sense of being. But then, perhaps it is the case that the distinction between 
play and art may lie only in the “theory” of expression, when an utterance expresses 
a thought, a cry expresses grief or pain, and a poem may express nostalgia or 
energy. The simplest view of this theory would be that any action which makes public 
or communicates a state of mind thereby expresses something in public. 
Nevertheless, a mere signal seems not to express what it signals, and a mere 
statement, “I am ecstatic with the result” does not express ecstasy in the way a poem 
does. It seems that expression requires some concept of the action being an 
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adequate or successful rendering of what is expressed. The words or other actions 
should somehow fit into the state of mind they express. The problem is to understand 
the conception of this fit.  
 
For instance, a language is more than a grammar and its vocabulary; it embodies a 
distinctive worldview, and it is that which constitutes the common culture underlying 
the diversity of individuals within it. When we speak, we do so by borrowing words 
from their public “understanding”, and here is hidden a significant problem. All 
movement-literates need to be able to trace in the author the residue in the 
speaker/signifier, or the mover-agent’s intended mode of meaning. But much is to be 
resolved before the listener can come to share, in part, something like the meaning 
the speaker thinks that he or she is conveying to another. What we are dealing with 
are those features of an utterance, or a work, which contribute to its success and 
“meaning” in its satisfying qualities: its aesthetics.   
 
Embodied resource 
  
According to Merleau-Ponty, it is not “I” who speaks “it”, my-body object, but rather, it 
is my body-subject “who/that” speaks to me.  The profession had neither 
incorporated his viewpoint [nor postmodernism’s “radical ideas”] steadfastly to 
protect the subjective view of experience as a necessary part of any full 
understanding of the nature of knowledge.  
 
In this dissertation ML is introduced as an endless endeavor to help “movers”, who 
may come to feel alone in the act-of-moving, not to be alone in movement. There is 
much tracking and trailing of the origin of words and that of movement by the 
teacher, whose vocation is exercised entirely on behalf of the learner. The 
professional is asked to “scout”, to “escort”, and accompany the learner from 
movement, through words, into a state of being. It is a state of being during which 
self-revelation is cultivated, eventually adopted or adapted to, depending on the 
realised preferences of that person who is journeying into adulthood. It is a process 
which can only be initiated during the inter-changes that befall both its interlocutors. 
The process of conditioning pedagogic situations, of employing the first principles of 
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learning how-to-learn, require educators to know and appropriately apply the astute 
knowledge, the nous or the mental faculty that perceives when to open portals to the 
subjective world.  
 
Exclusion of the self 
 
What modernism’s PE carried with it was a story, a narrative, which conveyed a 
sense of social conformity, a cultural loyalty and an unwitting adherence to a 
language which conspired to “externalize” perceptions (Albright 1989, Almond 1983, 
Bain 1985). In its modernist, rationalist discourse, in its lack of treatment of 
body/subject, its learners suffered the effects of self-alienation because self-concerns 
such as that of one’s embodied sensual existence and concrete social experience 
were not deemed to fit into one’s lesson arrangement. Serendipity has no place in 
PE’s philosophy in the 1970s; target completion was objective number one, even if 
the experience did alienate its clients. “Alienation” is Hegel’s word (1977) for what 
happens when people and ideas are cut off from unified reality. It takes place when 
the act of thinking falls into conflict and fails to be resolved, as when movement-
learners are placed into movement disciplines, and find the entire experience utterly 
confusing, losing touch, as it were, with their conscious sense of being; fracturing 
their relationship with their own sense of embodiment, and becoming distanced from 
that of others. Experiencing alienation led to what could be a loss of confidence in 
themselves and as a consequence, this negative encounter led them to separate 
themselves even from their own bodies. 
 
Harnessed by its technical language, last century’s PE’s sanctioned communicative 
language served to dislodge, stifle, and fragment knowledge. In Chapter 3, I show 
how the use of its sterilized speech falsely lead its clients to create doubts about 
themselves, encounter disaffection, endure humiliation, and become alienated even 
from their own bodies. Countering this negative, and isolating trend, ML, by not 
placing our passion or subjectivity under siege, can be a way to generate a more 
ambient atmosphere of closeness, to appreciate what honourableness means 
through judging one another’s manner of behaviour and actions.  And how such 
pedagogic features as collegiality, trust and care between its experienced and 
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inexperienced participants can be engendered, and how aesthetics comes to play a 
significant part in our processing of meaning and its subsequent understanding.   
 
Aesthetics  
 
In aesthetic theory, a popular view is that a work of art derives its effect by 
expressing the feelings of its creator, conveyed to that of a viewing public. The view 
that this work expresses the artist’s own value was forcibly presented by 
Collingwood (1960) in his text “The Idea of Nature”, and may strike many artists as 
correct. Yet, it raises the problem of existence and nature of these feelings before 
they take shape in words on paintings. As Barthes (1986) argues, feelings are often 
regarded as the “surfacing touchstone” of each player in the flesh and blood world of 
sport-like activities. By using the term “surfacing touchstone,” Barthes (2007) was 
referring to the intriguing way the cultic [magnetic and mesmeric] nature of sport and 
recreation seems to well up from the depth of our deepest emotions and, uninhibited, 
displays these “innermost” feelings in public. Collingwood also insisted that true 
artistic activity takes place “in the head”, before anything is embodied in the actual 
medium of the artist. The creation of an art “work” is then just a matter of “craft”, 
following on that realised “eureka” moments.  
 
This is a romantic theory since the artist is now singled out as the person of 
extraordinary feeling and sensibility (expounded on in Chapter 3), rather than the 
person of particular skills. This view can be seen as a vindication of “expressionism” 
in art, [seen, for example, in the use of exaggeration and distortion for emotional 
effect.] Notwithstanding its leaning towards romanticism, the articulation of one’s 
inner feelings requires its speaker to have undue confidence in the idea of a 
determinate, and interesting, inner life with its own properties, existing independently 
of any actual externalization. If expression is to retain a central place in aesthetic 
theory, a closer connection is needed between what is expressed and the nature of 
the work, and more so, when it comes to expressing the nature of life itself: 
expressing oneself to reveal hidden facets of oneself.  
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As with Collingwood, Ryle (1949) also spoke of this “intellectualist legend”, of the 
Cartesian mind “before” body. Descarte’s dualism made a neat incision between 
physical and metaphysical reality. He thought up a logical process of induction in 
which he perceived the body as mindless, which implied that the practical experience 
of physical skills is independent of the theory of its embodied enactmentImportant to 
clarify in this chapter is the assumed idea of a person that Cartesianism carried with 
it: that of the singular notion of being, a human being, that is, of not acknowledging 
another person’s mode of existence, of not being treated as a noun. Contrary to 
Cartesianism, the nature of the human person can be made accessible and 
assessable by what one hears, does, and sees of that person. The dissertation 
stresses that we are all made up of different modes of ourselves and our 
unconscious selves, about which we may know little. There is always a conundrum in 
our effort to understand what comes into play when we move.  
 
Summary 
 
The loneliness that is movement needs not to be encountered in austere isolation, 
but rather celebrated in its splendour. This is why I call upon the discipline of 
phenomenology in Chapter 4 so that the mover is encouraged to become a story 
teller of one’s PE enterprises. A story teller must not be inhibited and prohibited to 
make one’s inner feelings known in a public forum.   
 
Movement can be an encounter that makes us feel alone. Sometimes we dread 
participating in one movement discipline or feel disregarded, or austerely 
unaccompanied in that form of movement. To cope with this austere isolation, in part, 
accounts for the reason why PE needs an inclusive and “caring” language as well as 
the language of science. PE needs to be treated by way of a therapy, of a 
“compassionate pedagogy”, pursuing positive courses of action that empower the 
resident mover, searching for the best features of another’s self. This is where 
Movement Literacy steps in. ML can be exercised in a way which allows us not to be 
alone. But then how can one share something that is “incomparably wonderful” when 
one is “zoned” into the enigma that is movement? Movement actions, I argue, are 
something we can indulge in, because, strange as it may seem, movement holds the 
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capacity for one to indulge in what is unfamiliar, but which makes contact with our 
intuitive, gut, feelings.  
 
In our schooling experiences, with the exception of literature study, it is rare, if ever, 
that our inner sense of “otherness”, our inner-stranger, or our mindless selves can be 
stirred to our conscious awareness. PE enterprises were designed to be of this 
nature (Abbs 1994, Barone 1978), and modern PE had “forfeited” this eventual end 
for the sake of its immediate objective rewards. Then, PE’s “selling point” to the 
public was its advancement in movement performances. Today, I contend PE’s 
“selling point” is its potential to create life skills through its playfulness. 
  
As will be acknowledged in this thesis, the manner of one’s engagement in play can 
also be a display of one’s dispositional nature. For example, I know my 
grandchildren. I have followed their growth into the world. They each show very 
different styles of behaviour. They show sibling connections. But, when it comes to 
their world of play, they do so as if “I” existed half in and half out of their world. They 
all address play as if they are looking into what they are playing with, or playing at,  
and yet keeping an eye on me (but as an outsider), turning to give me sorts of 
sideways-on-looks, not face-to-face, when they initiate tangential hints, and clues. 
They are playing with me, with words. They do so in a way which places or locates 
my present sense of being as if I am existing on the borders of two close domains of 
lived experiences, and leaves me hesitant as to which orientation holds the most 
promising outcome for me.  
 
Moments of play, my grandchildren might imply in years to come, appear 
unpredictably in the most unlikely of places, even during the most crucial of moments 
arising during a job interview, and the most ecstatic flights of child’s play may 
suddenly drop into dull compulsion. “Let’s keep swinging on the ropes”, says my 
grandchild Lucy.  J.J., my grandson, standing nearby, agrees. Yet, the style of his 
movement towards the ropes suggests a certain lack of enthusiasm on his part. Lucy 
is eager. J.J. looks bored. They both swing on the ropes.  Ballet-like in style, nimble 
and lithe, Lucy “climbed-with a sense-of-purpose”, an intent of which only she had 
insight. It was clear in her movement that she wanted to reach different parts of the 
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scaffold that supported the swinging ropes. Her face blossomed bright and almost 
sparkled. Head drooping, tying his body into a smaller shape by knotting the rope 
around him, J.J. pulls funny faces at me. I watch them both. Were they both involved 
in the act of climbing?  
 
Clearly, we all appear to hold a remarkable ability to transform almost any tedious or 
unpleasant task into a game. It was a game J.J. my grandson was playing with me. 
But, at the same time, he was also telling me that he was playing in company with 
Lucy. We do have the capacity to corrupt Caillois’ pure play. We can step into the 
realm of play. Equally, we can retreat out of play. Our ulterior and often well hidden 
motives to engage our “self” in play or games may be frivolous or profound. It can 
vary from the innocent intent to maintain our state of physical fitness to that of a 
more sinister motive: to maim an opponent in order to secure a winner’s share of the 
spoils. We can be seen to do one thing, but the “intent” in the doing is only 
occasionally available to the “doer”.  
 
In the film “Cool Hand Luke”, for instance, a group of convicts bewilder the guards by 
increasing the tempo of their road work, by running back and forth in eager 
performance of their imposed task, by laughing, by turning punishment into play. 
There is in this situation no formal contest because the guards are not included 
among the “players”, but their bewilderment is in fact the rational point of the 
apparently irrational game played by the prisoners. Had the prisoners begun the 
game purely for their own amusement, like my grandchildren, one of whom was 
captivated by a whim, the activity would have been nonutilitarian, one 
phenomenologically indistinguishable from the utilitarian work that was done 
previously in their compulsory task to repair the road. The prisoners cleverly 
exploited the diffuse meaning they held between themselves as they injected a 
playful element, (a flight of fancy,) into their version of an activity, labelled as work by 
others [the guards] not privy to the implicit motive of the participant players, and who 
could only interpret the same activity as a display of work. 
 
Phenomenologically speaking, there is both a “unity”, a “single entity” when 
Descartes (in Meditations IV; xi: 1673 1968) wrestled with the real problem that:             
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           …I am not merely present in my body as a sailor is present in a ship, but…am very closely 
joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I form with it a single entity. 
 
 
The point Descartes makes here is that when we come to realize that there exists a 
most profound disparity in our inability to cope with different realms of knowledge, 
then any account that fails to do full justice to both the unity and the disparity cannot 
be taken seriously. There may be just one “whatness” here, a body labelled Ted. 
Though a thing, a quantity, a material whatness can be reduced to another; that is, 
accounted for in terms of its constituent parts. Differently, my being Ted has more 
than one howness. But then, how do “I” come to know “Ted”?  This matters because 
my attention to my “self” changes who “I” am, the “I” who is doing the attending. 
Attention, however, is not a thing, nor a brute fact, but rather, an intrinsic way in 
which Ted is able to relate with the “Big Other” (Belsey 2002), with others and their 
world. 
 
Phenomenology is not a conceptually easy philosophical movement to understand. 
For instance, in giving his vague expression to the notion of lived-experience as an 
immediate awareness of what he called “sensibility”, Merleau-Ponty (1968:215), 
posits quite a tangled argument about his understanding of sensibility which he 
describes as:  
 
           …that medium in which there can be a being without it having to be posited: the sensible                  
appearance of the sensible, the silent persuasion of the sensible is Being’s unique way of 
                manifesting itself without positivity, without ceasing to be ambiguous and transcendent… 
The sensible is that; this possibility to be evident in silence, to be understood implicitly. 
 
 
As we can note, Merleau-Ponty’s view of lived experience and sensibility is mired in 
the mulch in what is generally referred to as “thick–descriptions”. He uses 
philosophy’s own “in-house” language, an ever emerging kind of language requiring 
specialist, key-terms, and thus a special kind of knowledge The kind of knowledge 
that arose out of the early study of phenomenology by Husserl (1920), a 
mathematics-inspired philosopher, and Heidegger (1971), an existentialist and social 
critic, whose thoughts and ideas about the intrinsic nature of the mental state, and 
nature respectively, will be further explained in Chapters 4 and 5.  
                      
 49
In this chapter I have given a brief historical summary of play because the act 
“playing” allows one to be indulgent in understanding. Playfulness is an essential 
pedagogical ingredient. Adopting a pedagogic temperament or disposition must rely 
upon, for its freedom of thought, not thought directed from an external source, but 
because as Montaigne in his “Essair” writes: 
 
            …It should be noted that children at play are not playing about; their games should be seen 
as their most serious-minded activity. 
                                             [1580, ed. M. Rat, cited in The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations 1998: 480] 
 
 
I identify play as a concept with rich potential for “self” illumination, a sphere in which 
well being rather that subjective exclusion can be achieved through the practice of 
contemplation. I point to the significance of play in a process of learning. Play is not 
something that is an add-on bonus, utilized as a relief from a PE lesson. It is not an 
injection of pleasure and enjoyment to sweeten and close a lesson. Rather play is 
one of pedagogy’s universal features. Play tended to be underplayed in PE’s 
modern, professional culture. It was a teaching culture dealing with binary 
oppositions between subject and object as unbridgeable connections. It was a 
culture conveying the belief that human beings are the result of structures that 
escape their self awareness, disguising rather than exposing their core dispositional 
meaning.  
 
ML is about tracing whatever residue of meaning that lies in the signifier, in order for 
its initiator and receptor to be placed in communicative touch with each other. It 
demands careful interpretation and transposing of their respective key tenets and 
compelling premises. The dissertation’s opening phase focuses on archeologically 
digging into some crucial limitations to learning in PE’s past profession. Its critique of 
modern PE’s systemic approach is completed in the next chapter. The dissertation’s 
closing phase offers a more comprehensive direction for movement educators to be 
able to validate their profession as a bona fide education discipline in its own right. It 
conveys PE in the light of its inherently responsive survival to live a healthy and 
reverential life style, by not trivializing movement and by attending more closely to 
language’s subtle nuances. 
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In essence, then, I am moving attention away from the physical in Physical 
Education, to the education in PE. I focus on unpacking the learning resources that 
can be made realizable when a person performs a physical action and then reflects 
upon that “event”. Moving acts can be studied cognitively [epistemology] and 
emotionally [ontology]. And it is with the understated interplay between these two 
domains of learning that the thesis’s introductory chapters reveal.  I want my 10 year 
old “friend” who said “nobody said nuffink about de learnin bit” to be able to live 
inside movement, and tell others what it was like for him. 
 
This is what pedagogy is about. It is about folklore storytelling, but the advantage 
here is that the author and narrator has a live gathering of listeners who are 
benevolently invited to contribute to that changing of that story. We, PE’s 
missionaries, need to set out our private “wares”, our personalities, our posture 
towards life, our blessing in being physically fit, in a playful manner which does not 
cause offence. We offer an array of symbols, gestures, or sounds which represent 
exchange currencies with another being. Our “commodities” are left open for another 
to ponder about, prefer and profess about, or reject. The decision making, the 
choosing or options opened by one participant speaker to another is left open. Such 
are the animating links which connect signifier-knower with those “to-be” signified-
learners.   
 
Pedagogy is about linking many forms of relationships. Some of which are simple 
and easy to understand. Others are obscure and perplexing.  It is with the concealed 
links of pedagogy that ML unveils. In its bridging or connecting process, there lies a 
delicate, interminable balancing act. It is an act during which an addressor is 
invested with the responsibility to know what mode of knowledge one should 
disseminate, when one is “au fait” with what is morally correct to attend to, whilst 
simultaneously leaving other relevant issues concealed from one’s listener.  How 
does one begin to cope with adjusting to such an imbalance of knowing what, when, 
and why one should say something, or better remain silent, in one’s lesson, and with 
one’s learner? There is no prescribed system that can serve as a recipe to become a 
pedagogue, as “Iago” seems to have expected. One must either be blessed with a 
certain dispositional nature, or, become familiar and intimately acquainted with the 
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use of pedagogy’s vitalizing elements, which I identify in Chapter 6 as bringing into 
harmony the purpose and prudence of the arts of educating. To study and inhabit the 
arts of how one can become pedagogically fit is one of ML’s ambitions.       
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Chapter Three      New Modes of Learning                          
 
Introduction: Forms of teaching 
 
This chapter interlaces early educational models with the three progressive phases 
of PE’s professional linguistic development. In the decades between 1950 and 1980, 
the study of educational theory and practice enjoyed intense academic research 
(Bollnow 1982; Bolin 1988; Martens 1987). This upsurge of scholarly interest in 
“education” and “learning” was to benefit the PE profession who copied a number of 
prototype teaching models that resulted from this intellectual growth. I shall explain 
three of these models, (i) the impression; (ii) the child-centred; and (iii) the rule 
model. The PE profession too readily adopted all three forms of these models, so 
that eventually there came a need to discard the professional disadvantages and 
limitations of these models and then to synthesise their benefits to enhance both the 
process of teaching and its reciprocal dependency, in order to become more integral 
to the art of learning-to-learning. Kantian (1781; 1998) ideas of categories of 
understanding will also be reviewed briefly. That is, his concepts of how the mind 
organises reality, enabling us to make sense of experience. These include space, 
time, causality and substance, which he called “a priori concepts”. 
 
My first two chapters have claimed that modern PE’s ratiocination was assumed to 
justify practices and beliefs associated with such definitive charactertistics of “human 
nature” and activities as philosophy, science, language, art and movement, due to its 
over reliance on a particular conception of “reason” and on verifying facts to plan 
regimented routines. It conveyed our human existence in terms of the application of 
brain or intellect. It aligned its professional consciousness with Kantian categories of 
knowledge, but without regard to emotion or sensibility of any kind of consideration 
for embodied sensuosuness, as is the emerging trend in contemporary PE (Austin 
2007; Bain 1992; Zakus & Malloy 1996; Qualley 1997). 
 
These introductory chapters identify ML’s aims are to gain a better understanding to 
their own and to each correspondent’s different PE experiences. I conceive ML as an 
untested approach to learning about how to learn in PE. I suggest it triggers a 
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readiness to learn when each observed and performed encounter becomes the 
source of self-identity. It ventures to move beyond the boundaries of the 
methodology [a guideline system for solving a problem, with specific components 
such as phases, tasks, methods, techniques and tools] of the human sciences by 
reaching out for embodied insights into the conduct of life. ML tries to correct false 
thinking about what false thinking is: a tenuous, tangential realm of revelations which 
always seem to lie beyond their methodological self-consciousness, but which 
implicitly “connect” one’s emerging selfhood to the totality of our experiences. This 
connection is partly manifested in language, which, in Chapters 4-7, is not in any 
sense characterised as personal or private; we merely borrow others’ words. But 
then, individuals can alter language. Language comes alive to accompany us and 
place us in company with others, as long as others adopt their changes. What after 
all do great poets, philosophers, and scientists do but change our vocabulary? But 
then, language can also die. The professional issue PE comes to confront is how far 
its practices should let its modern language impose limits on what it is possible to 
think, hence, what it is possible to do and be. 
 
Significantly, movement educators who lack the capacity for critical reflective thought 
and informed judgment are unable to confirm their own professional status as 
educators. They also leave exposed their own sense of vulnerability to others, 
including their “learners”.  In Chapter 8, I view the process of teacher education as 
an initiation, an overture into teaching, pedagogy, and beyond, as a rite de passage 
into a deeper awareness of the phenomenon of PE. Continuing to live with my own 
guilt, with the shallowness of my philosophical background, my naïve inadequacy as 
a supervisor was put to the test when I was unable to help “Iago”, at that time, to 
understand why his lessons demonstrated how easy it is for the oppressor to 
become the oppressed.  
 
In this chapter, and unswervingly throughout this thesis, intense caution is called for 
PE professionals who rely only on replicating the use of established teaching 
models. The use of teaching “models” tend to deceive us to construct all “relations” 
between subordinate ends and an ultimate end on the basis of a relation which 
remains essentially instrumental. They tend to stifle the vibrant energy required to 
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animate learning processes. In the opening two chapters  I began to call on PE 
specialists to help learners to find a way into understanding the “meaning” of 
movement, with the resolve to try to place themselves, as experienced movers by 
way of treating others, in the caring way one wishes to be treated. In its eventual 
effect, I want to use PE enterprises as a language’s medium through which I place 
myself by way of imagining being another being. I forward PE as a way of attuning 
one’s self awareness to movement by comparing similarities and differences which 
may resonate or contrast with another’s description of movement.  
 
This is the key task facing educators. Modern PE educators generally learnt about 
themselves and their professional skills as they devoted their lived-through and 
judicious knowledge of movement and life for the benefit of those who follow them.  
Modern PE tended to treat its active learners in a “passive” way, that is to say, 
passive to activating the thinking, experiencing beings, beings that is who exist in a 
state of happenings. We all fall into different moods (Freud, 1961). We assume we 
all perceive the world through a spectrum of lenses as Fetters (1978) claims when 
the mixing of sport and myth offers participants opportunities to imagine themselves 
as heroes.  We ourselves nurture different frames of thought (Leach & Moon, 1999). 
The idea of “ourselves” is perceived as existing in an ever changing experience of 
transition and transformation is the premise that Scheffler (1973) adopted to map out 
the early prototypes of teaching’s education models. 
 
In this chapter, for the reader to get the flavour of what PE teaching was like some 
decades ago, I summarise some of these models’ strengths and weaknesses, their 
conventions and limitations as Scheffler (1973) reviewed them. They were adopted 
unchallenged and digested whole by the PE profession. It was a teaching set against 
an orthodox backcloth dominated by “technicism’s” ideology. Critics accused its 
teaching of being knowledge-bound but wisdom-bare, because it had disdain for the 
unpredictable, and invested a premium on the harsh ambition of detached objectivity 
(Place 1956; Bain 1989; Dewar and Horn 1992; Sparkes 1992; Crum 1997). Modern 
PE teachers, subordinated to institutional bureaucracy and abstract theories, seldom 
spoke the language of transcendence as occurs between the act of inscription and 
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that of description. It created an impasse between unexplained series of gaps 
separating pedagogic idealism from technical realism. 
 
Technicism reflects not scientific thinking but scientific “misunderstandings” of the 
nature of science. Such misunderstandings, which were widely perpetrated in PE, 
stem from a more or less Baconian (1996) view of science as a matter of observing 
nature with a pre-suppositionless mind, spotting irregularities, hypothesising that they 
are laws and testing them empirically, so that in due course a body of generalisations 
about nature accumulates which both explain phenomena and afford us control over 
them. By its very nature, technicism cuts knowledge off from experience by 
producing generalizations and technical principles abstracted from the early attempts 
to analyse the processing of experience.  
 
Empiricism and Rationalism 
 
Technicism is an over reliance or overconfidence in technology as a benefactor of 
society. Put differently, empiricism is a way of looking at the world which construes 
human understanding as confined within the limits of human experience. Straying 
outside those limits one falls victim to scepticism or, eventually, loses oneself in 
nonsense. However, empiricism began to come of age as a philosophy when it was 
able to align itself with a comprehensive theory of language, when theory brings to 
speech our unreflective self-absorbed understanding of movement, unaware of itself, 
until pointed out by significant others. It was only in this merging, when it felt able to 
determine what can and cannot be said that empiricism was able to challenge 
rationalism in what was proved to be its weakest spot. Rationalism must assume that 
humans possess ideas the significance of which outstrips the limits of experience 
which might provide their content. Among such ideas were those of “God”, 
“substance” and “self”, upon which the rationalist world view had raised its 
foundations. It is this assumption that the new philosophy of language, [its 
poststructuralist version] was to deny.  
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A falling out over unity  
 
According to both Gadow (1982), and Geertz (1988), prior to the introduction and 
radical views of the new philosophy of language into PE’s schooling practices, its 
founding philosophical “conscious temperament” relied heavily upon Kantian 
thinking. Kant (1963) was interested in what experience of reality can tell us about 
metaphysics and the area of knowledge that lies beyond physical reality, forwarding 
the belief that we cannot trust our senses to tell us directly about reality. 
 
Basically, what Kant believed in was that the mind and the rest of reality are part of 
the same unified picture. His mind and reality vision conceived as two sides of the 
same coin inspired a number of other philosophers like Fichte (2000), Hegel (1977), 
Schelling (1936), and Schopenhauer (1999) to look at things in terms of a 
transcendental unity, an idea of a synergy of understanding relating the mind to the 
word, linking what may befall us as something of which we are unaware which 
impacts upon us beyond that of our direct experience.  
 
Hence, Kant described categories of thought as “concepts” enabling us to 
understand the phenomenal world. For Kant, our experience of “reality” can tell us 
about the area of knowledge that lies beyond physical reality.  By contrast, Hume 
(1975) strove to create a total naturalistic “science of man” that examined the 
psychological basis of human nature. Hume argued that even though we must 
depend upon our senses to gain knowledge, we cannot trust them very far. Hume 
was sceptical of the mind’s abilities, whilst others like Leibniz (1989) were too 
confident in it.  
 
Kant attempted to show that even though we cannot trust our senses to tell us 
directly about reality, our senses do tell us much of how reality “appears” to us. And 
the appearance of reality is not just guess-work as Hume suggested. Reality, for 
Kant, points beyond experience to a transcendent unity of the way the world seems 
and what the world actually is. Kant distinguished between what the world is and the 
way it appears. The appearance of things he called “phenomena”. The actual world 
he called the “noumena”: the “thing in itself.” Kant said we cannot know the noumena 
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directly, but we can apprehend it, based on the way we perceive the phenomenal 
world.  
 
On the one hand, Kant maintained that we judge reality by its cover. Hume, on the 
other hand, said that nothing can be known without experience, and that we need to 
make judgments about our experience in order to make sense of it. These 
judgments, though, are not reliable, since they do not come from experience, but 
from habit, convention and human nature. These judgments depend on the position 
from which we make them. They are not true independently of who sees them and 
how they are seen. Hume suggested that even though we cannot prove these ideas, 
we cannot do without them. He argued that the mind has to rely on “connections” it 
makes on its own that are not simply based on real objects. 
 
Kant tried to solve this problem by reversing Hume’s “empirical attitude” towards 
knowledge. Rather than saying knowledge must conform to objects, he said objects 
[the noumenal world] must conform to knowledge [the phenomenal world]. According 
to Kant, objects get organized by the mind.  By analogy, we can think of the 
noumenal world as the yeast and the phenomena we experience as bread. Kant 
says we can never experience the yeast directly. For example, all we can know 
directly is the bread, which we have sliced up by our understanding.  The bread 
“slicers” of understanding are “concepts” including space, time, substance, and 
causality, and, for Kant, these bread slicers are called “categories of understanding”. 
We do not have direct experience of these concepts. Instead, through them, we 
experience that things that we say have substance, exist in time and so on.  Kant 
called these “a priori concepts”, which, he claimed, come before experience. They 
make experience possible. As a result, they are not concepts that people have made 
up; they existed before our own existence, before we ever gave them any thought. 
But they are necessary in order for us to be able to understand them.  
 
Kant asserted that what actually happens to us is that we get experience from 
knowledge, and later, proceed to think about ethical questions or issues to do with 
morality. He tried to find an objective basis for moral ideas. This debate continues as 
to whether there can be an objective basis for morality, and also whether objectivity 
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is possible at all.  Many believe morality, like everything else, depends on one’s own 
perspective.  Kant adopted the distinction Hume made between ideas and about 
what exists, and ideas and what ought to be. Hume said that we cannot draw 
conclusions about what ought to be, based on our knowledge of what exists.  To deal 
with this problem, Kant came up with the view that there are objective categories or 
moral thought. He referred to moral thinking as practical reason or reasoning about 
how we should act. He contrasted practical reason or the act of reasoning about 
what exists, and came up with the idea of a moral law called the “categorical 
imperative”, which according to Kant, holds true for everybody and forms the basis of 
our “practical reason,” or moral understanding.  
 
Kant’s magnum opus, the “Critique of Pure Reason” (1781), aimed to unite mind, 
nature, and morality, or reason with experience [our lived through perceptions] to 
move beyond what he took to be failures of traditional philosophy and metaphysics. 
He hoped to end  an age of speculation where objects outside experience were used 
to support what he saw as futile theories, while opposing the scepticism and idealism 
of thinkers such as Descartes (in Bloom 2003) , and Hume (1975). Kant maintained 
that one ought to think autonomously, free of the dictates of  authority. His work 
reconciled many of the differences between rationalists and empiricist traditions of 
the 18th century. 
 
Broadly speaking, Kant sought a mid-line position between a “two-world” 
interpretation, he held the view that epistemology had serious limitations, but 
humans are able to transcend the bounds of our own mind, meaning that we can 
acccess the “thing-in-itself”.  We have two contrasting interpretations of the thing-in-
itself. One is the dual-object view, according to which the thing-in-itself is a distinct 
entity from the phenomena it gives rise to. The other is the dual-aspect view, 
according to which the thing-in-itself and the thing-as-it-appears to us are two “sides” 
of the same thing. This view is supported by the textual fact that most occurrences of 
the phrase “things in themselves” are shorthand for the phrase, “things considered in 
themselves”. Although we cannot see things apart from the way we do see them, we 
can think of them apart from our mode of senisibility [perception], thus making the 
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things themselves a kind of noumenon or object of thought: closing the gap between 
what people think and the way the world actually is. 
              
Kant, however, also speaks of the thing in itself or “transcendendal object”  as the 
product of the human-rooted understanding as it attempts to conceive of objects in 
abstraction from the conditions of sensibility. Following this line of thought, some 
interpreters have argued that the thing in itself does not represent a separate 
“ontological” domain but simply a way of considering objects by means of 
understanding alone and is known as the two-aspect view.  Kant himself did not like 
this conception of reality, but it had the advantage of closing gaps between what 
people think and what the world actually is. The idealists after Kant tended to see 
mind and the world as one and the same.  
 
Hegel (in Plant 1983) drew on Kant’s conception of categories of understanding that 
give shape to reality. For Hegel though, unlike Kant, the categories keep changing 
and tend to conflict with one another. Moreover, Hegel suggested these categories 
work themselves out through time. They are constantly developing and constantly in 
a state of flux with their opposites. Hegel refers to this process as “dialectic”. He 
gives an example that shows how his dialectic works. He gives “being” as an 
example of a thesis. Being’s antithesis is “nothingness”. As being and nothing work 
out their differences, they resolve into synthesis, “becoming”. Hegel modified Kant’s 
idealism by taking history into account in trying to describe ideal [rational] reality.  
 
The study’s first two chapters claim that modern PE’s ratiocination, its over reliance 
on “reason”, on verifying facts to plan regimented routines, was assumed also to 
justify practices and beliefs closely associated with such definitive charactertistics of  
“human nature” and activities such as philosophy, science, language, art and 
movement. It conveyed our human existence in terms of the application of brain or 
intellect. It aligned its professional conscious with Kantian categories of knowledge, 
but, without regard to emotion or sensibility of any kind of consideration for embodied 
sensuosuness, as is the emerging trend in contemporary PE (Austin 2007; Bain 
1992; Zakus & Malloy 1996; Qualley 1997). 
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In contrast with Kant  
 
Sensuousness is when we participate in the spontaneous rhythms and responses of 
the body and are open to the joys and delights, pain, suffering and stress of bodily 
experiences. It implies an ability to relax, where too much thinking about a decision 
makes that decision more difficult to resolve, that the nature of play, its passive 
frivolousness allows our “otherness” to meet its active seriousness, its ecological 
side of self, suspending the controlling and driving impulse-impetus of the rational 
mind and will. Sensuality, in contrast, is what happens when the body is driven by 
the mind and used as an instrument of pleasure for reasons found in one’s “mood”, 
or mental presence of mind.  Sensuality, the state or quality of being sensually 
gratified, is the submission of the body to the driving, straining consciousness of the 
mind alienated from its embodiment. It is not the subjection of the mind to bodily 
impulses.  
 
On the other hand, sensuousness refers to the “appreciativeness” of qualities 
perceived by the senses, and accompanies a mystical view of the world which 
attributes meaning and grace to matter. The opposed view of matter is seeing matter 
as a “thing-in-itself”, so to speak, as a collection of physical “facts” and their 
interrelationships. It results from the segregation of the so-called “scientific” objective 
way of looking at things from our subjective perceptions. It resulted from the 
“scientific revolution” whose success stemmed from its ability to manipulate nature, 
to medically heal the human body, to render the body fit for movement.  
 
In other words, when the body is reduced to physical “facts”, as was happening in 
“Iago’s” treatment of movement, then, his learner’s sense experiences were also 
treated as mere physical objects and events, split off from “Iago’s” own conscious 
awareness.  Constantly depriving the moving act of any meaning or significant import 
for their experiential selves, his learners soon began to pose questions, to ask what 
was the “reasoning” behind their being directed to move in one way rather than 
another? The eventual consequence for learning to move was never discussed. 
“Iago” did not [could not] present the “content” of PE as an educational enterprise. 
He did not conceive movement actions as an act of learning, as an assisted 
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guidance to fulfilling one’s potential as a responsible person. He was unable to 
extend PE’s experiences to his “movers’” life projects. Such altruistic concerns had 
not yet become a matter for “Iago”, nor had the PE profession during the 1970s and 
early 1980s started to infuse these ambitions into its professional preparation 
programmes (Tinning 1985; Williamson 1986; Walker Pick and Macdonald 1991; 
Talbot 1998 b).  
 
This is why Whitehead’s (1992) launching of Physical Literacy was so vital. When we 
begin to align ourselves with the “Big Other”, with other people and our ecological 
world, our mode of understanding is seen as “related” to human living [sentient being 
as the “point” of the world], sensuousness that which happens to us and not 
sensuality [that which we seek-out], becomes the appropriate key to changing our 
Kantian attitude from that of a separated mind and body and to that of our monist 
conception of embodiment.  
 
Federation Internationale d’Education Physique (FIEP) 
 
This monist view complements that of the Federation Internationale d’Education 
Physique’s (FIEP) 1978 conference “theme”. It called for a fusion between Western 
attitudes’ design on identifying causal influences, with the Eastern confluencial 
temperament, which is oriented to accept that with which befalls us, to cope with 
fate. Pierre Seurin, in his Presidential Speech, held in Taipei and in my personal 
discussion with him later that evening, and subsequently with my colleague John 
Andrews, FIEP’s next President from 1978 to 1984, was calling for a convergence of 
ideas between what he referred to as Western “selflessness”, and Eastern 
“groundlessness”. And it is with combining their global vision for delivering PE with 
“Iago’s” lack of personal perception that I turn to ML to unmask pedagogy’s 
traditional but still hidden protocol.  
 
There are parallels here between PE facing a dilemma parodied in Jane Austen’s 
(1962) “Sense and Sensibility, in which two of three sisters manifest starkly different 
personalities. One epitomises prudence and self-control, the other embodies emotion 
and enthusiasm. They all experience love, romance, and heartbreak. The 
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philosophical resolution of the novel is ambiguous: the reader must decide whether 
sense and sensibility [sensitivity] have truly merged. The novel’s ambiguity is 
somewhat akin to that faced by the PE profession towards the closing half of last 
century. That is, should it maintain its stark distinction between natural and 
humanistic science, or merge sense and sensitivity? 
 
Sense and sensitivity 
 
Sensuality is the result of objectifying the body as a physical “thing” to be “used” and 
thus deprived of its mythical meaning, dimly held between the sacred and the 
secular. Consonant with this issue were the teaching method approaches and their 
early models I next refer to in this Chapter. Teaching methods were primarily 
concerned with how the body and how teaching “works”, rather than addressing what 
was seriously at stake, learning about human nature through PE, and to what 
“meaning” these models  subscribed. Consequently, teaching was viewed in 
quantitatively good mechanical terms rather than in those qualities that render others 
as good human beings, appreciated as human communicators and communicants.      
 
What I pursue in this thesis is unlike the concept of objectivity as defined from a 
modern, positivistic perspective. I seek to expand on the notion of objective 
reasonableness which fosters a capacity for commitment, for altruistic caring, and 
shared feelings which are sympathetically viewed to protect and nurture the learner’s 
sense of well-being: respecting another’s position. Striving for reasonable objectivity 
is the process of considering another’s opinions and demonstrating tolerance for 
another’s viewpoint. Objectivity, in this sense, involves an examination of our own 
biases and capacities to exercise restraint. It is the ability to realise our own 
limitations to fully understand an alternative position while also attempting to meet 
another’s meaning in the very act of conversation and to reconsider its merits.               
 
Trawling for knowledge 
 
By scanning through three key education models, called the impression, insight, and 
role model, I begin to set the foundational structure for my ML practice which is not a 
 63
procedure answerable to theory, but rather, an accumulation of different ways to 
exercise one’s experienced professional experiences. For example, whilst Mosston 
and Ashworth’s “Spectrum of PE Teaching” became more learner-oriented, 
nevertheless, its teaching practices failed to answer certain critical questions of the 
teacher.  For example, what sort of quality learning should one aim to achieve?  In 
what does such learning consist?  How shall one strive to achieve it?  Such 
questions are, respectively, “normative”, “epistemological”, “ontological”, and 
empirical in import. And the answers that are provided for them give point and 
substance to the emerging shape of education in terms of progressively meaningful 
enterprises as delivered by PE professionals for its incumbent learners. 
 
Rather than address all such three questions separately, dealing directly with each 
abstractly and explicitly, I shall employ a more succinct, collective and genealogical 
[or ontological] approach through a brief consideration of these three prototype 
teaching models that were to emerge from the 1970s onwards In all three models, 
the primary purpose is to trace in each the respective model’s features, which are 
deemed as the grounding which helped to reshape and re-think PE’s professional 
practice. More importantly, from the mid 1970s to the present day, these innovative 
teaching models and ideas served to change PE’s own conscious temperament as a 
teaching profession. These models promote patterns of thinking which direct others’ 
source of knowledge. 
 
Impression model 
 
The desired end result of this “impression” model led to an accumulation in the 
learner of basic elements fed in from without, organised and processed in standard 
ways, but, in any event, not generated by the learner. The strength of this position is 
that it encouraged collection of information by providing accumulative growth of 
knowledge as a public and recorded impression.  
 
At best, it was a method to transmit informative knowledge.  Such a learning 
enterprise does not however, qualify as an “educational” encounter. It precludes an 
explanation of the way the learner is able to use that information or objective 
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knowledge, let alone innovate with it.  Perhaps more to the point, this teaching model 
discouraged the recipient from doing so.  Aptly described in the realm of PE as a 
“body-engineering” model, it was essentially designed to produce teacher-dependent 
pupils, rather than independent learners. 
 
Nevertheless it has certain educationally legitimate points.  For example, in some 
way or other knowledge is acknowledged to rest upon the gathering of experience. 
Therefore, in the process of educational planning, the richness and variety of the 
beginner’s relatively unadulterated experience should be attended to as a critically 
important consideration. In other words, when it came to teaching movement, the 
teacher also had to try to bear in mind how the movement “dweller”, its resident, 
might be guided into a thoughtful description of that encounter. The embodied, felt, 
difficulties one is likely to encounter when performing a disciplined action, [a swim, a 
climb, a dance, for instance,] in addition to commenting about its potential 
fascination, indifference, or alienation was becoming addressed from the learner’s 
point of view (Kretchmar 1994; Talbot 1998 a). 
 
This mode or style of teaching however, suffered from fatal difficulties. It was 
considered impossible to substantiate. As Dewey (1916) claimed, the notion of 
receiving absolutely simple ideas and then transforming these abstractions through 
one’s own “raw”, mental powers, and then somehow improved upon them to achieve 
some means of understanding through physical exercise, implementing ideas in the 
play of physical movement. Dewey viewed this claim as “mythical”, and myth, he 
argued, “converts history into nature”.  He said: 
 
…the supposed original faculties of observation, recollection, willing, thinking, …etc. are 
purely mythical. There are no such ready–made powers waiting to be exercised and thereby 
trained. 
                                                                                                                                  (1916: 80) 
 
This simplicity of the transformation of ideas is a “relative”, not an absolute concept. 
It reflects a particular way for a particular person to analyse experience. In other 
words, the analyses of experience in terms of simplistic ideas are not given, but 
occur to us and are understood [re-made] in the manner by which we are able 
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individually to invest meaning in them. Whatever the learning in this teaching 
approach, it was not perceived to be generated by the learner. 
 
A more fundamental criticism of this impression model is that the implicit conception 
of the growth of knowledge is “false”.  However conceived, knowledge is not 
achieved through any mind-exclusive operations for the processing of sensory 
particulars.  Rather, knowledge is eventually embraced and variously relayed in 
language-use. I shall show that different forms of knowledge involve a convoluted 
conceptual network not derivable from sensory data alone, but, in the PE context of 
this thesis, knowledge is imposed upon our embodied senses. By its very nature, 
knowledge unpredictably emerges from conversations held between educator and 
learner. [I shall focus on this supposition from Chapter 5 onwards.] But, dialogue is 
not a characteristic of this impression model. Its style of communication is largely 
instructional in nature, directed as a monologue almost exclusively from teacher to 
pupil.  In this model, only the PE teacher would be fully conversant with what he or 
she chooses to say, but the “impressed” meaning of the speaker’s words was likely 
to offer little meaning to its audience.  
 
This was a vital problem which Strawson (1970: 38) pointed out regarding education 
in general: 
 
    …They both (teacher and pupil) need to be able to fit together each other’s reports and 
stories into a single picture of the world. 
  
 
Part of the knowledge gathering and filtering process is a creative and individualistic 
enterprise, and takes its agent’s thoughts and ideas beyond the realm of simply 
collecting informative data. It involves gathering information not at random, but 
rather, in quite distinctive ways. Knowledge gathering involves such thoughtful 
concerns as the need for generalization, and for the postulation of entities.  These 
substantial matters, as explained in Chapter 7, can only be brought to one’s 
understanding by means of the astute deployment of analogies, similes, tropes, and 
metaphors. This “impression” model cannot be impressive in the general sense of 
the word since this term “impression” literally implies a capacity to excite, to entice 
the pupil’s inclined feelings and attachments, all of which are deemed necessary for 
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creative and individualistic learning encounters.  Clearly, in this teaching model, this 
is never the case. 
 
All versions of this impression theory of teaching have this defect: they fail to make 
adequate room for radical innovation by, and on behalf of the incumbent movement 
learner.  This is not surprising.  As professionals, PE teachers find little time during 
their lesson [duty of care responsibilities] to feed into the pupil’s mind all that we 
hope our pupils will learn as an eventual outcome of their own, accrued and 
enlightened, movement encounters.  Furthermore, no career specialist can afford to 
construe, or translate word for word, the critical faculty as generated in standard 
ways out of the generally objective language they exercise. More to the point, they 
cannot set forth insight, understanding or new applications of their own accepted 
theories, nor propose new theories.    
 
This, again, highlights the enormity of professional and personal issues that seem to 
arise, almost like a subterfuge, trapping the uninitiated career missionaries in the 
world of teaching, learning and its pedagogy in this large “chiasm” which I shall refer 
to as PE’s “ludic-Rubicon”. The unpacking of PE’s “ludic-Rubicon”, for now, can be 
thought of in general terms as something which happens to us during the act of 
movement, be it in an informal, playful, recreational, or a competitive and formal 
sporting context or, what occurs unexpectedly during our implementing a lesson 
plan. To better qualify and promote PE’s educational credibility, closer attention to 
PE’s striking encountered incidents was called for by Stones (1981), Woods (1985), 
and Sparkes (2002).  All three writers aspired to infuse “researched knowledge” from 
different academic disciplines into PE’s professional arena, including attempts to 
account for its unexplained “ludic-Rubicon”. 
 
Ludic Rubicon 
 
I shall constantly draw the reader’s attention to PE’s unique “ludic-Rubicon” because 
I believe that the profession should be more serious in its education development. 
PE’s education, I argue, is located by crossing this “Rubicon”: the gap between 
natural and human science. I believe the profession should be more concerned with 
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delving further into the spectre of these series of “gaps”, gaps which educationalists 
Witherall and Noddings (1995) and Winch (1998) began to address. In PE’s context, 
these are “gaps” located between PE’s parasitic necessity to gather theories from 
different academic disciplines, and those which inform its practice in how to deliver 
different forms of knowledge. They are gaps into which subjective concerns and 
objective issues had fallen (Whitson 1976; Jauss 1982; Turner 1992; Weiss 1999; 
Talbot 1998a; Torres 2003), and remained untouched. The most ambiguous of these 
gaps is that which disconnects subjective concerns from objective issues. To unpack 
this gap demands exploration and a re-planning of the curriculum input (Kirk 1989; 
Stones 1981; Ross 1994; Rink 1993) to which the impression model of teaching 
cannot begin to donate.  By introducing ML’s “literary inspired” linguistic praxis, I 
show how PE’s human ideals, its potential values and learning benefits for the 
individual need not linger suppressed and concealed, as was the case in modern PE.  
 
The insight or the child-centred model 
 
The second model is called the “insight” teaching model. It is affiliated to the child-
centred ideology.  As opposed to the impression model, it denies the very possibility 
of conveying ideas and bits of knowledge to the pupil’s mind.  For the insight model, 
knowledge in this public “container” sense has nothing to do with the process of 
learning and teaching. As a consequential outcome to this educational enterprise 
[primarily concerned with nurturing the pupil’s own expressive process of learning], 
the model represents a radically different approach to modernism’s teacher focus. 
The model is centred almost entirely on ‘behavioural objectives’ mode of teaching. 
For PE specialists, its appeal involved the systematic analysis [and investigation] of 
human behaviour through controlled and naturalistic observation employing 
disciplined scientific application of mechanics to the body. It served PE well since it 
attempted to accomplish legitimate, objective conclusions through rigorous 
formulations and observation. It was favoured, but not critically reflected on, by the 
profession from the late 1930s to the 1970s. As Inoue (1987) and Hoyle and John 
(1995), as well as Harris (1983) were to note, the world of play, PE, and sport was 
not yet attuned to the “idea” of looking back upon its encounters.                                                                                 
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The premise of the “insight” teaching model is that insight defines and organises 
particular experiences. Insight points up significance for the beholder’s awareness.  
Insight implies dealing with something within reach, intimately felt by the learner-
agent and entails exploring one’s insight into the very core values of one’s 
understanding: one’s meaning. This mode of “teaching” places understanding as its 
foundation. The model attends to the contextual setting and the proper occasions in 
terms of when to speak, or not.  Knowledge, so this mode portrays, is such that it 
does not dismiss lightly the power of one’s alleged vision. It more willingly pursues 
and guide’s one’s insightful reach into the open sphere, or cosmos of meaning. 
 
The learner’s or beholder’s insight, in itself, however, cannot be dissected into simple 
sensory or verbal units that may be easily conveyed from one person to another. It 
can either be stimulated or prompted by much of what the teacher does. For 
example, the professional can display a technically complicated movement, and, by 
silent demonstration, the teacher’s performed act may provide its “observing-
audience” with information for their own consumption and benefit. Perhaps observers 
break up that movement into various “sections” and thus cue in their own perceived 
insights to try to interlace together their interpretation of the technique.  With the 
onus falling upon a science-informed and calculated technique, movement’s 
“meaning” is left to the mover’s own insight and subsequent contemplation. The 
performer’s encounter may have been mulled over, but later, whatever the 
revelations for its agent, they were still left aside, or outside the teacher’s concern. 
The learner’s own appraisal on one’s own behalf could equally be acquired by 
reading about it, or be in Tokyo televiewing its performance at London’s 2012 
Olympics.  In this teaching mode, if indeed any insight does occur, it extends beyond 
what is thus merely seen to be done. There is a difference between an event and its 
doing, and one’s agency being “done-to”. 
 
Teaching in this mode is an attempt to simplify how one can learn “to move”. It is a 
legitimate way of highlighting what are thought to be movement skill’s important 
features and weaknesses. Nonetheless, this model again serves only to repeat the 
same weakness and limitations of the behavioural mode of teaching.    
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The expressive-process model 
                                                
The “rule-model”, is strong where the behavioural model is weakest. In its concern 
for the conservation of knowledge, the latter fails to do justice to innovation. The 
former addresses itself to the problem of new knowledge resulting largely from the 
teaching encounter. The latter emphasises flexible and manipulative fragments 
[micro/nano levels] at the expense of understanding; the former stresses primarily 
the acquisition of insight.  The latter paid inordinate attention to externalised 
information; the former attached importance to first-hand inspection of different 
versions of “realities” by more fully acknowledging the necessity for the pupil to earn 
one’s knowledge by one’s own efforts. The central position held in this expressive-
processing teaching style rests on the psychosomatic phenomenon, the mentally and 
embodied felt emotion of vision or glimpsed images of insightful knowledge.  
Encountering this teaching mode enables the learner to become involved in the 
knowledge’s acquisition in terms of a more corroborated and insightful grasp, in 
knowledge’s immanent nature.         
               
According to this expressive “model”, the learning process is concerned with taking 
up, or treating the pupil as a person, as another living “being, a being almost akin to 
the mature PE advocate; but who is less exposed to conflict between what is claimed 
to be “the known” and that which is yet to be “made known”.  Inevitably, therefore, as 
beginner-learner, the learner creates nothing less than a situation of conflict. A 
conflict always lies in need of resolution and thus involves wrestling with conceptual 
innovation.  Certainly, my student teacher “Iago” found this aspect of inter-personal 
engagement disturbing. His inner sense of unease, manifested as a tense reaction, 
suggested that his private perception, his own image, his self-perception of his own 
being, should be concealed from others. The possibility here is that by over-revealing 
what happens to us during these excessive moments of austere loneliness, or 
exuberance and companionship, the teacher might find oneself in a state of mind to 
say more than one would like to say to another person. 
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Reviving the insight mode of teaching 
 
Denied the insight that was to be revealed in post structuralism’s linguistic analysis, 
modern PE found itself trying to bridge its professional concerns between the 
inexplicable realm of play and that of the beguiling world of sports whilst employing 
the language of science. The playful act was perceived only as an overture, a 
nursery phase offering individuals a menu of movement disciplines which they 
enjoyed or rejected.   At the turn of this century, delivering PE encounters faced a 
confusing state of affairs (Saunders & Oliver 2003; Rossi & Cassidy 2001). PE 
encounters left many unexplained “links” for its “mover”. The “insight” model 
however, laid the grounding for what was later to be labelled the “expressive-
process” model. During its prototype testing time, however, the learner’s curiosity 
about one’s movement experiences was left unattended to; regardless of whether it 
was dampened, or raised as to what movement may come to mean for him or her.  
 
Pre -1980s PE sidelined the phenomenon of “curiosity”, laid to one side its attention 
to movement’s oddity, its ambiguous affect on us. But, for Berlyne (1966: 889) the 
notion of “human inquisitiveness” suggests that movement’s affect occurs when the 
subject finds oneself exposed to novel, surprising, ambiguous, problem-raising or 
otherwise conflict-inducing experience, as is ever the case in movement. The very 
distraction, or, the allure of curiosity, he says, impels the subject to: 
 
   …seek external stimulation containing the information that he needs to remove his 
uncertainties and resolve his problem or else to engage in ideational processes that will lead 
to the solution of the problem.   
 
 
It was his play on Berlyne’s “ideational process”, that William Taylor, (1986) in St 
Paul’s and St Mary’s annual professional lecture entitled, “Improving Teaching – Can 
We?” that caught my imagination. 
 
Drawing on the use of imagination not only invites intuition, it also exalts personal 
expression, and enables one to experience delight in the eloquence with which the 
learner’s vision has been re-presented, both in the gesture of the movement, and 
subsequently, in the use of one’s language to describe how to convey that gesture.  
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Clearly, this teaching model does not specify the behaviour which the pupil is to 
acquire after engaging in such a learning enterprise.  Nevertheless, it invites both 
teacher and learner to explore, defer, or focus on issues that are of peculiar interest 
or import that serve to illuminate their mutual inquiries.  Such an educational 
encounter may lead both teacher and pupil into a discussion that is undertaken not 
for the sake of coming to some conclusion, but rather, as Hampshire (1960: 165) 
says:        
   …for the sake of what one might see on the way. 
 
Associated with this type of insightful learning is knowledge gained, but, which is also 
understood in the form of a striking insight, a sudden eye-opener, like a surprising 
infusion of thought, or feeling: an inspiration. Foe me, inspirations come more when I 
am running, rather than when I am imprisoned between chair and computer. A 
moment ago I did not realize, but, now I do. I am indeed a slow learner. 
                                 
After my retirement from the University of Gloucestershire, I had time to read such 
text as Tanner’s (1999) “Schopenhauer”, Suzuki’s (2006) “Zen Mind, Beginner’s 
Mind”, and Frayn’s (2007) “The Human Touch”. I became over-involved in the 
author’s text. Condensing and recomposing others’ knowledge for the sake of 
squeezing their wisdom into my thesis, led me to fall into a deeper quagmire, out of 
which I am now trying to re-surface: to make their knowledge as that of my own. 
Importantly, what I do sketch in this thesis is a profile of how learning comes about. I 
cannot learn by myself. Others before me have done most of the hard work. They 
have already trodden the path of education, and, as I now “see”, have made the 
process of crossing into the realm of knowledge more accessible for their followers.  
 
And this is what the introduction of ML into PE’s practices tries to put on offer. I 
conceive ML as unpacking the notion of pedagogy and as a guide to move beyond 
the systemic sphere of teaching to enter into that of the more diverse and 
challenging realm of offering experiences from which learning can be realized. ML is 
my way of coping with the hitherto hidden realm of crossing from modern PE’s recipe 
to teach to that of contemporary PE’s search making movement more accessible as 
a form of knowledge.  
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The evaluative mode is still evolving  
 
Also referred to as the “rule-mode”, this evaluative-process model of teaching 
reaches back, as it were, to enquire of the mover how moving “events” may have 
affected, or influenced him or her, and what impressions did these acts reveal. This 
processing–model of teaching touches on the solitude and confidentiality of one’s 
emotions which can either improve trust in its participants, or inhibit interpersonal-
relations; this is what Westerners casually refer to as subjective concerns.  
 
Subjective concerns are personal concerns. Personal concerns are always 
vulnerable to preconceived notions [entrenched but unconscious bias] we all seem to 
possess. But, our personal apprehensions, our anxieties are susceptible to hidden 
prejudice which may lead to further confusion, rather than help lead us towards more 
indicative answers. Disquiet and dismay lead to consternation. Worry leads to 
divergent speculation [panic] rather than to convergent conclusions.  Such is the 
nature of learning. Learning is accounted for, eventually, only by giving way to what 
Thomas (1983: 34) refers to as “certain leaps of faith”. According to this ascertaining 
model, the distinctiveness of knowing is characterised in terms of a simplistic vision, 
or unsubstantiated insight into meaning, which, in itself, lacks credibility. This is 
because it is impossibly simple.  In other words, the notion that what is crucial in 
knowledge relies on the gift of a vision of all underlying versions of “realities”, an 
unending process of consulting what is found in leaps of faith in the mind. It is far too 
straight-forward and reveals this teaching mode at its weakest. 
 
Too reliant on reason? 
 
The primary philosophical emphasis of the rule model is on reason, and reason is 
always a matter of abiding by general rules or principles.  The concepts of principles, 
reasons and consistency go hand in hand and apply both in the cognitive judgement 
of beliefs, and, the moral assessment of conduct. They define a general concept of 
rationality.  A rational person is one who is consistent in thought and in action, 
adheres to impartial and generalisable principles, freely chosen as binding upon 
oneself.  On this position, rationality is an essential aspect of human dignity. In its 
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deed, in its intended use, the rational goal of humanity is to construct a society in 
which such dignity shall blossom into a society, so ordered, as to adjudicate 
rationally the affairs of free rational agents. From this specifically Kantian point of 
view, [that the derivation of God emanates from the human desire for the existence 
of moral values], Kant held the idea that it is the mind that organises knowledge or 
reality. That is, the mind, exclusively, enables us to make sense of experience. Our 
body plays no part in how we make sense. It follows, therefore, that the principal 
purpose of education is to develop character in the broadest sense, namely 
principled mind-induced thought and action, in which the dignity of the human being 
is manifest. 
 
Beyond the impression model, the mere receiving and the stringing together of 
information, and beyond the insight model, the exercise of cognitive judgement, the 
pupil must satisfy a further condition in order to know the proposition expressed by 
the teacher’s statements or the belief in question.  This condition involves the 
capacity for a principled assessment of reasons bearing on justification of the belief 
in question.  That is, the pupil must earn the right to attain confidence in their own 
belief by acquiring the capacity to make a reasonable case for the belief in question.  
However, as a condition of knowledge it is not yet sufficient for the listener to have 
been explicitly taught.  What is generally expected of the pupil is that their making 
and course of actions are evidenced in the ability to construct fresh or alternative 
arguments.  The pupil should manifest their capacity to generate one’s reasoned 
argument, to advance innovative argument, rather than replicate stale arguments 
earlier stored, and merely inculcated.              
 
According to this rule mode of PE delivery, teaching should be geared not simply to 
the transfer of information, nor even to the development of insight, that is, to the 
hidden inculcation of principled judgement and conduct. Mosston and Ashworth’s 
positivistic and epistemological teaching “spectrum” was founded on the logic that 
eventually its advocates could gradually retreat, “distance oneself” and in time, even 
be removed from the mover’s learning-of-movement enterprises. In this way, 
teachers assumed to an overseer position, whilst “movers” attained sufficient 
knowledge to teach themselves about movement. The classroom interaction was 
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systematically and strategically simplified in order to construct an irreducible 
“objective” set of causal relationships between teaching styles and learning 
outcomes.  Unwittingly, therefore, it uncoupled personal concerns from movement’s 
cultural settings, largely because the entire “scheme” stalled when it came to the 
level of a communiqué, of issuing statements only. It did not reach the level of inter-
communication: how to do things with words, and thus to engage in critique.  In this 
case it is not sufficient for PE “communicators” to simply tell pupils what to do by 
giving out an informative message as if it is a statement released by a public agency, 
sent from an anonymous source to an anonymous receiver. Nothing is exchanged 
since it is a request or an order between what effectively remains: two strangers who 
remain unfamiliar with each other and their respective worlds.   
 
Proposed differences between PL’s connections and ML’s sharing  
 
Physical literacy is PE’s most recent response to postmodernism’s initiatives was 
that of the highly acknowledged introduction of Whitehead’s emerging concept of 
Physical Literacy (PL) (2010: 64-66). She described PL as: 
 
…a capability [competence and aptitude] the understanding of which demands an 
appreciation that spans both pre-reflective and reflective aspects of human embodied 
functioning; that is, both the embodiment-as-lived and the concrete embodied form.(p.64) 
 
             …A new discourse is needed to move on from language forms commonly used in                                     
Western culture that seem only to refer to our embodied dimension, that is, as an 
object.(p.66) 
 
PL calls on PE’s profession to come to an understanding that humans do have an 
“embodied dimension” that functions on at least two “levels” of perception, but that 
these “levels” are not, as yet, part of everyday language in Western culture. 
Westerns are not used to referring to certain aspects of our human condition, to 
what, for example, can be spoken about in terms like “being the body”. The “body”, 
Whitehead points out, is classified as a noun, a thing, an “it”, and it will be a huge 
task to change both the appreciation of our embodied dimension and the habitual 
way in which “it” is referred to in our common parlance. 
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PL was conceived as a guide for parents and children [0-14 years] to become more 
acquainted to “read” the environment and make appropriate decisions. Its advocated 
practices proactively seek to encourage novices to move confidently and with some 
control in a wide range of physical activity situations. Its prime ambition is to nurture 
a foundational PE philosophy for a life-long participation and a committed belief to 
attain the best of one’s ability. PL offers a sense of harmony between participation 
and excellence in sport-like activities. Ideally, the notion of physical literacy is 
developed prior to the adolescent growth spurt (Higgs C., Balyi, I. & R. Way 2008).  
PL’s multi-disciplined professional learner treatment tries to prepare all its 
participants with an imaginary and attractive panoramic “concept” of physical activity 
as differently encountered through the many phases of one’s life-course. PL is 
conceived as a novice mover confidently sharing with experienced knower a search 
for something that is “appropriate” to each learner’s physical endowment. Whitehead 
defines PL (2012:11-12) as: 
 
            … the motivation, confidence, physical competence, knowledge and understanding to 
maintain physical activity throughout the lifecourse. 
 
 
The coming to understand something about all the above features is considered to 
be of vital importance to the individual if, as Whitehead maintains, one is to grow and 
develop as a physically and morally “well-balanced” embodied being. 
 
PL explores for significant meaning(s) by “languaging movement”. For now, 
“languaging movement” refers to PE specialists subjecting their mover agent’s 
phenomenological [personal] account to hermeneutic treatment addressing the 
speaker’s unconscious and  social [deprived or prospering] “situatedness”.  
Languaging movement is a notion critical to this thesis to which I shall refer and 
further develop throughout the ensuing chapters. 
 
As praxis, PL further seeks to rationalise why one’s allegiance to daily exercise 
should be perceived as a lifelong commitment. Purposefully adopting close attention 
to our embodied dimensions, PL invites a “reading” into as a literary form of 
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movement interpretation; as a way of linking a caring empathy with others and the 
local environment.  
 
For example, Whitehead perceives a physical literate either as being blessed with a 
dispositional trait and/or having achieved a nurtured ability to capitalize on one’s self 
and another‘s innate movement potential to contribute to the quality of life. When 
exposed to PL’s personal treatment practices, the participant movement learner is 
encouraged to develop (a) one’s own ability to identify and articulate the essential 
qualities that influence the effectiveness and appeal of their personal physical 
performance, and (b) an understanding of the principles of embodied health, with 
respect to the basic aspects such as exercise, sleep and nutrition. 
 
On the other hand, and in direct contrast, “physical illiteracy” is a concept which, 
according to Whitehead (2012: 7), perpetuates a dualistic attitude in those who tend 
to minimize their physical task.  A “physical illiterate” finds little attraction to perform 
what is perceived as extraneous and intimidating activities. Hence, one avoids any 
involvement in physical activity in all situations whenever alternatives are possible in 
order to guard against failure or humiliation which negatively creates a sense of low-
esteem.   
 
PL’s underdeveloped guidance 
 
As conveyed by Whitehead, to become physically literate is possible “irrespective" of 
one’s motile capacity or practical body-proficiency so that ultimately, one may still 
develop an appetite for PE’s potential linkage to life.  PL aspires to expose some 
educational deficiencies in Modern PE’s “hidden curriculum” and acknowledges the 
professions’ need to understand and respect new “literary” forms of knowledge 
operating in speech acts as veiled injustice and inequitable learner treatment by PE’s 
missionaries. Nevertheless, these linguistic knowledge impediments and learning 
restrictions are not explicitly publicised and challenged as a way of conveying PL’s 
message to understand human actions which nurture self confidence.  
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My thesis differs from PL because ML aspires to nourish one’s self-value and 
propositional knowledge, and emphasizes the necessity for learners to be able to 
cope with and gain respect for one’s own “motile capacity. Furthermore, what PL has 
not been addressed is the veiled way language “itself” operates. To appreciate one’s 
physical capacity compels PE’s language to be revivified. It is to clarify PL’s 
underdeveloped “literary” and tangential messages that I introduce ML. The role of 
language use in PL is to advance PE as an educational and personally beneficial 
enterprise. This ambition is repeatedly stressed by Whitehead. Yet, what has not 
been addressed is the potential ambiguity which language use may create to hinder 
its correspondents’ learning experiences. 
 
As professional communicative practices, both PL and ML appreciate the need to 
generate empathy with one’s learner’s “motile-capacity”. Complimenting the learner 
for one’s physical prowess is one thing. Even so, when it comes to a learner’s 
“limited-motile” skills, then, as Whitehead’s PL acknowledges, PE enterprises can 
create non-receptive experiences of social and personal alienation. I proffer ML as a 
refined linguistic way to alleviate movement as a self-negation enterprise.  
 
In effect, PL’s practices do not attempt to “more directly” address what I have labeled 
as PE’s “ludic Rubicon”. Again, what I mean by referring to PE’s “ludic Rubicon” is 
when, (i) in the act of moving, its resident “in-dweller” finds oneself swamped in an 
ambiguous experiential state of mind,  (ii) one can temporarily encounter a telling 
loss of “self awareness”. Seemingly one is showered with endless signals by one’s 
thoughts, ideas, values, impressions and perceptions, all obscured by many as yet 
unexplained “knowledge gaps”. These gaps may befall us in PE encounters. They 
hovering in-between theoretical and practical knowledge.  They become vaguely 
apparent to us as residing in-between abstract, subjective concerns and material, 
objective issues. Trying to cope with their overwhelming nature can hinder [dislodge 
and fragment] self learning and learning between experienced addressor and naïve 
addressee.  Whilst PL strongly informs and orientates its movers towards PE’s 
potential meaning for each participant individual, it does not offer some key guidance 
as to how to best tackle PE’s own Achilles heel, that is, the task of how to “manage” 
cognitive and emotionally touching words which pass between signified and signifier. 
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ML differs from PL  
 
ML holds a higher aspiration for the use of language. ML’s quest for teacher and 
learner is to be reflective and reflexive about PE and self. Its praxis includes 
enhancing one’s ability to know how and when PE professionals may apply one’s 
maturing professional “nous”. ML aspires to convey PE enterprises by guiding and 
comforting movers especially when traumatized or disoriented from self following 
physical encounters. ML also helps those who seek to become more intrigued about 
their entranced, exhilarated PE moments.  
 
What ML generates is mover’s acknowledgment for all PE correspondents to 
consensually raise awareness to PE’s many unexplained cognitive and emotional 
“gaps”. By venturing into PE’s ambiguous “ludic Rubicon”, ML seeks to accompany 
its resident mover(s) out of many “knowledge gaps” by offering each other an 
interpretation of the movement-event. ML exploits this accessible testimony to 
formulate an identity of the human nature of PE’s agent commentator. ML’s key 
ambition is to render PE experiences as meaningful and therapeutic for all its 
participants. In addition, its “sub-plot” is to explain the necessary but ill-defined 
protocols which allow pedagogy to develop from teaching to “andragogy” stemming 
from pedagogic practice. 
 
ML’s onus is to engage in a critical, interpretive, and imaginatively moving language. 
Its task is to generate speakers’ and listeners’ versatile and imaginatively fluent 
conversational language. ML readers are invested with responsibility to exercise their 
literary capacity to detect and address each other’s ontological nature which may 
arise between one’s conscious and unconscious awareness. Effectively and 
affectively, ML tries to engage its correspondents in a dialogic discourse which offers 
a different mode of understanding movement and one’s “self” from the way in which 
Modern PE was taught. As an “entrée” into “andragogy”, ML openly discusses the 
communicative problems of interpretation, and the goal towards which interpretation 
moves. 
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Andragogy for 15 year-old and beyond  
 
Both ML and andragogy can infuse PE experiences with aspects of lived-encounters, 
but the latter’s practice is the hardest for physical educationalists to attain. 
Andragogy is orientated towards adult language and is best understood not in terms 
of a “direct application” of a series of pre-determined ploys [strategies]. It is not, for 
example, the act of applying something to “fit” a particular use. Rather, andragogy 
evolves as a discrete and sensitive process of knowing more when to employ 
defensible reasons why one should follow traditional but now lost tangential and 
unwritten educational-learning procedures.  Andragogy is a deliberated process of 
“languaging movement”. 
 
Andragogy alludes to the kind of learning knowledge that resides in-between words, 
or to imaginative ideas that strike us during purposeful moments of silence. Whilst PL 
is a philosophy and a means of learning about movement and certainly draws 
attention to one’s self as resourced from the act of moving, PL also helps to 
translate/ transform systemic teaching into pedagogy’s invitational realm of debate. 
Located beyond PL’s published agenda, however, ML’s deep-seated mission is to 
transcend pedagogy into andragogy’s more consummate form of 
describing/discussing moving encounters as a way to learn. ML embraces the 
speaker’s response to movement’s task as well as examines meaning immanent in 
the speaker’s reply to human resourced rhetoric.  
 
Further featured from Chapter 7 onwards, andragogy involves calling upon the 
uttered but only partially fettered voices and conscious temperament of professional 
specialists to act as benign co-explorers into PE’s unavoidable and yet unexplained 
knowledge “gaps”. From PL’s experiential grounding in dialogue, ML’s praxis serve 
as a prelude to andragogy which  I conceive as an intimate way to accompany the 
suspension of the learner’s self during awesome PE encounters. Incessantly, via ML, 
andragogy searches for the mover’s own reasoned sense of alignment with 
movement, or desire to move. 
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My thesis is that simultaneously, ML establishes the grounds for being interested in 
PE’s lifeworld and simultaneously detects hints into the mover’s “consciousness 
intent” as made retrospectively available in its correspondents’ mode of language.  
 
Reflective thinking is used to make qualitative decisions about movement 
 
Qualitative movement account aims to gather in-depth understanding of human 
behaviour and the reasons that govern such behaviour. Qualitative approaches 
explore the why and how of decision making, not just what, where and when. They 
pose questions like, “What is learning to move like?” “When should one employ PL?”  
“Why and how does ML share in the potential act of learning?”  “How does ML offer 
someone a sense in which the speaker is seen as the author of one’s words or 
alternatively is a product of one’s words?” “Can PE nurture a sense of self, develop 
relationships with others?” and “Can one begin to philosophise conceptual and 
definitional issues as emanating from the body?” 
 
Conventionally viewed, qualitative concerns tend to produce information only on a 
particular person, or a single incident, and that any more conclusions are only 
propositions [informed assertions]. Assertions are used for hypothesing, for testing, 
and for generlaizing beyond particular case studies. A case study is a strategy of 
reflexive learning which can evolve into an agency-membership network, a network 
which can develop its own speech community, as modern PE did.  
 
Differently, ML’s informed practitioner is called upon to deliberate on a range of 
physical experiences and openly debate about such enterprises. ML’s rationale is 
concerned with nurturing a PE professional’s vocational posture and deliberated 
behaviour when  interacting with one’s participant learner-movers. ML subjects PE’s 
daily language to critical and interpretive hermeneutic treatment. It is a treatment of 
words which, in their astute usage, are then capable of evoking an empathetic 
“feeling” for transformative pedagogy. This altering pedagogy is explained in Chapter 
7 as craft wisdom blended with experiencial wisdom. ML offshoots from a pedagogy 
which is artistic in the manner which participants present and represent themselves, 
neither marginalising the self nor the other person; a process which constitues a risk-
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taking enterprise.  In tandem,  both practices attune its participants to the lifeworld of 
movement and allows both correspondents to perceive different glimpses whilst 
being located/dislocated in the moving act.  
 
In its unending fruition, ML challenges Modern PE’s discourse of “domiation” to 
produce a more just and “liberating” education. Theraputically, through tact and 
thoughtfulness, ML aspires to “heal” learners who have become privately 
traumatised in movement and perhaps alienated from their embodied identity, as well 
as having experienced a fragmented sense of social and personal isolation. Whilst 
physical competence is not prioritized as a concern for the professional educator to 
comment on, ML fully acknowledges one’s performative skills to be of vital 
significance to the moving-agent. ML attends to physical skills particularly in terms of  
their qualitiative potential to enhance, fragment or distance one’s self-image.  This is 
because self-assurance and  appreciation of one’s movement endowment  affect 
physical confidence.  
 
ML becomes PL’s underpinning project to “voice” movement to life. It draws the 
profession’s fundamental re-orientation to PE’s generic but now immanent 
processing conditions which allow learning to occur. ML locates and interprets 
human movement as a vitalizing and precious source of finding who we are, our 
ontological standing. It aspires to value movement as a refreshing way to resource 
our selves, which we must care for with unremitting attention, and not deal with 
ourselves only when we malfunction, or feel dispirited. Somewhat differently, what 
PL does is to bring our bodies into discussion under the subject of PE and tries a 
balancing act to focus on PE enactment through a vast range of other curriculum 
subjects’ academic lenses. 
 
Balancing act 
 
For movement’s “educator/translator”, however, “teaching” is always a balancing act 
sustained between the world of technique and that of expression, between the 
knowing body and the moving mind; a mind that consumes our awareness when it is 
immersed either in the playful mode (Bresler 2004), or in the deeply contemplative 
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realm of meditation and when boundaries disappear in a deep flow of being and 
“joy”. It is from within such a state of mind, in the unfolding of what Suzuki (2006: 18) 
enigmatically refers to as an “unrestricted mind”, or “Buddha” mind that we encounter 
both doubt and possibility.  Meditating grants us the ability to see things anew.  
 
Buddha was not interested in some metaphysical existence, but in his own body and 
mind, in the here and now. Immersed in this so called “beginner’s” mind is the 
practice of a Zen mind.  A Zen mind is a workable religion and discipline about 
posture and breathing. Zen is about reaching the basic attitudes and understanding 
all of which make Zen practice possible. Similar to what play can bestows on us, the 
notion of non-duality [monism], Zen achieves an empty mind and enlightenment 
[learning]. Such learning is conceived as a partial revelation only, since this form of 
learning retains concealment at the same time. Zen helps us to realise the deepest 
expression of our own nature when we teach ourselves, when our practices, attitude 
and understanding roughly correspond to body, feeling and mind, all sythesised as a 
“locale of tranquility”. This is a condition during which Buddhists consider the wise 
may seeks for wisdom, and the experiencing human may approach enlightenment.   
 
In Chapter 7, I draw from Ricoeur’s text (1992) “ Oneself as Another”, on his account 
of philosophical “ethics,” which lays the groundwork for a metaphysics of morals, 
pressing on the need for us all not to shut ourselves off from the insights available in 
alternative traditions of knowledge and topics. ML serves as a stepping stone linking 
PL to Knowles’s “andragogy” (1980; 1985; 2005). Already mentioned and partially 
explained, ML’s informed andragogic practice specifically shows what intricate 
exchanges and interchanges of potential meaning occur when speakers and 
listeners engage in mature conversation.   
 
For example, through ML, linking PL to “andragogy”, andragogy can evolve only if its 
correspondents participate in a conversation that treats both its interlocutors with 
mutual respect and dignity. PE’s silent mode of learning to flourish cannot be 
conducted by the knower’s efforts alone since learning is a co-dependent act, relying 
on both its participant’s responses, when each appreciates that the other person is 
both a knower and a learner.  
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Summary 
 
This chapter has shown modern PE had responded too quickly to adopt scientific 
“ideas” and too slow to adopt notions of “playful imagination” into its practices. In 
tandem, ideas and imagination mutate radically from one epoch to another and the 
history of teaching models is more like a saga and less like a linear progression. 
PE’s evolution actually reads as history of human nature, a story that is well worth 
telling in more than one way, but PE’s meaning and significance remain untold by its 
profession.  For example, alongside a history of “nature” there is a corresponding 
history of ideas about human self-knowledge. My proposal for advancing ML is that 
through this un-deciphered mutation between nature and human nurturing, between 
the subjective abstractions and knowledge as objective facts, knowledge itself has 
become ever more intangibly and inextricably linked through non-transformative e-
language. It is not a kind of information ladder “Information Technology” (I.T.).  I.T. is 
information which gives form to the mind and is of a nature that transforms the social 
practices which make certain forms of knowledge possible. Currently, ML is a kind of 
“Luddite” analysis of movement and language countering PE’s rigid communication 
mode which dehumanizes PE’s consequences.   
 
For instance, I agree with the limits of artificial knowledge criticized by Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus (1986). They argue that human intelligence and expertise depend primarily 
on unconscious instincts rather than conscious symbolic manipulation, and that 
these unconscious skills could never be captured in formal rules. Their critique was 
based on the insights of modern continental philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty 
(1962), whose early philosophy is examined in the next chapter and interpreted 
through a range of others who have examined Merleau-Ponty’s (1964-2003) work on 
the phenomenology of the body. These thinkers include Kwant (1963),  Edie (1973), 
Olkowski and Morley (1999) and more recently, Shusterman (2005).   
They all claim that “technology”, which I have denigrated in the context of PE’s 
teaching, among other things acts as an amplifier to expand our boundaries of 
human understanding. For instance, Mosston and Ashworth’s “Spectrums” and 
technology’s strength lie in an approach which makes action possible. Their 
weakness, however, is that the very reason for action is hidden in the unquestioned 
 84
assumptions of a theory or paradigm, so that we see the world around us and each 
other in different ways. Separating facts from values implies the separation of the 
cognizing “subject” from the “object” of cognition. Eventually, the PE profession must 
acknowledge that different discourses produce different “truths”. It needs to free itself 
from paradigmatic mind-sets, to become more localised and personalised.  
One should not forget that movement “disciplines” are, in themselves, paradigms of 
lived experiences concepts wrapped up in language’s bureaucracy. But, language 
can have the hermetic effect of sealing formulaic models of teaching which give the 
illusion of bringing everything under control, confining the teacher’s attention to their 
overt technical framework, without informing one that other covert and personal 
factors relating to human interaction are left unattended. In order to alleviate self-
sabotage and promote self-enhancement, I turn to reveal some of PE’s covert 
[phenomenological] modes of personal knowledge in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Four      Phenomenology         
                    
Introduction  
 `  
Transferring and transforming private experiences into public knowledge 
 
This chapter centres on Merleau-Ponty’s (1962; 1964a; 1973) radical notion of a 
“body-subject”. Understanding his enfleshed or “fleshly world” helps inexpereinced 
PE specialist students to begin to “feel” what it is like to become a pedagogue. 
 
By bringing the constitution of the body under critical review, Merleau-Ponty’s 
embodied attention to movement and, later, to language awareness brings the body 
even more into the direct concern to the PE profession in terms of one’s ethical 
treatment of another. Following Merleau-Ponty’s embodied conceptions, learner’s 
movements now need to be understood by its advocate and agent as an interchange 
of located places and dispositional postures.  Acording to Merleau-Ponty, a change 
befalls its agent as a consequence both in physical terms [medical health] and 
emotionaly [sensitivity and self-confidence] as one becomes aware of a reconstitued 
“self”.  
 
This chapter aims to explain how a movement educator invites the participant to 
construct an animating and evocative description [anecdotal text] of one’s action, and 
the experiential consequences met in those “events”. The professional’s purpose is 
to make use of words, because it is through the experience of the performance, in 
conjunction with its agent’s utterance that aspects of the sentient nature of the mover 
can be found. The description situtates the speaker by providing testimony to one’s 
own innner sense of being. In this chapter I also refer to my experience of being 
“inside” movement through Eastern thought.  
 
In pursuit of meaning 
                         
In its broadest sense the meaning of an “object”, or the “meaning of meaning” as  
Cassirer (1944:112) puts it, is meaning’s multiple positioning of relatedness, or 
attachment to all other objects with which it is associated with the experience of its 
incumbent agent. In our bodily presence, we both reveal something about ourselves 
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and we always conceal something at the same time – not necessarily consciously or 
deliberately, but rather in spite of ourselves. This is because the direct impetus of our 
embodied kinaesthetic feeling seems to shade the clarity of our thinking at the time 
into a kaleidoscopic encounter, startling enough to leave its most impressive of 
impressions, but also overwhelming enough not to allow the minute details of its 
glimpses to be caught. 
 
I continue to construct ML by interpreting PL as a conjectural curriculum which is 
stimulated by recognizing the shift from structuralist language that PE needs to 
acknowledge to that of a poststructuralist linguistic analysis. The latter focuses on 
expression which fastens on to the individual speaker and his or her associated or 
dispositional characteristics. Voicing PL, ML seeks opportunities and a cause for 
reflection, on the basis of a study of language itself which is more useful in prompting 
the uncertainty of questions than in delivering the finality of answers: at once, 
sceptical towards inherited authority and affirmative about future possibilities. In 
Chapter 6 I bridge the gap between last century’s transformations from the realm of 
teaching into those of its pedagogic philosophy of engaging others in a hermeneutic 
critique of dialogue. I advance ML as a way of nurturing PE’s contemporary 
communication processing via the immanent discipline of a dialogic discourse [a now 
hidden code which I show to be pedagogy’s protocol and is rich in its correspondents’ 
displays for independence].  Independence is the capacity of one to think with a 
mature caring awareness for another, discretely placing the other’s interest ahead of 
one’s own. 
 
Modern PE was exercised as if professional practices could be resolved into 
analysis. As a form of action, then, teaching was not seen as embedded in particular 
contexts or within cultural, linguistic, or political traditions which may be at work in all 
kinds of tacit and nuanced ways in teachers and pupils as persons. It was assumed 
that everything essential to teaching could be removed from such concerns, as well 
as from the urgencies and contingencies of the “classroom”. Constantly, PE needs to 
look more seriously into the unity of experience in knowledge, expression, and action 
of the agent learner and see the educative task, [which is the actualization of certain 
preferred dispositions].  I exhibit who I am by what I do and say, and the witnessed 
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evidence bears testimony as a form of open texture of who I am and how I think 
about the world. 
 
Public knowledge, private experiences 
 
I show what I can do in PE, but I also need to account for my actions. This is why 
“teaching” needs to embrace the philosophical movement of phenomenology, to 
allocate speaking time to learners to gain access to the kind of person one is, behind 
the teaching role, and behind the learning role. Phenomenology is an attempt to 
reconcile and combine opposing perspectives, such as empiricism and rationalism. 
Although it originally responded to problems in scientific thinking, arbitrating over the 
confusion between abstract and material substances, it can now be used as a form 
of confessional therapy (Becker, 1992). Phenomenology came to be seen as a way 
to help stabilize [re-settle, and comfort] individuals who felt the sense of loss, of 
having encountered meaninglessness in their lives. One of the most important 
branches of 20th century thought, phenomenology, like all new philosophical 
movements, opened new dimensions, one of which was existentialism. 
Phenomenology with existentialism offered people a way of facing the cold realities 
of life without despairing, by saying, in effect: take responsibility for your own world 
and work to realize the potential of your existence in your own terms, because this is 
the way I am dealing with my life; I, who offer this advice, am advising myself.  In an 
important way, advisors, therapists, counselors and, today, life-coaches, are who 
and what they are, largely because they themselves have either experienced life at 
its edges, or come into contact with others who have. It is with the “I was there 
significance” that seems to endorse one’s own reminiscence.  Teaching is like this. It 
brings into one’s presence the past of its knower. It should also bring into focus the 
nature of the knower, something “Iago” found impossible to cope with, indeed, 
seriously avoided. 
 
Experiential roots of phenomenology 
 
Phenomenology was developed by philosopher/psychologist Husserl (1954; 1970 
and cited in Buytendijk, 1967) as a “movement”, which took on the task to study the 
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relation between the world, on the one hand, and the senses that experience the 
world on the other. For Husserl, [whose ideas I discuss later in this chapter] 
phenomenology is the necessary preliminary to any science of the mind, since it 
locates, prior to any description, classification, or explanation, the individual mental 
acts which psychology [and, currently, neuro-psychology] must investigate, since 
movement is now accepted and interpreted as capable of placing its inhabitant agent 
into some delirium-like but also vivid, state of being (Devine, 1984). Moreover, 
embodied movement and its languaged [articulated] epiphanies may be regarded as 
the most profound resourced access to meaning (Abrams 1996; Allbright 1989; Bain 
1990; Bresler 2004). Meaning is created by mental acts, and the world becomes 
present through consciousness only through those acts. Hence, it is our 
understanding that determines the essence of things, by fixing the manner in which 
they are known. Phenomenology is about yielding a form of knowledge, not of facts, 
but of essences, the core fundamental nature of holding together the experience of a 
memory, or a meaning, such that, objects are only what individuals “make of them”.   
 
Physical Literacy; from its inception 
 
It was to draw more attention towards movement experiences that PL was 
introduced in the 1990s. Under the guidance of its originator, Dr Whitehead (1990; 
2001; 2005; 2010), PL ultimately asks from its movers “Movement for the sake of…?”  
It is an attractive schema in which its advocates use particular modes of “teachings 
and pedagogies”, that are “unrelated”  to physical ability, and which require the 
adoption of new modes of thinking about what happens to us in the act of moving.  
Rather, PL and its astute, deliberated, singled-out and differentiated voicing through 
ML opens movement’s experience to its schooling of life, as a “rite de passage”, not 
as a disposable ritual ceremony marking one’s individual change of status [as at 
puberty and marriage] but as undergoing change in the immediacy of its doing.  
Unlike many other curriculum subjects, you cannot set PE as homework. One can 
study the body’s workings in biological, physiological or mechanical terms; the laws 
of the conservation of motion. One can study life in psychological, sociological and 
philosophical terms.  One can study language, one can study sport. But, most of the 
time, their discrete study remains discrete in the sense that the “reader” cannot 
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display their acquired cognitive knowledge unless he or she is able to transfer that 
knowledge to correctly answer a question, or to manifest that knowledge in how they 
present themselves.  
 
Most of the time, the language we speak is barely visible to us. We are more 
concerned with what it can do: buy a cup of tea; remonstrate with the referee to 
plead our innocence; or, using blatant deception, to feign innocence to lie. And yet, 
[outside the malaise that is contemporary sport] few issues are more important in life. 
After food and shelter, which are necessary for survival, language and its symbolic 
analogues are the most crucial determinants in our social relations, our thought 
processes, and our understanding [realization] of who and what we are. But, at the 
same time, language intervenes between human beings and their world.  Language-
use leaves us to rely not on causal facts, but on tenuous guesses.  
 
PE puts life’s characteristics on display 
 
Importantly, PL tries to accompany its participants’ moving encounters from its 
learner’s enterprising sense of “presence”. By presence, here, I am drawing attention 
to the kind of “charismatic” uplift that I encountered whilst swimming in the Indian 
Ocean, noted from my diary. I use my diary to remind myself of such memorable 
experiences and then, in its reading, I approach what I have written with a refreshed 
mind, asking questions upon questions, endeavoring to find new angles, new visions, 
new interpretations which help me to see this “incident” differently each time I think 
about it.  This is what Movement Literacy “does” to one. It asks questions from 
questions. For instance, when after two days travel, utterly exhausted and 
disheveled, I quietly slipped into the serenity of the Indian Ocean, off the Malaysian 
coast, and later wrote the following diary-notes:  
 
“Incredible… surreal warmth of the sea-water… exhilaration… elation…excitement…I remember 
…suddenly… my entire body felt as if …dissolved … I’m dancing with a piece of sea-weed swaying so 
deliciously calm in the elegant flow of the sea-water…were these my thoughts? I drifted away … 
where was I?... I imagined a sense of falling into my self…a kind of intrusive look …Did I really 
glimpse an image of a little me?  
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What PL aims for, eventually, is to help its movers better understand that movement 
really is a healthy activity, as well as to appreciate that tangentially our bodies also 
speak to us in their silence. I listen to my body each day. Perhaps this is a sign of 
insanity? But then, is it so strange that when I am tired then my body “tells” me to 
sleep?  Who tells me to run, when I am alone?  Who tells me to stop moving?  
 
Stirring new ideas into forgotten modes of pedagogy 
It was the profession’s innovative response to new initatives about meaning that were 
being challenged and changed as a consequence of phenomenological initiatives, 
and quickly followed by postructuralism’s language analysis, which, in turn, was 
subjected to hermeneutic’s forensic-like interpretation (Beckers 1996; Bernstein 
1988; Bleicher 1980; Caputo 1987; Dostal 1987; Drumm 1992; Gallagher 1992; 
Harris 1983).   
                
On the threshold of the 21st century, the profession faced the task of trying to 
relocate itself between languages, our human affairs, its flourishing, and the world 
consigned to silence. For me, PE is now called upon to reposition its ultimate focus 
by searching for the conditions which may reveal that which is “human” in us, as 
unveiled through “movement”. It is a PE which aspires to ignite/induce the mover’s 
self-interest. ML is a quest for creating a repository, to make available for others to 
compare and contrast PE’s hidden cache of experiences, experiences made 
available for comparison with that of their own. Speaking about these experiences is 
useful for others to be able to relate to, for others’ movement images to be made 
more readily accessible and pondered over. This is because movement is the 
readiest expression of individuality. It is a rare encounter, since it is lived incessantly 
as a spectacle between its public representation, and the private version of its 
experiences.  
 
If, as poets maintain, “experience is the child of thought”, then, it is in this direction I 
am trying to orientate the profession’s ambitions. I want to help others understand 
PE as a series of education enterprises; it is as much about how we talk and what 
we think, as much as what we do and think about what we have done, or what has 
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befallen us.  PE, as I wish it portrayed, is about the voiced, as much as the silent 
language of pedagogy.  
 
Body-Subject: a co-constitution of meaning 
 
 
According to Husserl (1995), we are already predisposed to understand our 
experiences in terms of the way that we relate to “reality” or “truth”.  Our relationship 
with reality, so Husserl maintained, is strongly influenced by the manner in which we 
come to comprehend the very nature of our relationships with others naturally by 
way of our Lebenswelt, how we think about people and things grow from our social 
connections.  In coming up with the ideas of the Lebenswelt, Husserl tried to 
correlate his phenomenology [which focussed on individual consciousness] with 
other philosophies that emphasized social influences [like Marxism] as an attempt to 
see the world with fresh eyes and provided a starting point for the existentialists such 
as Kierkegaard (2000) and Nietzsche (1992; 1995) who held that we need to rethink, 
or isolate for inspection as it were, not only what science says about the world, but 
also what religion and even philosophy say too. Globally, the way we think differs. 
Western philosophy, for instance, is strongly influenced by religion [when sacredness 
interprets the secular], whereas, it is the other way round in the Far East, religion is 
strongly influenced by philosophy [the secular seeks interest in the sacred].   
 
Existentialism is one of the most important philosophical views of the twenty century. 
And it is no coincidence that a student of Husserl’s, Heidegger (cited in Breivik, 
2007), was one of the first of such philosophers. Heidegger built on Husserl’s 
thinking by shifting from consciousness to “being”. What was important for Heidegger 
was not so much our experience of “reality” but our existence itself. Just as Husserl 
said that artificial attitudes interfere with our ability to appreciate our consciousness, 
Heidegger believed that the whole tradition of ideas about “being” actually interferes 
with our ability to appreciate our being. For Heidegger, the fact that things, including 
ourselves, exist is incredible and inexplicable, in spite of centuries of philosophical 
attempts to explain it. We need to see through these past explanations, says 
Heidegger, in order to see being for what it is.  His word for “being,” is dasein, of 
“being there.” Dasein is open to the possibility that you may need to create your own 
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meaning for life, in order to achieve, not a fake, delusional existence, but that of an 
“authentic” existence.  
 
Simultaneously, we also “experience” our experience in a special way; a 
representational version of it, containing now static, separable, bounded, but 
essentially fragmented entities, grouped into classes upon which predictions can be 
based. This kind of attention isolates, fixes, and makes each thing explicit by bringing 
it under the spotlight of our attention. However, in doing so, it renders things “inert”, 
mechanically lifeless. Yet, it also enables us, for the first time to know, and 
consequently to “learn to make things”, to give us power. 
 
For Heidegger, interpreting our existence is everything. Nothing lies outside, before, 
or beyond being, and being takes place in time. The fact that we exist in time means 
that we are always changing. We are no longer what we used to be; on our entry into 
the gymnasium we are not the same as when we leave it. It is by revealing the 
fundamental nature of each person’s discrete Da-sein, of the kind of existence we 
have, that we come to understand other kinds of existence, [that is, other senses of 
“being”] and thus begin to answer what Heidegger calls “the question of being”. He 
perceived knowledge as a process of growing through the world, where a certain 
foresight guides the Dasein towards gaining an authentic perspective on living. 
  
Part of what Heidegger took from phenomenology and applied to existentialism was 
the idea that you cannot separate knowledge from experience; they are both part of 
the same “reality”. You can not have an experience without in some sense knowing 
about it, and you can not have knowledge without experiencing the knowledge. In 
fact, says Heidegger, we can “know” before we even realize it. In other words, we 
develop attitudes and assumptions toward things without necessarily thinking about 
them. It was Sartre (cited in Kaufmann, 1975), however, who guided Heidegger’s 
and Husserl’s ideas in a new direction to show that “reality” is inherently 
meaningless. The problem, according to Sartre, is that we would all like just to exist 
independently of a made-up meaning, be we cannot: it is impossible. Sartre says that 
in addition to being what we are, we are also conscious of being. This is a problem 
because we cannot simply be conscious of ourselves being, without bringing in some 
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kind of meaning along with our consciousness. Whatever meaning we add is not 
necessarily better than any other meaning we could have added instead. As a result, 
we get lost in our own freedom to come up with resolutions and possible meanings. 
In Sartre’s words (1992) “We are condemned to be free”.                                                                              
 
Merleau-Ponty  
 
Modern PE was well set to place learners into its science informed and rule-bound 
realm of movement. But, as Merleau-Ponty (1962) revealed in his understanding of 
soccer, a mover’s body-training is one thing, whilst an existential understanding of 
the game becomes the privileged knowledge only of those who play the game, not 
merely study it from the outside as an armchair voyeur. His point was that we can 
study the history of soccer, from its documented accounts, however, to “know” the 
game one must become involved in exploring its ancient traditions from the “inside”:    
 
     …The body is our general medium for having a world. Sometimes it is restricted to the 
actions necessary for the conservation of the life, and accordingly, it posits around us a 
biological world; at other times, elaborating upon these as primary actions and moving from 
their literal to the figurative meaning, it manifests through them a core of new significance: 
this is true of motor habits such as dancing. Sometimes, finally the meaning aimed at 
cannot be achieved by the body’s natural means; it must then build itself an instrument, and 
it projects thereby around itself a cultural world.                                                   (1962:146) 
                                                                                     
 
By literal [factual, in word by word] and figurative [metaphorical, or symbolic] 
meaning, Merleau-Ponty was trying to bring into harmony movement’s “technical 
make-up”, with that of its capacity to draw our attention to the fact that we become 
familiar with physical events, both as spectators, and, via our embodied experience 
and perceptual structures, our powers of sensibility.  
 
In Merleau-Ponty’s core ideas about the human body, he acknowledges the deep 
connections between biology and civic culture which arise because the human body, 
itself, is a communicative body whose upright posture and audiovisual articulation 
open up a symbolic world that enriches our experience beyond any other form of life. 
It is with this form of philosophical movement, phenomenology, of which Husserl 
(1970) says that “intentionality” or attitude always goes along with consciousness, 
that I am seeking to nurture into the profession, so as to become more receptive and 
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open to its own thinking and imagination; to shift from the mundane nature of viewing 
the body through the microscope to that of looking into movement through the lens of 
one’s own life. 
 
Merleau-Ponty first toyed with the idea that, somehow, humans held an internal, 
bodily but immanent, capacity to become conscious of the seductive appeal of the 
desiring self. In short, he conceived of the idea that human effort and resistance went 
hand-in-hand, and somehow, our becoming aware of our consciousness of this 
sensuous experience emanated deep from within the body’s centre of gravity. 
Modern and Western trained PE specialist struggled with this idea. In fact, they 
avoided confronting it. There was no place in Modern PE teaching for a forum 
discussing mind-body issues.  That was left to other thinkers to solve, thinkers 
outside the profession. But then, the mind-body issue is not simply a mind-body non-
relation. That is, in this study’s opening phase, I have explained how the mind-body 
issue was left aside for others to speculate about in theory only.  
 
PE’s contemporary delivery centres on how we can muster, or “relate” others’ 
abstract theories to our reflection of movement, especially when we meet 
movement’s potential meaning hovering between our own intended efforts, and 
those of unknown resistances. Indeed, Oriental PE specialists, especially Buddhists, 
should not be surprised by this “gap”, this idea in our understanding of movement: 
the idea that whatever it is that animates our livingworld is “located”, [as described to 
me in 2006, when I shared almost a full day in compelling discussion with a “Zen-
Master”, during which I talked and searched, while “Master” merely listened]. His 
extraordinary calming, and inordinately patient, “silence” resonated so powerfully 
through me that he was able to make effective his profund presence by his personal 
tranquillity. His silence invited me to think through the very nature of my own 
questioning. Having studied the Chinese anthropology of “Tai Chi,” at Shaolin 
Temple, he viewed it as a disciplined mode of self-learning, as an art of mental as 
well as a physical preparation for understanding better the unpredictable nature of 
life. He did not conceive movement as informing the mind, or vice-versa. He did not 
portray the idea that whilst the mind is occupied, as it is during exam-time the body is 
“forgotten”, nor the idea that if we suffer an injury, the nature of the pain comes to 
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preoccupy our thinking; that our thoughts are somehow omitted, blanched out of our 
sense of awareness.   
 
Largely because he was silent, he made me think into my own questions, to what I 
held in my own rhetoric. With a few words, he suggested to me that somehow, my 
inner most feelings were centred somewhere deep within my abdomen, in my “gut” 
feeling. Gently, he pressed one finger against my midrift.  What he later said was 
perfectly true. He declared that I had been exceptionally unsure about how I 
envisioned our meeting. That, despite my slightly gestured smile, and calm but 
deceptively postured stance, my hesitation, my nervousness was echoing inside of 
me. Through his finger touch, he could detect these echoes, their tactile vibrations. 
His parting words to me, late into the night, came when my talking had ceased. My 
asking had become exhausted. My “thinking” capacity had reached its limits. I had 
arrived at the state when I had no mind to think with. His parting words were “It is not 
what I say that you will hear from me. It is what stays with you”.  
 
Only then did I realise that I had fallen victim to my Western interpretation of what his 
ancient Eastern pensive idea was all about, and is now explained. When we feel 
confused by what is happening to us, or perplexed by what others might be doing to 
us, deliberately or otherwise, we tend to turn our thoughts inwardly, mystically 
perhaps, trawling blindly, scrambling to find a sanctury in the realm of reason, to 
purchase a footing for protection from an outside interference. Occidental thinking is 
that of a calculating hunter, sent out to fix, to achieve, to resolve, to control, whereas 
Oriental realization is founded on gathering that which comes to one. 
 
Oriental insight accepts revelations in the indissoluable quietude of meditation, in the 
stillness of the body. In contrast, Occidental thinking comes about from the 
rhythmicity of embodied mediation and the dynamics of dialogue, and, as I shall 
explain in Chapters 7 and 8, such thinking can be re-threaded into PE’s 
communicative modes of teaching.  The western tradition of education has split and 
impoverished both bodily and mental education by demeaning the former [the body] 
and disembodying the latter [mental education]. From my many visits to the Far East, 
and five years lecturing at Neipu University in Taiwan, my concern is that Eastern PE 
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senior schooling, much of which is dedicated to teaching baseball, athletics, and 
swimmimg, follows this Western trend in its modern version. 
 
Absolute thought 
 
In his early work, Merleau-Ponty  battled against absolute thought, that is, the idea of 
an unrelated, unrestricted and unconditioned thought. He was constantly stressing 
the insurmountable ambiguity and contingency of all meaning and truth. An arch 
opponent of Cartesian rationalism, he was an early and ardent spokesperson for that 
position now called anti-foundationalism: the doctrine that knowledge  is ultimately 
based on beliefs that require no further justification.  
 
His major work, “Phenomenology of Perception”, is best known for its central thesis 
concerning “the primacy of perception”. In his magnum opus (1945;1962), Merleau-
Ponty developed the concept of the body-subject as an alternative to the Cartesian 
“cogito”, the declared idea that if “I think, therefore I am”. Merleau-Ponty perceives 
the essences of the world existentially. In effect, he was of the opinion that 
consciousness, the world, and the human body were all intimately fused as a unified, 
perceiving thing, intricately intertwined and mutually “engaged.”  
 
Founded on this viewpoint of mutual engagement between sentient beings and the 
material substance of the earth, what becomes of importance to those who subscribe 
to this kind of thinking is that PE’s professional practice is focused not on the 
unchanging objective realm of the natural sciences, but rather, on its more 
contemporary requirement: to perceive a correlation between that of our body and 
that of our sensory motor functions. Based on Merleau-Ponty’s idea of a “body-
subject”; conceived as a kind of pre-programmed, thinking body, the body is 
conveyed as an intelligent body capable of responding appropriatey to certain 
actions imposed upon it, and of taking up and “communing with” those of our 
sensible qualities. He characterised the body as capable of using its pre-conscious 
sensibilites, that is, inherited sensitivities, and thus, granting its perceiver with an 
understanding of the world's makeup. This elaboration of the body as resourcing 
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human meaning, however, is “inexhaustible” and, for Merleau-Ponty, the body is the 
hallmark of all our perceptions.  
 
Perceptions 
 
According to Merleau-Ponty, perception is not an inner representation of an outer 
world. He maintains that there is no “inner” theatre of the mind where “shows” from 
the outside are projected on its surface. Perception occurs in the world rather than in 
the mind. It is an opening onto rather than an opening within “being”. The visual 
perception of an object, a learner’s body for example, forms between that mover’s 
body and the body of the perceiver [the advocate]. There are not two bodies, one in 
the world and one in the professional’s mind but rather one which is seen first, and 
then subjected to observation within the parameters of a specific context. 
 
To see, in this sense, is to be “decentred” in relation to the visible world. The 
perceptual field, which is constitutive of the perceiving subject [PE specialist/learner], 
stretches out and around the subject for literally as far as the eye can see. 
Furthermore, this implies that perceiver and perceived are relational beings. 
Perception does not involve the convergence or correspondence of two distinct order 
of things [that of the perceiving subject and that of the perceived object]. It involves 
one order, perception or the visible, which may be subdivided [by means of 
theoretical reflection] into two derived, interdependent and relational aspects [i.e. 
perceiver and perceived]. 
 
In this respect, for Merleau-Ponty, the body has two facets, the sentient and the 
sensible. It sees and can be seen, hears and can be heard, touches and can be 
touched. These sides are not separate from each other, as are Descartes’s mind and 
body. They are reversible aspects of one and the same “being”. The human body is 
a visible seer, a tangible toucher, and audible listener. Moreover, the body’s visible-
tangible “presence” is central to its [the body’s] perception. One perceives always 
from somewhere, and it is one’s visible, tangible presence which provides this 
somewhere. The perceptual field, in this respect, is constituted through the 
articulation of body and others and the world. 
 98
The problematic of perception is no longer centred around the attempt to pull distinct 
substances together [body/mind, subject/object] or reconcile distinct realms [‘inner’ 
and ‘outer’]. Such distinctions, insofar as they are recognized as having any 
phenomenological validity, are redefined as relational, fused and reversible aspects 
of a single fabric, which Merleau-Ponty (1968) refers to as the “flesh”. He refers to 
both the “flesh of the body”, which includes the reversibilities of sentience and 
sensible, and the “flesh of the world”, which includes the relational intertwining of 
seer and seen. The perceiving subject, from this point of view, forms part of the 
visible world. It constitutes a convergent point within the visible world where that 
world becomes visible. 
 
From this understanding, we encounter the first move of a “rethinking” of 
embodiment. Accepting that the body has an object side[i.e. a sensible side, a 
sentient or subject side which can be seen and touched], he adds to this in that it 
possesses another side, a sentient or subject side which sense touches, and which 
thereby experiences its world meaningfully. The flesh of the body, consists in 
sensible sentience. The body’s being-in-the-world is at once mediated through 
physical presence and perceptual meaning, indicating the body is more than “an 
object”. It is a sentient being whose primary relation to its environment should be 
understood in terms of this meaningful sentience, the “body-subject” as Merleau-
Ponty understands it; each body has a generic responsive power to discriminate its 
relationship with the world and with others. 
 
In addition, his rethinking of perception is that it is based in behaviour; that is, in 
looking, listening and touching, acquired as culturally habituated forms of conduct. 
The perceiving body constitutes itself as such, by implementing acquired perceptual 
schemas. It does not passively receive messages from the world but actively 
“interrogates” the world in terms of its cultural schemas [to which it has been 
exposed and acquired]. These “Gestalt images” of what we see depend on the way 
we look and the way that  we organize our visual field,  and on our perception of 
written and spoken language. When reading or listening to linguisitic utterances, in a 
language that we are trained in, we actively [though unwittingly] apply our acquired 
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skills of reading or listening (Chapters 5 and 6). We apply perceptual schemas that 
will make what we see or hear immediately meaningful to us.  
  
Following on from his intriguing notion of body-subject, Merleau-Ponty claims that 
things are those upon which our body has a kind of “grip” [prise], and that this “grip” 
itself is a function of  our instinctive resonance with the world's things. He holds that 
we belong to the world outside us. The world and the sense of self are emergent 
phenomena in an ongoing “becoming.” In other words, we are born into the world, 
and [as shown in the next chapter] our carnal knowledge is evoked from us by our 
felt need to become accepted by our siblings, our family, our location in the world, by 
our felt actions to become related to others, and to cope with and know how to 
preserve our ecological world. 
 
Merleau-Ponty believed that all the “higher” functions of consciousness, for instance, 
intelligence, volition and deliberation, are rooted in and depend upon the subject’s 
pre-reflective, bodily existence, i.e., perception: all consciousness is perceptual, even 
the consciousness of ourselves. His principal goal, however, was to try to get beyond 
the intellectual constructs of traditional philosophy such as sense data and its effect, 
to find a way of returning to the phenomena of the world as we actually experience it, 
as embodied subjects prior to all theorizing. For him, the body is, itself, the original 
knowing subject [albeit a “non”, or, pre-personal, “anonymous” subject], from which 
all other forms of knowledge derive.   
 
Merleau-Ponty argues that whilst “I” do not actually know myself, nevertheless, my 
body is me and it is from within me that “I” emerge to engage with the world of 
others, and beyond this social domain we have a deeply endowed, interminably rich 
ecological sense of resonance. He accepted the Cartesian primacy of the thinking 
self and also Husserl’s (1929) belief that experience is the source of all knowledge. 
Husserl worked on a method of phenomenological reduction, the act of suspending 
judgement about the natural world that precedes phenomenological analysis by 
which a subject may come to know directly an essence. Differently, Merlau-Ponty 
claimed that the phenomenological reduction led back not to a separated 
transcendental consciousness or ego but to the “lived-experience” of the “body-
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subject”. In perception, for Merleau-Ponty, we find ourselves already embodied and 
active in the “life-world” which, for him, is the domain of inter-subjectivity. Knowledge 
of the self and of the other are thus intimately connected in a “dialectic of ambiguity,” 
by which he meant that knowledge is never complete. 
 
What I shall show in the thesis’ second phase is that the act engaging in movement 
was regarded as “trivial” but somehow beneficial for pupils as a form of relaxation 
from academic study. But in reality, by falling into a playful mood, as is often the case 
in games-playing, its incumbent resident’s attention is not harnessed into a 
concentrated focus on a minute detail. Rather, its “agent’s” thoughts are distracted, 
and can encounter a release of attention from contending with the minutiae of details 
and fall into an unrestrained freedom of mind. And, what may initially appear to its 
agent as trivial may well, in time, turn out to be quite an epiphanic but immanent 
revelation about one’s self and about life in the world at large.  
 
Immanent knowledge 
 
It is faith in this “immanent” knowledge that allows phenomenologists to make 
recourse to P.E. since, like play in sport movement, phenomenology brings fresh and 
invigorating aspects of reality through the impressive moments in movement closer 
to our awareness of reality; a reality which is heightened, uplifted, and sensitive to 
one’s “own” sense of resurgence, closer to meeting the illusive, inner self that lurks 
within us. Merleau-Ponty “suspected” that we appropriate new words and phrases 
through their expressive tonality and texture, through the way they feel in the mouth, 
roll the tongue, to relieve our inner tension or passion. It is in this direct felt 
significance, the experience of a word or phrase, the way it influences or modulates 
the body that provides the polyvalent source of fermentation for all the more refined 
and obscure meanings which in time may come to hold for us. However, the 
meaning of words, for Merleau-Ponty (1962: 184): 
 
             …must be finally induced by the words themselves…their conceptual meaning must be 
formed from their gestural meaning which is immanent in speech. 
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His unfinished approach to examine language from a structuralist’s understanding 
and to interpret language in terms of its systemic meaning, he predicted, discloses 
meaning’s generic source in a carnal field of participation. However, Merleau-Ponty 
tended to emphasize the gestural significance of spoken sounds. Linguistic meaning, 
for him, is rooted in the felt experience induced by specific sounds and sound shapes 
as they echo and contrast with one another, each language a kind of song which 
serves as a “raft” of emotional meanings from which, sadly, our embodied being has 
taken many centuries to drift from its anchorage with nature. Because Merleau-Ponty 
viewed language from a structuralist’s viewpoint, he was unable to offer a wider 
panoramic semantics, the study of changes in meaning of embodied and resourced 
action. He first maintained that a thought was limited to existing for itself 
independently of speech and communication, but later came to perceive thought as 
incarnated in speech. 
 
Being 
 
In philosophy, being is the object of study of metaphysics, and more specifically 
ontology. The term “being” is typically understood as one's “state of being,” and 
hence its common meaning is in the context of human personal experience that 
involves expressions and manifestations coming from a being's innate being, or 
personal character. The visual perception of an object, a soccer ball, for example, 
forms between the ball and the body of the perceiver: both ball and body inter-relate. 
That is to say, there are not two balls, one in the world and one in the mind but rather 
one ball which is seen. To see is to be “decentred” or aware of oneself being 
dispersed in relation to the visible world. The perceptual field, which is constitutive of 
the perceiving subject, stretches out and around the subject for [literally] as  far as 
the eye can see; a world exists for me within the parameters of the visible 
boundaries that surround me.  
 
In a teaching context, however, and especially for the learner beginner, this 
decentring experience implies that the perceiver and the perceived, or the player and 
the referee, or the offensive and defensive player, constitute a fresh series of totally 
new and ever changing situations between their “relational being”. Perception does 
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not involve the convergence or correspondence of two distinct orders of things that of 
the perceiving subject and that of the perceiving object. It involves one order, 
perception or the visible, which may be subdivided [by means of theoretical 
reflection] into two derived, interdependent and relational aspects. For example, the 
perceiver and the perceived think of the offensive penalty deliverer, and then think of 
the defensive goalkeeper receiver.  Both are involved in the same match, but each is 
playing a different kind of mind game with the other.    
 
Clearly, Merleau-Ponty rejects the notion that the mind [qua perceptual 
consciousness] is a separate substance from the body. Rather, for him, perception is 
both inseparably sensational and meaningful. Expressed in another way, perception 
consists in a meaningful configuration of the power of perceiving through the senses. 
And these sensations, these impressive but transient revelations belong to [and are 
resourced from] the body: our sensations make us what and who we are as a 
sentient being. 
For Merleau-Ponty, the body has two intradependent sides: sentient and sensible. As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, sentience is used in the study of consciousness to 
describe the ability to have sensations or experiences, known to Western 
philosophers as “qualia”, a feature raised again in Chapter 7.  In Eastern philosophy, 
sentience is a metaphysical quality of all things that requires respect and care.  
What Merleau-Ponty was trying to deal with in his early work was that one never 
perceives from nowhere. One always perceives from somewhere. For example, take 
a diver in an underwater cave, or a single sailor in the epicentre of a vast ocean. For 
both explorers, it is one’s visible, tangible presence which provides the only 
anchoring, core as it were, of this ill-defined loction. One of his most fundamental 
premises was that the embodied senses are crucial to the “presence” of being, to our 
apprehension of an is in things that no analytic dissection or verbal account can 
isolate. Who and whatever “I” am, it is the “I” that is at the centre of all my 
perceptions. My seeing things, my making sense of things, eventually comes to rest 
upon how “I” come to  conceive myself. I am my final court of appeal. Nevertheless, I 
can not exist alone. I have to rely on what others can reveal to me. One’s perceptual 
field, in these instances, is constituted through the articulation of the body with and in 
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the world. This form of perception is that of an interminable interplay between myself 
constanly having to adjust to the vagaries of another person, e.g., the penalty taker, 
and to that of nature. 
 
Being a body 
 
Unable to examine views about the concept of movement’s behaviour or conduct 
from its agent’s viewpoint, early educational theorists created a problem of 
mind/body dualism through their tendency to abstract human meanings and ideas 
from their situation in embodied and engaged action, rather than within it. The 
concept of “behaviour”, providing that it is understood as “meaningful behaviour”, 
allows us to avoid this abstraction. In “behaviour”, mindedness and embodiment are 
aspects of a single structure [as constructed by Oriental thinkers]. The active body 
embodies meanings and ideas. 
 
In dealing with the concept of “behaviour”, the term behaviour tends to have the 
effect of defining the body as an active body, a body which is always already 
engaged with its environment, and behaviour is a word which suggests that the 
“form” of that engagement is derived from an ever expanding reservoir of cultural 
skills and techniques [in PE’s case, the motile perceptual schemas in particular, such 
as the way soccer is played in the U.K. is usually characterised as “physical “ and 
“robust”, whilst continental play is described as “artistic” and “tactical”]. For Merleau-
Ponty, then, it is the perceiving [intelligent] body that takes up and uses externalised-
to-internalised information and is shown to be an “agent” in its own right, an agent 
able to absorb cultural practices, and, conversely, cultural practices are resourced 
from an active body-subject.  According to Merleau-Ponty, body/culture dualism 
collapses as it does with mind/body dualism, rendering the primary function of 
perception not as a form of Oriental contemplation but practical involvement. He 
holds perception as an instrumental mode always relating to our other ongoing 
projects and which is not usually a project in itself: a number of traffic islands 
clustered together, rather than a more conventional cross-road (Haag 1982; Greene 
1991). 
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For example, what is reflected in our experience of playing soccer is the simple or 
complex way in which we survey a pitch, the players, the conditions. George Best, 
for example, excelled in picking out fine details from within the milieu of a game. His 
talent was in spotting “openings” and “opportunities”, and exploiting them before 
others stopped him. His visual field was structured through his practical 
involvements, without any reflective process taking place. Hence,  his movement to 
action and perception interwined and mutually informed each other in the context of 
a single project. He “read” the playing situations ahead of his opponents. 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s early phenomenological account should not be  read as an account 
of our experience of embodiment. Embodiment is not experienced in this account; it 
is, rather,  the foundational resource of experience. We experience by way of our 
“sentient” embodiment. Our body is our way of being-in-the-world, of experiencing 
and belonging to the world. It renders possible our “point of view” on the world. As 
Merleau-Ponty argues : 
 
…I am not in front of my body, I am in it or rather I am it …If we can still speak of interpretation 
in relation to the perception of one’s own body we shall have to say that it interprets itself. 
                                                                                                                            (1962:150) 
 
A helpful illustration of the “body” interpreting itself, is found in Merleau-Ponty’s 
(1962:93) discussion of pain and the language of pain. To say that one’s foot hurts is 
a qualitatively different form of statement to saying that a player’s boot hurts. In the 
first case, where a body part, e.g. the leg, is referred to, what is being identified is not 
a cause of pain but rather a “pain manifested space”. In the second statement, by 
contrast, it is a cause of pain, i.e., “player’s boot”,  that is being identified.  As will be 
shown in chapter 6, it is enigmatic “grammar” of the language of body experiences 
that identifies the body as a “composite location” rather than an object of experience. 
 
This is not to say that we do not and cannot achieve an experience of our bodies. 
Merleau-Ponty is clear that we can and do. For example, he notes (1962:434) that 
our interaction with others affords us an outside perspective of ourselves, such that 
we can become objects for ourselves, and can experience ourselves [qua embodied 
beings] as something or other; e.g., tall, fragile, stick-like or rounded. It does not 
imply a separation of body and subject. They involve the body subject turning back 
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on itself to experience itself, described as a “carnal reflexivity”. Merleau-Ponty’s aim 
was to constuct an anti-sceptical account of knowledge and reality, or what amounts 
to one’s learned sense of valued meaning, neither monist nor dualist, and which has, 
as its basis, the world of perceptual experience.  
 
Merleau-Ponty’s early interpretation of a radical embodied-subject was reliant on a 
socially constructed “self”. However, in his unfinished text “The Visible And The 
Invisible” (1968), he drew attention to the second kind of knowledge we are endowed 
with, by exercising skills, and which signaled our reliance on interpersonal meaning 
as being dependent upon the manner we use, understand, and interpret language: 
by meticulously and benignly excavating what can be detected in the diction or 
pronunciation of the speaker’s language. Movement, he maintained, granted us our 
first intermediary mode of experience, but it was language that allowed us to develop 
a communal sense of sharing our human affairs, and it was Steiner (1978:366) who 
noted the unvoiced or internal components of speech as spanning a wide arc: 
 
           …all the way from the subliminal flotsam of word or sentence fragments…to the highly 
             defined, focused and realized articulacy of the silent recitation of a learned text or of the taut 
             and analytic moves in a disciplined act of meditation. Quantitatively, there is every reason to 
             believe that we speak inside and to ourselves more than we speak outward and to anyone 
             else. Qualitatively, these manifest modes of self-address…test and verify our “being there”.
  
 
 
The act of movement can no longer be conceived as a “singularly-possessive” 
encounter as was portrayed by modernist PE. Denied from saying what we want to 
say, modern PE was an ascetic encounter because it referred to the delivery of 
locked knowledge, rendering docile the act of thinking. Its learners were denied their 
basic human rights, the privilege to bring their own presuppositions into full view, or, 
equally, decide not to exercise this dispensation. Essentially, learning is a process of 
give and take, of being given and of receiving opportunities suitable to flesh out one’s 
own thought processes.  
 
Phenomenology serves to remind us that our early experience of the world is inter-
subjective and does not include an awareness of self as distinct from another. There 
is, instead, an immediate flow of experiences, undifferentiated between mine and 
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“thine”, which actually contains both our own and others’ experiences intermingled 
and without distinction from one another. Understood in this sense, we rely on the 
knowledge of others, we must realise this: we fit into others’ mode of learning. 
Neither can we reject the premise that the person of practical wisdom inhabits the 
human world but cannot attempt to rise above it but can make their own ideas [ideals 
secular, sacred and scientific] more visible, by not losing touch with the sort of open 
texture that pervades movement and conversation. This is because we perceive and 
understand human behaviour in a manner different from how we perceive and 
understand the ecological world. We explain human behaviour by giving reasons, not 
causes. We address ourselves to our future by making decisions, not predictions. 
We understand the past and present of humankind through our aims, emotions and 
activity, and not through predictive theories. 
 
All these distinctions seem to create the “idea”, if not of a specifically human world, at 
least of a specifically human way of seeing things. By contrast, contemporary PE 
seeks to nurture one’s astuteness to unlock knowledge through pursuing 
differentiation, creating divergence and thus, seeking innovation by becoming a 
speaking subject. And, this is possible only by conforming one’s speech not to the 
system of language prescription, as was the case for modern PE, but taken as a 
systematic medium that opens its speaker’s or reader’s realised understanding of 
differences.  
 
Summary 
 
In this chapter, “phenomenology”, has been explained as a feature of PE’s daily 
practice because it searches into the margins of language for “fleshy” concepts, 
which themselves are plunged into the imperceptile shifts of meaning. And whatever 
meaning happens to surface in dialogue, itself, emerges from the deep structure and 
living experience of language. This is why modern PE’s communicative, instrumental 
and logical language cannot carry any substantive commitments with respect to 
educational values located at the personal level. Its science-bound language tries 
“clinically” to remove personal affairs from its dissection of objective matters. 
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A physically “literate” movement interpreter, I have started to establish, needs to be 
able to read movement as a native speaker, which requires one to be able to 
describe encountering its “moving” events in terms of its phenomenal revelations; 
that is, by blending cognitive issues with emotional concerns, so that existentially, 
one can begin to appreciate one’s responsibility for giving meaning to what one 
comes to understand as reality for oneself and for others. Much is involved in PE’s 
professional practices. If the profession follows the PL philosophy as an invitation to 
its participants to become involved in physical activity, to view one’s embodied 
presence from different perspectives, then, it eventually falls upon ML to know how 
to differentiate between “effect” and “affect”. ML is portrayed as an infinite practice 
benignly sharpening physical competence whilst reinvigorating self-esteem. 
 
From this chapter onwards, I identify some of the inherent difficulties with which 
listeners fail to connect with the intended meaning of other speakers and are 
unsuccessful in detecting and thus miss reading or even fail entirely to detect the 
latent tendencies of its speaker-beholder. Detected in the phenomenological 
description of movement, one discovers something unfamiliar as if its meaning is 
stalking on both the lived edges of movement and on the margins of its speaker. ML 
is an intellectual journey. It aspires to elicit our inner voice expressing our embodied 
belongingness to the words which can serve to sentence us [pass judgment] or free 
us. This is the difference between a decree and a request. This is the difference in 
the way we choose to convey such encounters, when the self can place its mark on 
those events that constitute its action. We come to philosophise with our bodies, and 
hence, poetize as we speak and live in it. Our body constantly monitors our physical 
health, which is a medical concern, but it also monitors our state of well-being, our 
emotional balance (Edie 1973; Abram 1988; Butler 1993; Cooper 1997; Shapiro 
1999). In so doing we become more willing to explore the less explicit reaches of the 
affective, unconscious mind, to actually extend the scope of our possible self-
awareness (Hildebrandt 1987, Heshius 1994, Stinson 1995). In movement, we tend 
to connect the “betweenness” of things, as is the way of phenomenology, before we 
reflect, and isolate them. The learning of an art form is always a balancing act 
between technique and expression. Technique being the knowledge of skills, 
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material, history, and usage in the context of practice and expression the context of 
evaluation, meaning, and significance in which technique is displayed.  
 
Phenomenology calls for a more eloquent way of speaking, a style of language 
which, by virtue of its fluidity, its carnal resonance, draws us into the sensuous depth 
of the life world, and indeed evolves as a story we tell ourselves about ourselves. 
Conceptual definitions continue to be employed so that we can learn about 
movement. Contemporary PE specialists need to be able to talk of movement. My 
thesis is that conceptual guidance is what is required by PE’s professionals if they 
are to learn what movement can reveal about its resident-agent, to become 
conversant with listening to the body’s “telling” kinaesthetic language in order to bring 
movement into life through the understated arts of pedagogy. I address this delicate 
issue in the remaining chapters. I explain in the next chapter why poststructuralism’s 
decoding of language helps its emissaries and learners to keep in touch with their 
publicly held epistemological knowledge [cognitive] and ontologically private [self 
identity] “moving” accounts.  
At a phenomenological level, learning-to-learn evolves as a process which is as 
much about our way of speaking about our orientation, commitment, and presence of 
mind as it is about procedures by which we have come to understand what we do. 
Learning is an attitude of attentitiveness to the things of immediate experience-
understood retrospectively. Whilst in one sense the body is the most abiding and 
inescapable presence in our lives, it is also characterised by absence. That is, one’s 
own body is rarely the thematic object of experience. The body, as a ground of 
experience tends to recede from direct experience.  
ML redeems this lived experience, and I so doing can provide a feeling for pedagogy, 
which carries within it a moral sense of what ought to be, rather than a set of 
procedures. To better cope with this moral issue is the reason why the movement 
profession should attend more closely to the use of descriptive anecdotes. It is ethics 
or moral understanding that helps us to conform to the guidelines for lifeworld 
description which van Mannen (1982; 1990; and 1995) has developed.  Ethical 
praxis draws us closer to living relations and situations of the lifeworld. This moral 
practice transforms thought into a more thoughtful praxis. It is the cyclical process of 
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reflection-action-reflection that changes the world and concretises and subjectivises 
our deepened understanding in practical action. 
 
Because of hermeneuticism’s sensitivity to inter-relational communication, ML can 
more astutely voice PL’s ambitious philosophical stance. In tandem, they transform 
as well as  transcend Modern PE’s language from its intensive care to create 
physical conditions in order to learn how-to-move, to that of manifesting care for 
creating the more apt participant conversational discourses and experiential listening 
conditions. Such conditions are required to better understand movement as a 
meaningful form of learning. Importantly, whilst Modern PE tended to “apply” 
[implement] movement to the body, its function was to fit all bodies to conform to 
various physical “event-techniques”, largely to become physically fit. Differently, 
through inviting phenomenological descriptions of movement enterprises, an 
interchanging-form of pedagogy evolves as a transition into initiating a “process” of 
probing dialogue into either disturbing, banal, or sublime and responsive 
experiences.  While negative movement experiences can distort one’s interpretation,  
(as explained in Chapters 7 onwards) positive encounters can enervate its practioner 
to  find out more about their PE enterprises and thus vitalise the necessary 
conditions for learning more for themselves about their own and others’ human 
resources. How we treat ourselves in the way we talk or the way we experience the 
many PE “gaps” we encounter is influenced by what we do ourselves, what appeals 
to us, but we need to converse in company with significant others in order to validate 
our claims.  
 
I propose that offering to commentate on one’s experiences helps its speaker to 
articulate and redeem their lived “moving” encounters, and in so doing may provide 
its correspondents with a shared feeling for pedagogy. This is because a good 
phenomenological description is one in which what is described carries within the 
description a moral sense of what ought to be, rather than a set of precedures to 
follow in our pursuit of knowledge. Indeed, the PE profession must remind itself that 
Kant’s criticism of metaphysics had concluded that all we can ever know with any 
degree of certainty is the phenomenal world of sense experience, the state of 
appearances, but never the noumenal world of things as they “really are”.  
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Phenomenology’s introduction to PE institution’s launched an attempt to answer the 
question of “what is it?” we are experiencing when we experience something. 
Phenomenology is not a propositional discourse. Rather, it constantly reminds us 
that there is no phenomenology of “passivity”, but there is a phenomenal “mood”. It is 
by engaging in phenomenology’s voicing of one’s experiences that teaching can 
begin to be transformed into pedagogy. 
 
Engaging in pedagogical and phenomenologically rich descriptions orientates us to 
what is carried within lived experience with and volitionaly accepted [or rejecteded] 
by others. Educators must bear in mind that phenomenology is a philosophical 
movement which concentrates on the detailed description of “conscious” experience. 
Phenomenology is understood as the science of phenomena as opposed to the 
science of “being”, calling for an interest in the nature of PE experiences.  Exercising 
phenomenology also helps us capture those beautiful moments when the heightened 
awareness of our experience somehow becomes lifelong lasting impressions. 
Furthermore, such phenomenal encounters can evolve into moral and personal 
concerns that can be shared in conversation and in one’s actions.  It is the immanent 
consequences of conversation that comes under hermeneuticism’s analytic review in 
the next three chapters. This is because it is through hermeneuticism’s treatment 
that one’s social situatedness, the location of the beholder’s austere sense of “I” is 
serially reconstitutued afresh in a cultural community, like PE.  For the PE specialist, 
what hermeneutics calls for is an interest in the person, the subject of experiences. 
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Chapter Five      Structuralism, Poststructuralism and Innovations in PE     
 
 
Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I sketch PE’s pivotal shift from unwittingly employing Saussure’s 
(1977) language as viewed from a structural perspective conveying the previous 
chapter’s “framed” models of teaching to employing poststructuralism’s open 
dialogue;  unravelling its dynamics to relocate and revere the subjective “self”. I 
continue to refer to Merleau-Ponty as one of PE’s early associates. His work 
provided the movement profession with a monistic, rather than a dualistic 
philosophical grounding which enabled the parasitic make-up of PE as a curriculum 
subject in its own right to begin to collate together the fields of language 
communication, the study of human movement, and the educational potential of PE’s 
daily practices. This professional transformation took place through three fairly 
distinct eras. The first stage occurred from 1950 -1970. The second stage ran from 
circa 1970 -1990, and the current stage from the early 1990s onwards.  
 
PE’s historical sketch 
 
I review in this chapter the study’s evolving narrative about PE’s patchwork-like 
growth and signal the watershed changes to their daily practices and forms of 
knowledge that currently, its professionals and future specialists need to come to 
terms with. 
   
I have explained why modern PE’s profession needed to change its image from that 
of its parasitic reliance to sustain its curriculum credibility by “referencing” its content 
of knowledge to the objective field of science and overt results data. It created a 
sense of completion by drawing lines where we cross into and out of, to what 
embraces a more covert, subjective form of knowledge.  Contemporary PE rejoices 
in both endorsing similar movement encounters and delights in welcoming 
“differences” in qualitatively covert experiences. For this purpose, all movement 
interpreters need to have a clear understanding of the inseparable “physical”, 
“cultural” and “personal” education goals. However, to fuse these triple objectives, 
rather than compartmentalise them, is one of the sharpest challenges of cutting-edge 
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thinking, especially when it comes to endorsing the understanding of PE’s meaning 
“on the move” as it were. 
 
For instance, coping with their hostile environment consumed the energies of our 
early ancestors (Van Dalen & Bennett, 1971). Their young generation were trained in 
“collective security” skills and “conformity conduct”, “group consciousness” and 
“group solidarity” were emphasised more than individuals’ rights in ancient tribal 
societies. Formal education arose with the development of writing, and education’s 
main objective was to read and write, for such knowledge gave one “power”. The 
expression of religious ideas and the preservation of national identity followed. 
Dance and hygiene practices, for Jews, were directed towards worship.  
 
Greek Spartan PE was designed to develop a “man of action” (Van Dalen & Bennett 
1971: 40) who possessed brute strength, physical endurance, unflinching courage 
and fighting skill. The Athenian educational ideal was to unite the “man of action” 
with “the man of wisdom”. Early Roman education was geared to train youths to be 
citizen-soldiers who would serve the state, industriously conduct their individual 
businesses and consciously revere their gods and elders. The middle age and early 
modern times saw education largely in terms of social and moral disciplining, more 
related to dealing with life’s earthly and verbal realities. Verbal realists believed that 
comprehending the ethical precepts and meaning of the classics were more 
important than analysing their grammar and literary forms, or their logic and 
dialectics (Van Dalen, 1965). There then followed the theory that ideas are acquired 
through the senses, which naturally refocused attention on the body. Curiosity about 
the physiological laws governing the body and mind opened the “pedagogical” swing-
door. The 17th century was an age when “men” were still trapped in religious and civil 
turmoil and engaged in a dramatic struggle between reason and authority, liberty, 
and despotism. The 18th century, the “Age of Enlightenment” marked a philosophical 
rebellion against enslavement of the individual. The great secret of education, 
Rousseau (1936: 237) declared: 
 
          …is to make exercises of the body and of the mind always serve as a recreation for each 
            other. 
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As summarised in International Council of Health, Physical Education, and 
Recreation (ICHPER) “Physical Education in the School Curriculum” in its 1969 
International Questionnaire Report part 1 p27, the major objectives for PE were: 
 
          …to develop normal physical growth, body control and fitness, personal skills, social 
            accomplishments, and character training and social behaviour. 
 
From this succinct historical sketch intertwining the evolution of its parasitic survival 
with educational roots, contemporary PE, I next argue, needs to acknowledge the 
very integrity of PE’s genesis, which includes the nursing of its maturing, upper 
schooling learners via the use of movement and language [having acquired and 
become familiarised to their own movement potential and an extended linguistic 
vocabulary] as a rite de passage into a disciplined form of adulthood.  Recently, PE’s 
professional practices have undergone a transition from modern teaching, 
characterised as a way to point in to the subject content’s “referenced” movement 
skills.   
 
It was during the latter part of the 1990s that some of the key influences from the 
broad philosophical movement of postmodernism, which I interchange with 
poststructuralism, began to be infused into PE’s professional “consciousness” by 
bringing communication, movement experiences, and their professional treatment 
under a more cohesive mode of scrutiny. Their collective effect upon PE was to help 
make known movement’s immanent meaning for its resident mover. In the wake of 
postructuralism’s indirect patronage, PE came to be re-viewed, and re-presented 
more under the auspices of its “meaning” (Schempp 1987, Shulman & Bowen 2002, 
Taylor 1991, Tinning 1985). It was at the turn of the last century that PL (1992) was 
introduced to the profession by Whitehead. And it was a year or two later that I 
began to think of ML as a way forward to promote PL’s philosophy to try to highlight  
and advert the hidden/unmentioned values and meanings of PE and human 
movement to its future generation’s participant and conscious awareness. ML 
however, focuses not on “teaching” the human in the movement, which is an 
impossible task. Rather, it seeks to engage movement’s inhabitants and 
correspondents in the more complex realm of pedagogy, where its professional onus 
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is to place more on a collaborative search for meaning. It is a meaning if it comes to 
exist between its interlocutors and less on the basis of an initiation into theory. 
 
How an apprenticing PE specialist begins to change one’s role from that of a 
“teacher” to a “pedagogue” centres on one’s capacity to engage others in 
conversation. Teaching is a telling process; pedagogy is a talking event. Pedagogy is 
an invitation to speak. But then it is much more than merely conversing with another. 
As I show in Chapters 6 onwards, to speak is to fight, to protect, to maintain, and 
even to advance one’s mode of existence. At the same time, it is also, paradoxically, 
a fight to preserve our sense of playfulness. Playing and fighting together is a 
paradox. Nevertheless, it is one that I intend to sustain and promote logically in 
response to postmodernism’s philosophical movement which evolved in reaction to 
modernism, the tendency in contemporary culture to accept only “objective truth”.  
Postmodernist thought is an intentional departure from the previously dominant 
modernist approaches. The term “postmodernism” comes from its critique of the 
“modernist” scientific mentality of “objectivity”, and which characterized PE’s science 
reverence during the last century. Amongst its many radical innovations was that of 
poststructuralism’s linguisitc analysis, qualifying the distinction between that of a 
conscious self and an unconcious “otherness” which are implicity interchanged in the 
sometimes benign and sometimes painful skirmishes of speech.  
 
Whilst following Whitehead’s (2002) PL philosophy promoting movement’s 
unquestioned physical benefits as a universal encounter, I introduce ML as a way to 
further discriminate, to point out and celebrate the perceived “differences” its “agent-
residents” volitional expression s about following their transitory immersion in 
movement. I want PE to be valued in its own right by converting its physical 
educationalists to become interpreters of personal epiphanies. Importantly, I want 
PE’s life meaning attributes to be resurfaced, to be reintroduced and refreshed so 
that its participants can once again begin to address its generic roots, to collate the 
sciences with the arts of human movement. It involves exploring not simply the 
different possibilities of movement, but the “human potential” of each person, to 
value what is familiar, like play, as something ordinary but now made to be perceived 
as something unfamiliar. 
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PE allows us to live in and out of movement. Its language should also be of a kind 
that allows us to live in and out of words, to venture in and out of our streams of 
consciousness, in and out of ourselves, to enable its specialists to improve their 
learner’s life through engaging in its original vocational, missionary calling. 
 
It attends closely to its agent’s enacted and reflected commentary about and in 
movement. In short, PE’s professional focus is undergoing a seminal shift from 
issuing details about the fact of the movement to the mass class to becoming more 
involved with interpreting the potential meaning and understanding of the personal 
effect of the act for individual movers.  Movement Literacy endeavours to put to 
practice the effects of this shift from dealing with the “grammar” of technical 
movement to that of discussing Barthes’ distinction between text and textuality. The 
former is a material object that occupies space in a bookshop; the latter is a 
“methodological” field that is experienced as activity and production (Csordas, 1999). 
ML addresses the textured literature, its PE advocate converses with each mover’s 
narrated tales enacted within movement. As a movement literate, one addresses 
familiar topics, like “healing”, “emotion”, “elation” or “confusion” but it is a different 
perspective from that of another’s embodied account. Essentially, then, I advance 
ML as a way to convert movement specialists from the notion that PE stands for 
physical education, but rather, for “personal epiphanies”. To begin to feel a strong 
sense of conviction in the potential of movement to reveal who we are. We all live in 
a state of constant change; however, stability comes to rest in the imagination of 
one’s belief in the healing power of movement. 
 
Seeking endorsement 
 
PE enterprises, as I interpret them, cannot be a one-person philosophy. PE can 
never be “As you like it”. Movement can be schooled in public but it is encountered in 
solitude and complete isolation from others. You need to compare and contrast your 
experiences with others in order for your account to be granted any credibility. Your 
particular, private encounter needs to be corroborated, compared and contrasted 
with public, universal accounts. To educate “movers” from approximately 14 years of 
age and onwards, whether they have an established skill threshold or not, PE’s 
professional focus needs to shift to become life-coaches. That is, to be able to 
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encode the immanent [inherent] terms of engagement between its conversing 
interlocutors, paradoxically, while masking the very process of learning. PE’s 
professional “preparation programme” needs to be reconceived as an initiation into 
the disciplined rituals of dialogic discourse. The “craft” of teaching movement was 
addressed at institutions preparing professional PE specialists, but the diverse “arts” 
of creating dialogue as a human skill was not closely examined, neither was the 
connoisseur nature of engaging in pedagogic as acts discussed. PE’s contemporary 
practices must become familiar with postmodernism’s criticism, its censure of 
knowledge, and its different versions of deconstructive and reconstructive critique as 
critical appraisal of knowledge; [benevolently and adroitly using resourceful 
techniques to elicit and compassionately help others to realize their own human 
qualities]. 
 
While ancient Platonism (in Chapter 1) and modern Western philosophy have been 
most critical of the body, ML recalls philosophy’s central aims of knowledge, self-
knowledge, right actions, justice, and the quest for the “good” [morally sound] life. 
Though Kant (in Chapter 3) is right that incessant attention to one’s bodily sensations 
is harmful, the problem is not somaesthetic attention per se but rather extreme one-
sidedness of attention. One-sidedness unfortunately affected “Iago’s” self perception, 
his view on PE, on “teaching”, and toward the conduct of “his” lessons. This one-
sidedness seemed to reside beneath his threshold of consciousness. Firmly, he held 
bodies of knowledge. His knowledge of the body, however, was stark. 
 
Guiding Motif 
 
Voicing PL, ML serves as a guiding motif for PE’s mentors and missionaries to move 
beyond the rigid paradigms of Modernism and into the more flexible arena of 
postmodernism’s critique. In the dissertation’s opening phase, modern PE was not 
yet fully cognizant with poststructuralism’s radical and critical reflection on the limits, 
on the immanent influence and consequences of language to, and for its users. 
Poststructuralism names a theory, or a group of theories, concerning the relationship 
between human beings, the world [the Big Other], and the practice of making and 
reproducing meanings. This is why this chapter focuses on the fundamental 
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differences between structuralism and poststructuralism as the latter’s innovative 
viewpoints and innovative ideas came to permeate and impact upon the practice of 
education in general. This was largely because at the heart of poststructuralist 
strategies and forms of analysis lies the dismantling or deconstruction of stable 
conceptions of subjectivity. 
 
What this study’s leading critical interpreters, primarily Merleau-Ponty (1962) and 
Ricoeur (1992) insist on as unavoidable is that in our efforts to understand others and 
oneself, the necessity of surrendering to a teacher-learner interaction always puts 
one at some kind of risk. There is a requirement for “situated reflection”, for which no 
indemnity can be provided, by many methods of technique claiming some 
independent security outside the interaction itself. In Chapters 7 and 8, I shall convey 
pedagogy as heavily governed by immanent contingencies which I seek to identify for 
preparing movement educators to become PE emissaries capable of reading 
movement as a conversation of humankind by using more prudent, demonstrative 
and less scientific language.  
 
PE’s enterprises, as I interpret them, cannot be a one-person philosophy. 
Nevertheless, it is an exploration of thought, and an encoding of the immanent 
[inherent] terms of engagement between its corresponding, conversing interlocutors. 
Its professional preparation needs to be conceived as an initiation into the disciplined 
“rituals” of dialogic discourse which is constantly oriented toward the personal art of a 
pedagogic act. I maintain that PE’s contemporary practices need to become familiar 
with a critique of knowledge. Ultimately, the pedagogic act which is brought under 
focus needs to be understood as reaching beyond the realm of theory. 
 
Philosophical moves from the rigid paradigms of modernism to postmodernism’s 
flexible implication for PE qua education reveal that neither human subjects nor the 
conceptual or material objects among which they live are any longer thinkable in their 
previous distinctness. Furthermore, there is a separation from among the dynamic, 
correlated, multiple systems within which they arise, seeing new connections and 
alliances that cut across the monolithic certainties of the Western logos. Following 
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the radical impact of postmodernity, PE’s professional understanding of the human 
being has been irrevocably de-centred.  
 
Established at this midpoint in the thesis is that professional knowledge within and 
beyond that of “teaching” can be clinically “evacuated” to that of a supervening 
“method” which, insulated from the idiosyncrasies and contingencies of the 
professional person’s being, can provide a secure vantage point from which 
directives can be issued in his or her “classroom practice”. In effect, professional 
educators can now bring together all of the most important themes and indications of 
19th and 20th century philosophy. Consequently, these traditional learning processes 
as featured in a learning-to-learn dialogue may be revisited, re-elaborated, re-
interpreted and critically examined in order to return PE’s science-bound language to 
its literary communicative origin. 
 
For example, modern PE’s communication lacked the use of metaphor, whereas it is 
largely via the use of metaphor that contemporary PE’s language differs from that of 
the last century, in order to reveal the reality in language’s use, and in the act of 
moving as a chosen location, but also revealing a reality. Whilst we cannot 
manipulate reality, we can interpret it in diverse ways to orientate our understanding 
towards a coherent meaning. The reflective practice of ML draws upon certain 
immanent but transient qualities of language, which makes of us what we are, a 
being in transformation.  
 
Structuralism 
 
Structuralism is the linguisitic and anthropological theory that different aspects of 
thinking, language,and culture are already related to one another in a logical pattern. 
It identifies universal structures underlying cultures, usually as binary oppositions. 
Structuralism creates beliefs that human beings are the effect of structures that 
escape their awareness. Not missing linkages of potential meaning is the key 
hazzard that is inbuilt into all languages. This is because any purely private language 
does not permit dialogue, and thus hardly qualifies as a “language”. Structuralism’s 
weakest link was that it did not create linkages in its language.  
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Crucially, structuralism’s instigator, Saussure (2004) contended that meaning is 
structured and therefore does not stem from individual choice but from the system of 
language itself. This remains controversial. For instance, it clearly undermines the 
existentialist notion that people are responsible for making their own meaning. 
Furthermore, it is contrary to the empirical way of looking at things. Rather than 
separating language into isolated events and studying them as distinct entities, 
Saussure’s (2004) structuralism was founded on analysing how things [not humans] 
connect to one another. At the extreme, a structuralist theory of language omits 
relation to entities outside the system, and stresses coherence rather than 
correspondence. 
 
Structuralism held that language is a self-contained, non-referential system, and that 
the philosophical task was to seek out language’s necessary and universal structural 
features, those features taken to underlie and be prior to the empirical, contingent 
features of language. In effect, “structuralists" were seeking subjective noumenal 
categories, viewing the world as it actually is. Although we cannot know the 
“noumena”, we know it’s there, based on the way we understand the phenomenal 
world. However, phenomenologists were content with describing the phenomena 
encountered without asking, or, not drawing attention to what connection to an 
external reality those experiences might have. This is where the work of 
hermeneutics steps in. In the next chapter I explain that hermeneutics concerns, 
being ever more critical of methods of human interpretation and its subsequent 
understanding first, of text, and secondly of the whole social, historical, and 
psychological world and the purpose of life. 
 
Structuralism, in particular, can be held responsible for the demise and distortion of 
PE’s public image. This is because structuralists saw the world organized into 
interlocking systems, allied to unaccountable, but genetic “deep structures”, with their 
own mode of “grammars”, their own self-contained explanations. Thus, if one could 
disseminate these structures, then, they would be made open to analysis. On this 
structural mode of understanding, therefore, it was assumed that a methodical study 
of PE’s modernist language, that is, its structures, when conceived as sign systems, 
would eventually prove to be a scientific study of the nature of humankind. Yet, when 
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viewed as a system, structuralism entirely rejected such concepts as human freedom 
and choice and focused, instead, on the way that human behaviour was determined 
by various sentient-inspired structures, which, inevitably, led to the danger of 
collapsing all knowledge difference; common denominators rule its [movement’s] 
language. Structuralism is like the snowman trying to understand itself by breaking 
itself into bits and pieces to be examined, useful to isolate and analyse movement, 
but detached [dislocated] from subject-referencing. 
 
What Saussure maintained was that language should be regarded as a structure, 
independent of the things that it refers to; words held their own self-standing 
meaning. This line of thinking led to some controversial ideas, not least of which was 
that the individual is essentially a complex fabric of meanings, intricately woven 
together. Meaning, however initiated, was thought of as emanating out of language. 
Contrary to structuralism’s construct of meaning, however, I intend to show that we 
do not simply speak a language, but, very differently, that language speaks itself 
through us, through our essential nature of being in the world.  We have no option 
but borrow other speaker’s words, if we are to inhabit and thus rightly use any 
meaning at all.  
 
Turning our inside experiences outside 
 
Saussure’s approach led to a new way of thinking about meaning. He said it is not 
individuals who give language its meaning, but rather it is the way words relate to 
one another. These words “already” have meaning, even before people speak them, 
and this meaning does not simply depend on what words refer to. 
 
This is why I introduce Movement Literacy as about untangling the essential but 
elusive qualities of pedagogy’s nature. By interpreting another’s version of PE as 
one’s own encounter, ML is composed in such a way as to transform movement 
enterprises into that of a therapeutic healing encounter. It does so, largely by 
constantly acknowledging one’s “self-identity”.  Implicitly, Movement Literacy links 
what is heard by and affects the listener, but such utterances may also remain 
unrealised by its speaker. ML informs apprenticing PE professionals in how to 
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exercise changing perspectives about reflecting upon and expressing rational and 
emotionally moving enterprises; an on-going dialectical analysis, not separating, but 
rather connecting relationships during educational praxis. 
 
ML’s critical and interpretive praxis can help PE missionaries to narrate their story as 
to why they have committed their career to advocating movement to others. The 
mystery of PE, that is, its “silent deed”, its “covenant-of-hope”, its “forgotten” linkage 
between the materialising of secular rituals to represent sacred abstractions, cannot 
be taught when learning is conceived to be analogous to that of a form of training, as 
“Iago” held it to be. Rather, teaching’s art, its pedagogy becomes apparent when 
having deconstructed the act of teaching in terms of its limitations to the act of 
learning, I unveil  some of its key, but hidden features into it what amounts to the art 
of practicing pedagogy to learn, in the closing chapters. 
 
I propose to raise the reader’s awareness of radical ideas emergent from the 
innovative possibilities of postmodernism for better valuing the fuller richness of 
human movement’s contribution to the realm of education. In particular, I encourage 
movement’s schooling advocates to employ a critical poststructural conceptualization 
of its own profession. The profession, for ever, needs to explore the hidden conflicts 
in the orthodoxy of its practices. It needs to constantly ask itself how one can 
strengthen and investigate professional relations and meanings, as they can be 
constructed within an ever changing realm of justice, freedom, and equity. Individuals 
should discuss the professional and moral principles which PE and its emissaries are 
morally bound to nurture.  
 
This axial phase of the thesis profiles the shift from teaching to pedagogy, to placing 
another person by way of similar experiences that others have encountered before 
them, coming to terms with the discipline of dialogue; coping with the dialectic 
between a mode of knowledge [techne] which refers to a reasoned novice as 
capacity to make / perform movement but not to its agent-maker.  Put differently, 
contemporary PE deals with a mode of knowledge founded on the experiential realm 
of “phronesis” which is more fully addressed in Chapter 7.  Phronesis is something 
which remains on the level of a speculative experiential quality and refers to one’s 
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capacity to act judiciously, since the universals within its grasp are always modifiable 
in the light of its continuing exposure to particular classroom happenings. For 
example, gifted physical performers may be found among the very young, as indeed 
one occasionally finds gifted teachers. On the other hand, both movement 
performers and professional educators need a kind of foil against which they can 
begin to compare their experiences. There are activities such as gymnastics or the 
playing of a musical instrument, which we might want to describe as “performative” 
rather than productive since they do not leave behind them deposits or reified 
products. Predictable performances, rather than elements of opportunity such as 
games playing, lessen the factor of luck and reduce the play of cavalier spirit. 
Performative concerns deny personal attribution, preventing the mover agent from 
conspicuously claiming one’s resourcefulness and opportunism [subtlety of mind]. In 
effect, facing a predicament in the realm of play or sport is very much like facing a 
predicament in classroom teaching. The more one plays a sport the more adaptable 
they become to its challenges. The same applies to teaching PE, or any other 
curriculum subject. 
 
I argue that different intellectual excellences, precisely insofar as they depend on 
different degrees of experience, correspond to different stages or phases of 
schooling and eventually life’s changing seasons. I equate the primacy of how we 
learn to move to that of how we learn to speak. There is an illuminating parallel 
between language as the act of interpretation and speech, and the practical field in 
which one acts, when the messenger is not detached from one’s message. There is 
a tension between closure and openness, and an ever renewed, never antecedently 
guaranteed, mediation between universal and particular.  
 
Relationships 
 
I seek to explain how to bind oneself to the web of human relationships by the astute 
use of language, especially speech. The infinity of language, its interventions and its 
inexhaustible capacity for new utterance itself is deeply historical and becomes what 
it is through a wayward development over time, a process of gathering, combining, 
profiling, recessing, discarding, and layering meanings, interests, perceptions, and 
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values; all of this directed by no higher logic or plan than what can be reconstructed 
of the life of the particular language itself. What is important here is not just the way 
in which language is bound to the past, so that it is the dominant mode of being of 
tradition. Language’s history, its pastness, signifies our particular encultured 
upbringing. More especially, language offers signs of the way in which it binds those 
who use it [everyone] to the past.  
 
In a sense, no one uses language; no one that is, constructs thoughts within his or 
her subjectivity and then employs words which can best convey these thoughts to 
the public. Rather thinking is already itself within language; as creative or radical 
thinking, it does not fall into the obvious pathways of the language [its clichés] but 
strains to cut fresh paths.  
 
It is with cutting fresh pathways of thinking about movement, and in the process, the 
thinking about one’s self in movement, that the voicing of PL comes under focus. 
What I propose is that when voiced through ML’s disciplined guided pathways, the 
presenting of PL may then help its professionals to treat one’s sense of “sovereignty” 
one’s own and that of one’s learners with the rightful reverence that we all deserve 
as fellow human beings. The crucial point is that language, be it for the sake of 
learning what PE originally means or appreciating literature in its own right, needs to 
be perceived and accepted as a kind of buoyancy that language gives to thought. 
Thinking is a tension-filled activity which is already detached from language, whilst 
interminably all thinking tries to find poise and direction in it. Modern PE’s profession 
had to navigate its participants’ attention through scientific terms which escape from 
their culture’s history and spoken dialect, hence lose touch with their ancestors’ 
traditional meanings, rituals and beliefs. 
 
Perspectives 
 
Movement pedagogy embraces many different perspectives which serve as a 
dynamic and fluent interplay amongst different fields of knowledge and between 
different personnel aspiring to turn movement into something which seriously 
interests and affects the commitment of our lives with the outside world.  For 
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example, all movement participants need to examine our performances as we live 
them, as well as how we conceptualize them, so that we can reflect on the essential 
“lasting impressions” which characterize the “event”, by acknowledging that we 
“author” our own descriptions. Such self authored commentaries about movement 
establish a strong and orientated relation between movement and ourselves as 
abiding concerns. This relationship balances the movement context by considering 
its conscious glimpses [epiphanies] as set against its whole encounter, and by being 
placed in touch with innovative aspects of one’s indwelt-self (Abram; 1996) as set 
against its habituated self. 
 
PE becomes familiar to us only by our volitionally adopting a posture to being-given-
over or losing ourselves to some quest of being restored to an original sense of what 
it means to be a mover, a thinker, or to be a listener to another’s words [suggesting 
an act of recovery which is uplifting as a form of self renewal and a settling into a 
newly restored self]. PE is a way of re-learning how to look at the world by turning to 
a renewed but transformed and re-awaked generic-experience, which is given 
another turn of meaning by the infallible use of a public language. Understood in this 
sense and sequence, then, PE’s pedagogy is always a project of someone; a real 
person who sets out to make sense of a certain aspect of a certain context. This real 
person is located in a certain set of particular circumstances, in a communal cultural 
setting and historical life-circumstance, but always in a one-off situation.   
 
Movement is learning on the move; it is about placing oneself in a novel, partly 
expected and partly unexpected position. Similarly, language moves us as we speak; 
rendering us vulnerable to the quirks, the spin and turns of linguistic reasoning, the 
experiences of which constantly help us to become sensitive to what lies 
unexpressed. 
 
Poststructuralism      
 
Unlike structuralism, poststructuralism is a label formulated by American academics 
to denote the heterogeneous works of a series of French intellectuals who came to 
international prominence in the 1960s and 1970s. It is best explained as a theory of 
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knowledge and language. It helps us to understand the broad concerns articulated in 
postmodernism, which is associated with a playful acceptance of a culture’s surface 
and superficial style, self-conscious quotation and parody, and a celebration of the 
ironic, the transient, and the contradictory. In its poststructuralist aspects 
postmodernism includes a denial of any fixed meaning, or any correspondence 
between language and the “Big Other”, the world, or any fixed reality, or truth, or fact, 
as the “object of enquiry”. Yet, for me, it is how poststructuralism critically looks at 
the question of locating one’s subjective-being in the process of education that I want 
to begin to disentangle, in order to disentangle the nature of pedagogy, and not that 
of teaching. 
In the first place, if the mover-agent, or the “learner-subject” is an effect of culture, a 
result of the circulation of meanings in the symbolic order, rather than their origin, 
subjectivity is more likely to reproduce the uncertainties and the range of beliefs we 
encounter, than to resolve them. This cannot be education. In the second place, the 
distinction between the subject “in here”, in me, and the object “out there” is itself the 
consequence of the old view of the relationship between human beings and 
language.  If, in the Cartesian tradition of Enlightenment, my consciousness is what 
exists unconditionally, and language is no more than the “instrument” it makes use of 
in order to communicate about the world with other consciousnesses, we may 
conceive of knowledge in terms of a subject contemplating the objects it knows 
about. On the other hand, if our consciousness is itself brought into being by 
borrowing meanings from the “Big Other”, and if the world itself is differentiated by 
language, we cannot any longer think in terms of a binary opposition between a 
knowing subject in here, and the objects of its knowledge out there. 
Language, according to poststructuralism, can intervene between human beings and 
their world. It suggests that the distinctions we make are not necessarily given by the 
world around us, but are instead produced by the symbolizing systems we learn 
which comes in structrualism. We learn our native tongue at such an early age that it 
seems transparent, a window onto a world of things, even if some of those things are 
imaginary, no more than ideas of things, perhaps derived from children’s play or 
heard during  the fast disappearing habit of story reading.   
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To emphasize, knowledge that befalls us in phenomenology is founded on one’s 
personal encountering a movement’s “moving” experience itself by its perceiver. In  
structuralism, knowledge, it was held, was to be founded on the “structures” that 
make experience publicly possible and thus subsequently accessible for verification 
and validation: by sharing what was assumed to be mutually understood concepts in 
a communal language or signs. Poststructuralism, in turn, argued that founding 
knowledge either on pure experience [phenomenology] or on systematic structures 
[structuralism] was impossible. This impossibility, however, was meant not to be 
understood as a failure or loss of meaning, but rather, conceived as a cause for 
“celebration and liberation.”   
 
Poststructuralism’s linguisitic analysis served to shake PE’s professional 
complacancy away from its science-bound style of communication. PE’s 
communication was deeply immersed in the language of target setting, scheduled 
programmes, repetitions, prescribed outcomes, time-measurement, points systems 
and finite numerical data. Such overwhelming concerns with objectivity shaped not 
only their lesson planning and content material, but also the manner in which 
movement was presented under the presumption that its movers were learning 
something akin to what the specialists themselves had been privileged to encounter.  
 
Learning movement was assumed to relay a closeness, or homogenous similarity to 
what had happened-upon and encompassed its career-minded “teachers” during 
their unexpected moving encounters, at their personal level of awareness. The 
strong supposition was that if PE’s designated movement-disciplines placed me by 
way of certain curriculum-proclaimed human learning experiences [granting largely 
sociological and psychoanalytic insights], such as that of team-building, rule 
following, fair play and their impact on moral learning; then likewise, the opportunity 
to become immersed in movement acts could be left to “that-physical-action”, and 
that action alone, [to assimilate its “performers” to the beguiling and bewitching 
nature of movement.] What poststructuralism’s approach to literature maintains is 
that words have no absolute meaning, and that any text is open to an unlimited 
range of interpretations. On interpreting what is differently conceived by others, when 
both language and movement are placed under the microscope of this new 
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perspective, new notions of learning and meanings take on very different 
consequences for movement educators.  
 
Unwitting but disempowering ways 
 
With technology’s penetrating eyes, its cameras, its internet, its mobile phones, sport 
technology becomes addictive to intimate intrusive scrutiny, addictive to the fear of 
failure, disempowering self-image and self-identity, to physical perfection. 
Nevertheless, it has failed to address emotional health (Allenbough 1967; Abbs 
1994; Becher 1989; Gore 1987; 1990; Kirk 1992a; Novak 1976).  
 
It failed to address the unexplained gap between physical and emotional health. By 
elevating one’s own life into that of what others expect of you and that when one’s 
public image fails to complement one’s private sense of being, it is possible for one 
to undergo exaggerated versions of one’s personal existence. On the one hand, the 
public sees you as an idol; on the other hand, you see yourself as a fragile being. If 
this is the case, paranoia can set in, as was the case for John Kirwan (2010). In his 
text “All Backs Don’t Cry”, he writes with candour about how he was finally able to 
escort others out of this downward spiralling gap, a gap of  confusion and 
depression, because he felt unable to balance his own sense of well-being with the 
demands the public made upon him. Many learners felt alienated in PE because 
they, also, could not resolve their own personal problems in failing to deal with the 
challenges, both overt and covert, that modern PE imposed upon them. It is with 
alleviating this problem that I offer this thesis on the therapeutic nature of ML. 
 
PE’s communicative approach failed to divulge its silent realm of knowledge, 
because its conventional practices could not convey, or articulate the profession’s 
immanent “covenant of hope”, a silent deed which I shall unwrap as movement-
interpreters’ true burden in the next few chapters. For now, this “covenant of hope” 
can be thought of in terms similar to that which political philosophers refer to as an 
other’s “social contract”; a promise, or an endeavour from a collective group, e.g., 
PE’s proponents as a kind of undeclared pledge to try to employ the best and most 
ethical possible means to enable its movers to better understand what the act of 
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moving may come to mean for them. My enduring concern is that when movers’ 
conscious attention become immersed “into” the beguiling realm of movement, they 
may encounter a rather alarming sense of alienation (a body/mind separation) or an 
exhilarating experience both of which can leave a lasting impression on that 
individual. ML can be a constructive therapeutic healing for movement advocates to 
employ to help their “traumatised”, or “confused”, or “astonished” learners to be 
ushered from the “unconscious” encounters in movement, and eventually, begin to 
come to terms with what might be implied from such enactments.  
 
Kinaesthesis 
 
For instance, in the case of our private, inner-felt sensations, our kinaesthetic 
encounters [or proprioceptive awareness] refer to the flow patterns the mover 
partially attends to as one is engaged in the process of moving. It is an acute 
awareness of something embodied which we regard as that of “one’s own” and its 
perception, and yet which is something that stubbornly remains alien to us. 
Kinaesthesis is the sense of the relative position of neighbouring parts of the body 
and strength of effort being employed in the movement. It is distinguished from 
exteroception, by which we perceive the outside world and interoception, by which 
we perceive pain, hunger and the movement of internal organs. Kinaesthesis was 
discussed some time ago by Arnold (1979), and even earlier by Best (1974), and 
again (1990), as something that is tacit, tangential, tantalising, and yet, seriously 
provokes differing modes of personal experience. It is with further surfacing the 
“personal” experience of PE that I initiate ML in a language which, importantly, we 
choose for ourselves.  
 
Vague designation of words 
 
In the act of speaking of  such experiences, for example, my running on Cleeve Hill, 
when, with a following warm breeze, and a slight down-slope that extended over five 
kilometres, I suddenly felt intensely elated, lost touch with my bodily sensations, and, 
even felt as if I was not touching the ground, yet my surroundings became brighter 
than usual. The yellow of the gorse bushes was luminous, the grass greener, the soil 
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shimmered in a brighter shade of gold. And I lost touch with time, indeed, I lost touch 
with myself. This loss of self was exhilarating for me but it can be depressing for 
others because they may not be able to cope with or fully recover from this 
disorientation. 
 
It is with such loss of self in both forms that in these closing chapters I try to surface. 
I try to make public what being engaged in its pedagogy is like - its spectral role. I 
seek to bring the reader’s awareness to PE’s hidden contemporary pedagogic 
communicative-ingredients. The coming PE profession needs to be made aware of 
the potential enlightening nature of clarifying its previously insular concerns about 
the way we learn. It needs to cope with the ambiguity of PE’s many conceptual 
cognitive and abstract emotional “gaps” to manage its connections between theory 
and practice, and vice-versa. It needs a professional willingness to venture into more 
panoramic but indistinctive and more qualitative realms of enquiry. 
 
Encoding 
 
In essence then, the thesis takes a distinctive semantic turn to address how meaning 
is encoded in language, and then examine its pragmatic practice, the actualised 
consequences of listening, understanding, and responding to all its speakers’ 
perspectives. In particular, I want to draw attention to the ambiguous but compelling 
sensuous feeling that one may encounter whilst engaged in movement, the nature of 
which may be made public for others to reject or to part endorse, validate and lend 
further credibility to its account. This is not an easy task, because of the vague 
designation of word usage, and its un-signified meaning.  
 
Most words, we assume, carry meaning, or at least, the general idea of its current 
meaning as exercised in the unpredictable dynamics that arise during movement-
disciplined activities. Words help define different concepts, and they also refer to 
different forms of experienced phenomena. They also hold the power to interflow, to 
cross-fertilize meanings, ideas, and beliefs, and offer a temporary bridge-head as 
linking part meanings when different individuals try to exchange their own intended 
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meanings with another person who also employs perhaps similar, but possibly very 
differently intended meanings.  
 
Merleau-Ponty welcomed structuralism’s attempt to go beyond the “subject-object 
correlation” (Signs 1960: 123), though he criticised the overuse of the term 
“structure” in contemporary writings. Even so, Merleau-Ponty (1968) did not view 
language as an anonymous system [as the structuralists did]. Although he agreed 
with Heidegger (1958) that “language speaks man”, he nevertheless always 
interpreted language grounded in perception. Our employment of language is like 
our use of a new sense organ, which itself retreats from view and presents us only 
with world. As in the visual field, what is seen slips out of focus into a blur, so also in 
language there is an indefinite boundary to our linguistic domain, where language 
shades off into innuendos, murmurs and eventually, into  silence (Signs, 1960). 
 
Phenomenology, for Merleau-Ponty, proceeds by suspending the natural attitude in a 
special form of reflection: overcoming the natural attitude is not a matter of installing 
us in “a closed, transparent milieu” (Signs 1960a:162), but of recognizing the manner 
in which thought arises out of its immersion in the natural attitude. Things are not 
merely pure extended objects in the Cartesian manner, but are disclosed in their 
properties precisely because of the nature of the body and its sensory and motor 
capacities. Whatever is revealed to its agent-encounter, the thing is:  
 
            …caught up in the context of my body.                      (Signs: 168) 
 
 
Moreover, “I” do not discover myself as an isolated consciousness, rather  
 
              …Cogito must reveal me in a situation, and it is on this condition alone that transcendental              
subjectivity can…be an intersubjectivity.                     (1945, 1962 xiii)                                 
 
 
Merleau-Ponty thinks it revelatory that only in conversation with others, in the act of 
intersubjective exchanges, can one’s ego become fully itself. He views the 
complexity of our bodily relations as a paradigm case for better understanding the 
nature of our self-reflection. We can not experience touching and being touched at 
the same time, rather we pass from one role into the other. We engage with others, 
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in a special intertwining relation. Our conscious activity and our unconscious 
passivity are different “moments” and this leads to us pass over the activity of our 
bodies in perception, and to attend more carefully to what we need to say. 
 
Living utterances 
 
My speaking act clearly takes place, in the now, in the immediate moment of my 
utterances, but sustained only on the unpredictable play of my words as received 
and understood by my listener. I am trying to help another person to share, to take 
turns, to be in the “know” of the nature of my experiences. During this talking 
process, I am trying to reproduce the imaginary relations of individuals to their 
realized conditions of existence, be it mythological or ideological. This live-
performance entails my relaying across my own insights to that of another, and then 
carefully observing his or her gestured and/or verbal evidence as testimony of the 
listener’s acceptance to align, or approximate with what I am trying to portray. 
 
This is what ML should be about. It examines the alternating process of counselling 
meaning from one person to another. It involves a dual connoisseurship in an 
intimate acquaintance with and in movement, and an ability to communicate 
meaning oriented towards another. The other in PE is one’s learners who occupy a 
different experiential background, and is approaching not the early stages, but 
rather, the maturing phases of conceptual and physiological growth: PE’s senior 
pupils. The assumption is made here that their maturing communication expression 
and more accomplished motile capacity is such that their description of enacted 
experiences as swimmers or as hockey players is uttered in terms consistent with 
their internalised personal self-perception [self-description] and their evaluative 
statements about one’s unappreciated, insensitive orientation towards human 
movement. This carries implications towards commitment to movement, or divorce 
from it. I seek to harmonise the emerging components of the self, to nurture a learner 
who becomes competent to self-orchestrate one’s self-being to cope with multi-
dimensional portraits of life and its unpredictable interactions. PE’s communication, I 
argue, varies according to the theoretical frame of reference employed and the 
stress placed on certain aspects of the total process, but which all include five 
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fundamental factors: an initiator; a recipient; a mode or a vehicle; a message; and an 
effect. 
 
Reaching into the zone 
 
I am especially interested in extending Mosston and Ashworth’s (1992-2002) 
incomplete “spectrum” of teaching”. It was largely focused on planning pre-lesson 
tactics to consider post-lesson consequences for all its participants, its professional 
deliverer as well as its agent recipients. Classroom interaction was systematically 
and strategically simplified in order to construct an irreducible “objective” set of 
causal relationships between teaching styles and learning outcomes. Styles of 
teaching were developed and disseminated as neutral personal issues, since its 
technical devices reflected no particular value position, no significant shift in equating 
power relationships; did not address the complex politics embedded in pedagogy. 
 
I am also interested in promoting and refining PL’s onus upon the qualitative modes 
of communication, linking its agent’s “moving-experiences” with those who may have 
an inspired passion to pursue epiphany-like enactments [which coaches and athletes 
now refer to as being “in the zone”]. This is the kind of experience that I associate 
with my run on Cleeve Hill, or my parachuting, or running amongst the sand dunes in 
Wales. Clearly, not all PE learners may encounter such privileges. However, if a 
person wishes to dedicate one’s life to become a movement missionary, she or he 
should be able to spread the word of movement and appreciate PE’s movement 
images who we are.  PE is made to “speak” the human contract (Chapters 6-8), but 
its immanent rules of engagement are veiled and not easily surfaced. This is a bold 
claim which I justify in these closing chapters by referring to “being-in-the zone”. I 
hold the view that most, if not all, aspiring PE interpreters will have encountered what 
I label as a “locale of tranquility” (Chapters 7 and 8). ML is all about encouraging 
apprenticing PE specialists to be human movement’s witness, to bear testimony to 
others about what it is like to be human, and to encounter moment in a caring 
compassionate mode of communication. It is to share PE with its missionaries who 
may have become dedicated to it, to share the admirable serenity and equanimity 
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and humility manifested in movement, as it can only be replicated in one’s words and 
actions during the most testing of circumstances.   
 
For now, reference to the “zone” can be thought of as a kind of suspension of one’s 
sense of “being and time”, a penetrating loss of a sense of presence and of time, as 
if my very being has been temporarily removed from within my bodily framework, and 
somehow taken out to transiently occupy another state of being, [another “Ted” 
stepping outside of me “the familiar “Ted” and seen in a different light, somehow.] 
This is the kind of removed “self” that phenomenologists tried, but failed to catch a 
glimpse of the personalised person inside the person and, endeavoured to surface 
for public reference and reviewing. Phenomenologists aspired to step into the gap 
between my familiar conscious self and that of my unfamiliar, unconscious self which 
Ricoeur refers to - as my “otherness”.  
 
Locale of tranquility 
 
PE’s “locale of tranquility” is a kind of upgraded version from “being-in-the-zone”. In a 
simplistic sense, the transient “moments” are when a person suddenly feels ecstatic 
because one has scored a goal, made a telling tackle, finished the school’s cross-
country run, or completed a first length of the pool, thus, becoming labelled by one’s 
PE teacher as a “swimmer”,  rather than a “non-swimmer”. But, I am more concerned 
with how a professional movement proponent begins to examine and utilize one’s 
mover’s enacted experiences, with eliciting what it was like for that person to move 
and to meet with, in the process of moving. Eventually, to attain ML’s realistic goal 
through its reflective and reflexive practice, I want all movers [especially those who 
may wish to become professional PE specialists themselves, or work in its allied, 
sporting field] to be able to share with me what it was like for them to move. I want all 
PE “insider encounterers” to tell me their lived story, so that I may gain an insight into 
what kind of person they are, to know better their evolving dispositional nature. I 
seek to find what it is that makes them feel passionate about movement, or makes 
them feel alienated from it, in the manner in which they volitionally “comment” about 
movement, and their involvement in or exclusion from it. This is why I now consider 
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some fundamental difference between modern PE’s reliance on a “structured” 
language; the fact that language is not a transparent medium of thought. 
 
Modern PE’s physical science language dismissed implicit meanings.  Its science 
bound communication mode tended to repeat and exaggerate “technicism’s” clinical 
search for stipulated terms which fix instrumental “methods”. PE’s “classroom 
communication” seriously needed refreshing not by displacing mechanical language, 
but rather, by engaging in the language of human science not dislodged from the 
realm of a caring and righteous language.            
 
This pivotal linguistic adjustment came as the profession slowly responded to 
poststructuralism’s hermeneutic introduction. Hermeneutics serves to address crisis 
in criticism, and examines the function of interpreting constructive critique. It was to 
this kind of treatment that PE’s language, its correspondents’ utterances was to be 
subjected. 
 
Contemporary PE educators and interpreters need to unwrap the language of 
“thought” embracing ethical concerns in order to access and better examine  what 
the processes of learning is “like” in order to dialogue with the kinesthetic texture of 
movement, to bring movement and ourselves into speech. To be noted here is the 
difference between eastern and western human science’s aim. The latter is to 
acquire understanding about concrete lived experiences by means of language, 
when “talk” is the concrete stuff of human discourse. But differently, eastern methods 
may practice other non-script orientated reflective contemplation; a more 
preoccupied and manifested concern ministering for the welfare of another’s self.  
  
Because people of different groups and different nations see, interpret and 
disseminate their version of the world differently, we are compelled to conclude that 
either some languages misrepresent the way things are, while our own describes the 
world accurately, or that in the past, structuralism’s version of language, which 
seemed to name units given in nature, did not in practice depend on reference to 
things, or even to our ideas of things. Instead, the units seemed to exist so that un-
problematically meanings may be differentiated from one another by language itself; 
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therefore, we think of them as natural. A language re-presents, hence represents a 
way of understanding the world of differentiating between things and relating them to 
one another, and for ever, remains as an interplay between acknowledging subtle 
differences whilst sustaining relations.  
 
Connection 
 
Authentic individual gestures, however, cannot be described in their generality. They 
can only be seen in their individuality, in the free act whereby the individual creates 
both oneself and one’s world together, by casting the one into the other, of finding 
oneself at once a free and a harnessed subject in one’s own eyes, and, 
simultaneously perhaps a determined object in the eyes of others. I stand in my own 
balanced and familiar sense of being, and yet, I feel unbalanced, disturbed even 
when I am in the presence of another person. Unsure of myself, I try to reach for a 
delicate balancing act which novitiate movers find difficult to cope with, because of 
the impossibility of ascertaining the nature of that obscure posture. What is its 
intellectual or its relational status? Is it a status which seems both true to experience 
something meaningful during its enactment, and yet, irritatingly paradoxical following 
its seemingly meaningless reflections?  
 
I can remove myself by not looking at this other person. Better still, I turn my back to 
him or her, so that I am sending out a signal that I wish to have no contact, no 
communication and no connection with that individual, whom I deem best avoided 
altogether. If there is an attraction to someone or something, then, by contrast, it is 
not a “detachment” that I seek, but rather, an “involvement” with another [or a thing] 
to which I can attach my [self-assigned] participant contribution. 
 
Summary 
In this chapter I have qualified that “structuralism was a linguistic version of 
Kantianism without transcendentalism, that of holding knowledge to be exclusively 
“discursive”. That is, the opposite of intuition. According to Kant, one’s knowledge is 
realised in the act of comparing, examining, relating, distinguishing, abstracting, 
deducing, demonstrating, all of which are forms of intellectual effort. Knowledge, 
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one’s spiritual, intellectual knowledge is activity. Knowledge in general, and more 
especially philosophical knowledge, as Kant (in Chapter 3) maintained, is certainly 
quite impossible without the work, without the unpredictable effort of discursive 
thought. Kant’s error is confusing primacy with exclusivity. If our attention needs to 
be mostly directed outward, this does not mean that we should not look inward at 
times.  
What the PE profession needs to recognize is the new capacity of post-modernity’s 
critical field to discriminate between novel possibilities about embodied experiences 
which can be developed on the basis of an astute dissection of post-modernity that 
might capture some of PE’s own innate characteristics and modus operandi. With the 
introduction of PL in the early 1990s, and in the wake of postmodernism, 
contemporary movement interpreters are better informed and thus able to appreciate 
what it means to be a human being, a sentient being whose field of possibility exists 
in a state of happenings, a being in transformation (Chapters 6-8).  
 
Through poststructuralism’s language, PL expressed new and related ideas in how to 
enhance PE’s delivery as a more meaningful enterprise for all its participants. There 
followed a seminal shift from theories of “movement teaching” which attributed credit 
or blame to the movement-agent to that of an “eco-minded”, or a “bio-conscious 
pedagogy”. What the former placed under focus for both teacher and mover was the 
quality of performance. Incorrect movement was equated with a poor person-
performer, hence, negative feedback led to self-alienation. The latter “bio-pedagogy” 
seeks to appropriate all evidence available which best benefits its agent-mover. It is a 
search by the educator-minded professional to glean something positive for the 
benefit of the performing person.  
 
What poststructuralism offers PE is an opportunity and a cause for reflection. It 
proposes a lexicon and a syntax, which is to say a vocabulary and an indication of 
the way words legitimately relate to each other. It is useful in prompting the 
uncertainty of questions, but not in delivering the finality of answers. 
 
This chapter’s critical message for the PE profession is that raw minds tend to be 
vulnerable to the use of raw words. Raw, unrefined actions like sneezing, coughing 
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are reactionary, unprocessed, undeliberated, and undisciplined in nature, to which 
we are all involuntarily vulnerable.  
 
Somewhat differently, raw but reponsive reactions like blushing refer to the 
“involuntary” reddening of a person’s face causally attributed to embarrassment or 
emotional stress, though blushing has also been known to come from being 
lovestruck, or some kind of romantic stimulation. Blushing is thought to be the result 
of an overactive nervous system. Severe blushing is associated with those who 
suffer intense, delerious anxiety, in which the person experiences extreme and 
persistent apprehension in social and performance situations as perhaps 
encountered in any PE context.    
 
Importantly, PE specialists need to empathise with something akin to another’s 
“experienced emotions”. Emotion is the most human of all expressions. It involves 
encounters of self-attention, shame, and modesty, as well as understanding 
experiences which leave one flushed with success, with an ecstatic sense of elation.  
Self alienation may well be attributed to the physiological rebound of one’s basic 
fight/flight “mechanism”, when raw emotions are displayed and physical action is not 
possible. Self affiliation can be silently signalled between its experiencers by an 
acknowledged “wink” of the eye. 
 
From Chapter 7 onwards, I argue that those who can mediate PE’s nuanced 
meanings via ML and have experienced the fascination of transcendental moments 
may begin to address contradictions between self and others. In effect, for PE 
specialists to become “educators” about self and others, it is necessary to hear the 
mover’s residential experiences. PE interpreters are expected to become familiar 
with the learner character. This is because they need to deal with transient moments 
when conscious awareness of our being seems to disappear, when there seems to 
be a momentary loss of time and space, when one’s solitary mind falls into 
extravegant reaches and new latitudes of imagination in PE’s “ludic Rubicon”. 
 
Andragogy, towards which ML aspires, is vitalised socially by the experienced 
“knower”, shepherding the listener through the unseen tacit inferences of 
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“processed” decision making. If PE encounters are deliberated and reflected upon, 
ML, I show in Chapter 7 and 8, acknowledges that there is no return to our original 
state of being: we learn to “reconstitute” ourselves afresh. 
 
What has already been pointed out it that whilst modern PE teaching was primarily 
concerned with “principles” such as authority and certainty, postmodernism’s 
pedagogic acts will be shown as associated with indentifying “difference[s]”, 
acknowledging pluralism, and becoming sensitive to the textuality of words and of 
movement, as well as maintaining a critically informed sense of scepticism. 
 
As re-viewed in the remaining chapters, pedagogy which, like all truly artistic activity, 
like all authentic living, must confront the paradoxical ambiguity of its existence in the 
world. It can be neither purely objective in its approach to subject matter nor purely 
subjective in its interpretation, for if Kant, Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur are right, 
perception inevitably colours the perceived fact. Nevertheless, movement educator’s 
task is to convey a certain set of information, and entertain a range of potential 
meanings. But then, pedagogy cannot afford to surrender to routine, neither can it be 
unscheduled to the point of disorder.  
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Chapter Six      Hermeneutic “Conscious Self” and “Unconscious Otherness”     
           
Introduction  
 
This chapter explains why language refracts our awareness in the delivery of PE 
experiences and is of critical concern to its interpreters and their agents. I show that 
the purpose of hermeneutics is both a search for the speaker’s “intentional” meaning 
and a radically interpretive gesture. It also consists not in finding meaning but in 
dealing with the “breakdown” of meaning. It is not a hermeneutic that conveys fixed 
meaning and truth, once and for all, but a hermeneutic fired by the dissemination and 
trembling murmur of meaning and the notion that its speaker is somehow clearing 
the way toward nearing somewhere closer to a truth. 
 
Here I also justify why and how PE’s modern professional practices had to be 
transferred from its “structural” informed language to that of a poststructural mode of 
communication as inspired by some of its leading “thinkers” such as Austin (1962), 
who took ordinary language approaches to issues of scepticism and led those 
approaches in how to “do” things with words, to be subjected to scrutiny. Briefly, I 
refer to Levinas’s work (1963; 1973), based on the “ethics” of “the Other” or in his 
terms, “on ethics as first philosophy”. For Levinas, the “Other”, the unconscious 
stranger within us, is not knowable and cannot be made into an object of the self, as 
is done by traditional metaphysics, which Levinas called “ontology”.  
 
Featured also will be Gadamer’s (1960; 1975; 1981; 1986) theory of interpretation 
according to which, the meaning of a text is never a function purely of facts about the 
author and his or her original public; it is equally a function of the historical situation of 
the interpreter. Habermas’ (1975; 1984; 1993) attack on the problems of the nature of 
communication and self-consciousness, and their role in the causation of social 
action will also be referred to. Whilst Ricoeur’s (1965; 1971; 1992) welcomed stress 
on the humility necessary to the pursuit of “truth”, and that different “meaningful 
actions can be read as text” (1971: 529-562) will be highlighted. In this chapter I 
bridge the gap between last century’s transformations from the realm of teaching into 
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those of its pedagogic philosophy by engaging others in a hermeneutic critique of 
dialogue. 
 
Learning to read PE’s “hidden language” and engage in its “immanent protocol” is 
what I aspire ML’s ambition to be. It transforms movement’s philosophical mode into 
a practical approach to learn about the nature of one’s point of origin about one’s self 
and about some desired and some unavoidable qualities of life. We live in a language 
which serves to widen our concepts of life and its different modes of living; where the 
organic function of thought is carried on for the most part unconsciously, in the 
shadows, as it were, of the luminous circle of consciousness. This shimmering, 
consciously aware realm of knowledge and understanding is explained in this 
chapter, whilst its “shadowy” realm, its subliminal counterpoint, is further discussed in 
Chapter 7.  
 
In view of such recent radical changes to its meaningful understanding and its 
interpretive linguistic portrayal, PE, I suggest can be relabeled as Movement 
Education to emphasise that movement is initiated by me (ME) but evolves into 
consensual meaning. ML brings cognitive and emotional responses together. It tries 
to marry physicality with sensuousness. It attempts to align moments when its agent 
begins to speak about themselves on behalf of their own “moving” encounters. This 
communicative “move” was left on the substitute’s bench by modern PE, until post-
structuralism’s newly generated ideas served to change certain views about the 
generic resources of meaning which were thought to arise solely from its linguistic 
background. Meanings are at work during the very usage of their own creation. Our 
understanding of human movement, like the use of language, is more fully realized 
when a person encounters insights and images in both their usages, in their play and 
in their supreme and sublime moments of achievements. By analogy, language holds 
the capacity to create new impressions during its writing or speaking acts. Enacting 
movement and its commentary attune us not only to others, to ourselves, but also to 
those hidden parts of ourselves, as being placed in touch with our unconscious 
[presuppositionless] self. Modernist versions of PE teaching employed 
structuralism’s language, which I show to be impossible to use as a way to unravel 
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different versions of the self and hence, harnessing the process of learning because 
it is insensitive to the multiple subtleties of life. 
 
Today, hermeneutics can be shown to be a widely defined and thoroughly reasoned 
discipline of interpretation theory that embraces the entire framework of the 
interpretive process. It is a process which encompasses all forms of communication 
and expressive gestures: written, verbal, artistic, geo-political, physiological, 
sociological and much more. In general terms, hermeneutic-informed debate centres 
on such issues as whether “pre-judgments” can be eliminated and an “objective-
truth” attained through understanding the nature of our life skills, or as Gadamer 
(1962) points out, our human interpretation of “Verstehen”: the current understanding 
we have of human activities, and their underpinning motivations and deliberations. 
Gadamer would argue that PE’s preoccupation with objective methods of teaching 
would be anthithetical to the spirit of Lebenswelt scholarship, that the profession 
should be on guard against technique’s seductive illusions when it comes to 
understanding and coping with meaning.   
 
Language use can be thought of as operating in different forums, peeling back 
physical identities, creating spectacles of social obedience, demonstrating 
compliance and the unquestioned following of rules. Language has the power to 
posit the body as a surface onto which groups and mainstream society inscribe their 
political and social ideologies and against which “Iago’s” student inmates carved their 
resistence.  
 
If learners are placed in a movement encounter, or are positioned to confront 
knowledge with some sense of reasoning, as Habermas (1981; 1984) calls for, 
learning involves rational deliberation and critical judgment. Learning evolves into the 
ability to discriminate, and thus presuppose general and impartial principles 
governing the assessment of reasons bearing upon issues. Indeed, without such 
“guiding” principles the very conception of deliberation collapses. In short, Habermas 
(1993) suggests the concepts of rational conduct lose their meaning, which is always 
context-bound and mutually interdependent with values.        
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ML employs a probing language to maximise and connect the most accommodating 
of conditions which allow the understanding of movement to be conceived as the 
genesis of learning. In this generic PE context, learners are involved in the act of 
“moving”. They are invited to consider options and consequences revealed through 
the heightening awareness of their moral agency. According to Greene (2002), 
movers develop a more conscious choice to engage with emerging facets of one’s 
inner “sensory-self”, one’s “otherness”, recognizing their connectedness between the 
inner somatic sense and the social consciousness. The body has been the explicit 
focus of instruction in the dance studio, centuries of training have perfected a 
language, a method and a kinaesthetic response system for shaping and remaking 
the musculature, posture, expressiveness and speed-in-action of our physical selves. 
Kinaesthesis, is the consciousness of specific qualities of movement, the sensing of 
weight and of the ways in which muscles, tendons and joints coordinate to achieve a 
particular action. Others, including myself, became aware of a “felt” knowledge, a 
“rightness” in our movements that would manifest through the accuracy of swinging a 
golf-club, the pitch of a musical sound, the dynamics of sound as a form of 
kinaesthetic feedback. 
 
The history of the body has been paradoxical because as the body has been 
targeted as a means for indirectly controlling and changing the movement learner 
intellectually and morally, institutionally it has been ignored except when it is seen as 
a pathway for an academic end. I next argue that the instructed body shapes us at a 
susbconscious level. PE is the performing of an understanding, or a confusion, when 
one become consciously aware of monitoring the body as my state of well-being. 
The irony here is that the metaphors used to descibe a well functioning mind are all 
words of the physical body, such as “vital,” “active,” and “alive,” metaphors not 
separating or dividing them. 
 
Eventually, then, it is with bridging this “gap” between “Iago’s” ascribed language of 
teaching and that of the attribution language of pedagogy that today’s PE specialist 
are now professionally and morally obliged to engage in. They need to locate, to 
surface, to question, to address and offer a comforting or therapeutic insight into 
coping better with both movement and language’s usage, with both of their intriguing 
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enigmas, their as-yet unexplainable allure, their beguilement, and how to transform 
their abstract mystery into something more “fleshy”: between our primordial 
existence and our adulterated [prejudiced] understanding of the word. 
 
If educated into a healthy scepticism about language, and hence, become more 
aware of its riveting power, I foresee PE as the curriculum discipline which can 
venture into nurturing self-esteem and human thinking, via ML. This is because it 
seeks explanation within the realm of individual consciousness and subjectivity, 
within the frame of the participant as opposed to the observer of action. If realities 
only exist in respondents’ minds, then, subjective interaction seems to be the only 
way to access them. The knower and the process of knowing need not [cannot] be 
separated from what is known, just as facts cannot be separated from values. 
 
Pedagogy, which is the art of sustaining and creating innovation, focuses on our 
dealing with a “pre-cognitive” aspect of the existing world, which is neither purely 
subjective [whatever I take it to be], nor purely consensual [whatever we agree it to 
be]. The art of teaching, pedagogy is not a conventionally-referring language, such 
that, whatever meaning it has will not be expressible in any terms other than those of 
its particular context [that “incident”, in  the “now” of that moment, as it were]. It is 
not, however, an arbitrary meaning, because its correspondents cannot give a 
“correct” translation into some other medium, it does not follow that we can give the 
“happening” between speaker and listener any meaning we care to. Both speakers 
set off on a journey to press their viewpoint, but the motivation originally held behind 
each utterance might stem from very different perspectives.  
 
Modern PE’s discordance with learning (identified in Chapter 5) lacked critical 
reflection. Critical reflection shakes the dogmatism of life practices. Yet what was 
forgotten by modern PE specialists was that PE’s original purpose was to construct 
experiences which can symbolise belongingness between sentient and sacred 
concerns. I show how language’s infinite use and experiences, as with practical 
movement’s limitless meaning, paradoxically, hold the inexplicable power to 
acknowledge the absence of what  both language and movement obscure: 
subjective concerns. PE must not banish subjective concerns from the court of 
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knowledge nor dismiss the moral obligation of interest of human reason and 
emancipation, which hold our assumptions in place. Our human flourishing depends 
on keeping in touch with sentient inspired schemes of understanding movement 
vindicating practical wisdom as pedagogically constructing traditional learning 
contracts in both movement’s and language’s silent deeds. PE learners require 
contemplative silence to become more reflective and allowed the time to become 
more reflexive about their movement enterprises. They need time to think not so 
much about the product of the activity, but more about the intricate processes that 
are involved in encountering movement in order to learn more about the nature of 
physical activity and about their own ontological selves. Movers need space to move 
and to think, and this is where hermeneutics steps in to guide its learner’s 
perceptions about physical events and their personal agency. 
 
Mapping connections 
 
Hermeneutics is concerned with locating the traditional history and tracing the 
emergence of language and the elusive delivery of a passing meaning for its user. 
Hermeneutics seeks meaning based on the assumption that there is meaning. It also 
deals with separating how the speaker’s language use “appropriates” the act of 
setting apart the “fact” of the act, its scientific analyses, from that of the person who 
inhabits movement as its agent–speaker.  
 
Applying this philosophical movement to that of embodied actions, by posing 
questions into questions, what is revealed about PE’s contemporary mode of 
communication is that it is profoundly invested with a moral obligation to do one’s 
best to explore movement as a twofold project. First, PE can be presented by 
“teaching” its epistemological path or grounding, its technical shaping of the body 
and of learning how to move. Secondly, PE is advanced by pedagogically exploring 
its ontological provenance; that of moving to learn who one is.  ML is concerned with 
learning about movement and with learning of one’s inner-self as revealed during 
and post involvement in the act. In addition, ML deals with human-movement as was 
originally devised by our ancestors; first as physical but silent gestures such as finger 
placed across the mouth [signifying to keep quiet] as noted by Van Dalen (1965) in 
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his article “Dynamics of Change in Physical Education”. Much later, such gestured 
movement was coded as sounded gestures, using signs and signals to convey 
certain forms of consensual meaning, for instance, a frown or a nod of the head. 
Currently, PE’s professional practice continues in its ancient quest to unravel the 
twofold adherence of one’s own body to the domain of things and to that of the self, 
or as Ricoeur (1992) would put it, to the unfolding of the dialectic of the self and the 
“other than self”.  
 
Hermeneutics 
 
Hermeneutics serves to compliment and at the same time address the narcissistic 
limitations of phenomenology. Central to hermeneutics is that knowledge of context 
and background is essential for any interpretation to take place and that meaning 
exists and is worth seeking. The process is circular in that any part of a text of social-
historical event requires the rest of the text or event to make it intelligible. ML is 
designed to promote PE under the auspices of its emerging meaning. It sensitizes its 
correspondents’ treatment of the other so that its advocate should act in ways which 
are not brought to the attention of one’s recipient but reciprocating learner. ML’s 
practitioners may be more richly endowed with a strong sense of humility and 
modesty, rendering its professional educators as those who wear and display their 
learning unnoticed in the midst of others. Be that as it may, one can do this only by 
knowing how to orchestrate the silent deeds that reside in the profound depths of 
language’s hidden devices.  
 
Hence, I now recruit hermeneutics into the hidden ways: the use of words shapes the 
opening and the closing of meanings in the realm of pedagogy. Hermeneutic-
informed pedagogy clarifies and acknowledges the need to identify the potential 
consequences of what one says to another. A pedagogue needs to carefully monitor 
the many differential hermeneutical movements, the subtle shifts in meanings that 
occur between myself and the text, between one’s use of theory and one’s academic 
and personal subject matter. Hermeneutics is a way of blending old perceptions with 
new ones in a unique expression of what has stayed true along with what has 
changed, with what has been gauged sometimes by the corresponding participants 
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in their dialogic critiqué which serves to filter out novel meanings. Rather than 
confine talk to the stilted language of science, Movement Literacy invites emotional 
presence and personal involvement so that movement encounters, in their success 
or failures may be ventured into, and subsequently provide experiential pathways for 
its incumbent residents, its acting agents, to be granted a transient glimpse into how 
to unravel the cutting-edge of human existence. 
 
Making things happen 
 
But then, words are difficult to manage. They do not always mean the same thing all 
the time. “Learning” for instance, is a word which has no term.  It is only possible, 
therefore that nature and genetics, or one’s  innate disposition towards learning-to-
learn, which is what ML is trying to deal with, is about displaying one’s versatile 
interplay between what is deemed as terminable fixtures, and that which can be 
thought of as interminable changes. ML deals with the ontological interpretation of its 
agent-speaker whose movement’s commentary serves to reveal something(s) about 
its mover. The posing of questions is brought into prominence in PE’s praxis largely 
because it is in the use of rhetoric/response which underlies the contemporary 
understanding of language that renders language as a field of action. I am trying to 
catch the sense of action as an arrangement and effect within the rhetoric of texts 
and lived lives, the worldly effect of movement and language for its resident-person.  
 
The other person, the PE specialist, is better placed to locate or be positioned to 
read and interpret my “hidden-otherness” which she or he may detect and take note 
of, but to which I can merely re-act through without being sensitive to my current 
irrational or “gob-smacked” existence. In movement’s beguiling state of existence, 
momentarily, I can experience a loss of contact with myself. I encounter a feeling of 
being consciously removed from myself as initiating control of me to that which 
somehow occupies a transient state-of-being. Professional education is the laying 
open of a question that may reveal some knowledge forms [theories, concepts] 
which gloss the overlay of our understanding of movement and of ourselves, but in 
so doing, also nurtures a radical allegiance to the subjective I perception.  It courts a 
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phenomenological dimension whilst education is about celebrating what others 
perceive of the world, and is able to talk about their perceptions. 
 
Language and PE 
 
I next clarify how PE’s commitment to modern “structuralist” language deceived the 
PE specialists’ belief that  they could analyze systems, including the body from an 
external, objective viewpoint. And then, differently, how poststructuralists argued that 
this understanding is incorrect, that one cannot transcend fixed-gathering-in of 
various perspectives that others hold about other people or that of our “Big Other”, 
our cosmological surroundings.  
 
Structural thinking is just that; it establishes a base and then merely adds categories 
onto that base, as Mosston and Ashworth (1966-2002) did for their “teaching-
spectrum”, as “Iago” was felt compelled to do for his “teaching”.  In other words, 
“structuralist” thinking assumes that once the “foundation” of teaching has been 
established, what automatically follows is that the assumed objective claims of 
movement for its movers once anchored to such objectives, also served to anchor 
the resources of meaning.  Pursuing the established movement objectives became 
the prime concern for its specialists, who then assumed that movement’s potential 
meaning would strike its learners, just as it did its specialists, hence the specialists’ 
“special-meaning” would also hold all other meanings in place.  
 
Modernist PE teachers held the view that analysis is itself determined by what it 
examines. What it failed to consider was the nature of the personnel who exercised 
that analysis. Its language was confined to the delivery of instructions, and no more. 
It did not question the nature of movement’s consequences for its performing-doers 
as discrete individual persons, bearing in mind that as persons we are 
“incomparable”, and “irreplaceable” (Auden, 1967). Modern PE  did not differentiate 
between statements and rhetoric, commands, suggestions and promises. PE did not 
question the hidden implications that its structured language carried for its learners. 
In Austin’s (1962) ground-breaking theory of “Illocutionary forces”, there was no 
direct link between what the teacher did and what the student learnt; there was little 
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personal engagement with the philosophy behind each teaching style, whereas 
contemporary pedagogy and personhood became central rather than peripheral 
considerations (Fernandez-Balboa  2006). In effect, the quality of the mover’s 
experience was not brought under consideration, because the dynamics of dialectic 
dialogue was hermetically sealed from the learning process. 
 
Illocutionary act 
 
Austin (1962) distinguished a number of different kinds of “speech-acts” as 
characterizing our utterances. Take for example, the sentence: “The ball is in the 
court.” When I, the PE specialist, utter this sentence I am sending out a sequence of 
noises. This is called a “phonetic act”. As an utterance, it is made in conformity with 
appropriate rules of grammar. It is said to be a “phatic act”. The utterance, 
considered as having a specific sense and referring to a particular object, is called by 
Austin, a “locutionary” act. However, in saying “The ball is in the court.” it may be that 
my aim, qua speaker, is to get a pupil to collect the ball. Maybe, I am pointing out to 
the entire class about a specific rule in a game which claims that one can actually be 
positioned outside the court and still continue to play the game. Perchance, even, I 
am exclaiming a surprise that the ball has remained on court, to be understood as an 
expression of amazement. In this respect, my utterance is called an “illocutionary 
act”. If, in my speaking through the utterance, my language [articulation] actually 
brings it about that a player responds to my words, then, this consequence is called 
the “perlocutionary” act.  
The hidden process of being alerted to such discretionary refinement of linguistic 
distinctions, to one’s need for open transparency in qualifying the speaker’s intention, 
and to that of the listener’s receptive range of potential meanings and consequences 
for impressing that listener, is largely attributed to political language and hermeneutic 
analysts. For this dissertation I draw on the thought of Habermas (1968), and astute 
rhetoricians as Gadamer (1960), and Ricoeur (2002). Their analyses of language, (in 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8) show how to help educators to employ a democratic, hence, 
empowering, embodied rules of engagement into the education of the learner-in-
movement.  
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Rhetoric  
 
Phenomenology was shown to be as much about asking questions which generate 
more questions (see Chapter 4). Questions serve both its instigator and its 
responder to delve deeper into the inner throes of their own thoughts and ideas 
about their personal viewpoints, about their personal posture towards themselves, 
orientated either towards or away from others and towards their local landscape. 
Education, I contend, is about how we can delve deeper into the cognitive and 
emotional gaps that occur in the many interchanges of one and another’s 
coordinating sets of ideas, values, and beliefs. Correspondents may meet and align 
with, but never share their absolute meaning with another’s. Education is not about 
avoiding these obscure realms of differentiated forms of knowledge, where their links 
are tenuous to say the least, and of which the Modernist PE profession was aware 
but felt uninformed about how best to cope with in their practices, until rhetoric, once 
more, began to take its rightful place in the presentation of movement. 
 
What is redeemed and made relevant to teaching movement is that, in ancient times, 
rhetoric was divided into three kinds: (i) judicial, with justice in view; (ii) 
political/deliberative, arguing in terms of expediency or utility; and (iii) epideictic; 
practised in eulogies, attributing praise and blame where the key concept was 
graciousness, decency and gallantry (Ricoeur  2002).  What is featured about 
rhetoric is that justice, deliberation, and distribution of emotional feelings and their 
consequences for others is brought into play when one asks questions, reminding us 
that words go with their associated meanings.  
 
Impersonal to personal 
 
It is not impossible to “teach” another via the internet, since the internet is impersonal 
and its correspondents can exchange neutral, and factual or fabricated information. 
What is absent here is the “human presence” of another’s interpersonal relationship, 
which, in the words of education may range from fleeting, detached interchanges of 
words, to that of an enduring attachment between its speakers. Important to bear in 
mind is the fact that PE specialists’ professional context in which this relationship 
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either flourishes or not, is regulated by law, custom or mutual agreement, and is the 
contextual framework or basis of this interaction which gives or denies access to 
human bonding.  
 
To advance from modernism’s systematic-delivery of epistemological knowledge role 
of a movement-teacher, one needs a much more versatile manner and style of 
communication in which the dispositional character of the person who ever aspires to 
become a learner-pedagogue, needs a great deal more personal qualities and 
professional knowledge to accommodate the constant reversal roles for learner to 
pedagogue, and from pedagogue to learner.  PE specialists have to live the life of 
their curriculum-subject, be a person who epitomizes what he or she preaches.  That 
is, for example, to be able to display a compatibility of interests and share mutual 
preferences in physical activities with their learners; to be fit, to look the part, to 
manifest PE’s objectives in practice. To demonstrate that games-playing teaches 
one the principles of moral integrity; then, it follows that a PE professional is one 
whose trust and respect as a person is made readily available for one’s learners.  
 
Unlike a chemistry teacher who has no personal link with the chemical compositions 
and liquid substances that he or she comes into contact, a PE specialist’s personal 
composition, one’s attitude and general demeanor form an integral ingredient in the 
advocacy of the subject. In short, when a PE specialist is exercising one’s 
educational skills, he or she, at the same time, needs to tread a very fine line 
between the many gaps that we come to feel between, for instance, intrusive 
thinking, between the fear of rejection, between our hope and our ambition, between 
realizing our actual competence and the limitations of our physical effects.  ML is 
about replicating life. It is about acknowledging life’s needs and fragility as best as 
possible and making public the nature of one’s movement experiences, not in a 
pompous, flaunting, self-aggrandizing manner, but rather in a way that showers the 
learner with empathy, with understanding, with just and comforting words.  
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Rhetoric and response entice action 
 
Rhetoric, or discourse theory shares with both structuralism and poststructuralism an 
interest in the formal devices of language. But rhetoric is also concerned with how 
these devices are actually effective for its users at the point of “contact” and 
“consumption”. If, at this crucial stage of the thesis, one accepts that identifying this 
point of contact where meaning occurs, or where its ignition is fused and actually 
takes place, is an impossible task, then what remains accessible and thus partially 
open to examination is the point of “consumption”.  
 
Discourse is the point for both speaker and listener’s “consumption” of information 
and knowledge, of social and personal impact. It can be a humanely transformative 
affair, because it is a complex process during which its incumbent participants are 
asked to confront something strange within a familiar context. Discourse is that which 
produces an experience of the unfamiliar, a sense of something or someone other 
than oneself. For example, Mohammed Ali became supremely competent through his 
self-proclaiming and self-aggrandizing poetry, whilst mountain climbing heroes like 
Everest’s Hillary and Tensing both downplayed their extraordinary feat. 
What poststructuralists maintain is that the concept of "self " as a separate, singular, 
and coherent entity is a fictional construct. Instead, and interminably, a moment-
upon-moment  evolving individual comprises tensions between conflicting knowledge 
claims, for example, of gender-role, race-acquisition, class conformity, and 
professional growth, as adopted by its beholder. Therefore, to properly study a living 
role or a fabricated role [as is created in a novel’s text], its reader-interpreter must 
understand how the role, or the work, or the narrative is related to his or her own 
personal concept of self. One’s malleable and ever-changing self-perception plays a 
critical role in one's interpretation of meaning. While different thinkers' views on the 
self [or the subject] vary, meaning for Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur is constituted by 
the thinker in the process of reading, or by the hearer in the process of being 
engaged in discourse with another person. 
Of course, the fiction author's intended meaning, such as it is [for the author's identity 
as a stable "self" with a single, discernible "intent" is also a fictional construct], is 
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always secondary to the meaning that the reader perceives. In other words, 
poststructuralism rejects the idea of a literary text having a single purpose, a single 
meaning, or one singular existence. Instead, every individual reader creates a new 
and individual purpose, meaning, and existence for a given text, and can do so, even 
when reading this same text at another time.  
Incessantly, pedogogy deals with destabilized meaning  
A poststructuralist-informed movement-literate adopts a critique of one’s own 
criticism, and hence, must be able to use a variety of perspectives to create a 
multifaceted interpretation of a text (which is referred to in Chapter 7), even if these 
interpretations conflict with one another. What is particularly important and thus 
illuminating to the reader who I am trying to escort into the realm of pedagogy is 
poststructuralism’s linguistic analyses (Derrida 1984; Foucault 1983; Deluze and 
Parnet 1987; Kristeva 1980; 1984) to divulge how meanings of a text shift in relation 
to certain variables, usually involving the identity of the reader. 
In the poststructuralist approach to “textual analysis” for example, the reader 
replaces the author as the primary subject of inquiry. This displacement is often 
referred to as the "destabilizing" or "decentering" of the author, though it has its 
greatest effect on the text itself. Without a central fixation on the author, 
poststructuralists examine not the author’s, but rather, the source of other sources 
for meaning [e.g., readers, cultural norms, other literature, etc.]. These alternative 
sources are never authoritative, and promise no consistency. In the process of 
reading, the reader follows the general orientation that words provide, so in a sense 
their imagination is carried on the effect and affect these words have for the reader. 
The author, one must remember, is dealing with the “traditional explanation” of the 
text, a means of imposing limits on the proliferation of meaning. The reader, the 
listener, differently, allows oneself to to be led down the path the author is creating. 
His or her chosen words are such that it seems as if the reader’s mind is taken in 
tow, and without having to actively “think”, the reader’s attention slides in the 
direction of the author’s orientation. 
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It was Lévinas (2003:11-120) who remarked on this new field of semantic inquiry that 
has arisen from poststructuralism’s ideas. Levinas claims that: 
    ...language refers to the position of the listener and the speaker, that is, to the 
contingency of their story. To seize by inventory all the contexts of language and all 
possible positions of interlocutors is a senseless task. Every verbal signification lies at the 
confluence of countless semantic rivers. Experience, like language, no longer seems to be 
made of isolated elements lodged somehow in a Euclidean space... [Words] signify from 
the "world" and from the position of one who is looking. 
 
Contemporary PE, re-routed by poststructuralism’s radicalized ideas, offers a way to 
understand how knowledge is produced and  raises the hidden-nature of the 
learning-to-learn act to the surface by means of critique of structuralist premises. It 
argues that because history and culture condition the study of underlying structures it 
is subject to biases and misinterpretations. To understand an object [e.g. a 
movement, or one of the many meanings of a text], a movement-literate approach 
always argues, that it is necessary to study both the object itself and the systems of 
knowledge that produced the object. In effect, poststructuralism now claims that 
descriptive language can be converted from an out-of-awareness tradition into 
matters of conscious, sub-liminal or unconscious aspects of dialogic debate. 
Another’s spoken/written words, the text of a conversation or a book, cannot be 
grounded on something stable and fixed beyond the sign system in which it occurs. 
We shall also note that certain texts include what is not written, but, nevertheless, 
produces shifting and decentred meanings in its reader’s/listener’s interpretation and 
understanding. This is because certain texts include traces of words and concepts 
not present, and, I argue, what is not present makes possible what is present.  
Structuralists also seek to understand the historical interpretation of cultural 
concepts, but focus their efforts on comprehending how those concepts were 
understood by the author in his or her own time, rather than how they may be 
understood by the reader in the present. Indeed, by criticising structuralism, literary 
theorists such as Bachelard (1989) Bakhtin, (1990) and Kristeva (1980; 1984) claim 
that it it not a question of the reader reading the book, but of the book reading the 
reader, not what we see in movement, but what undergoing movement encounters 
evoke from within us. 
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PE specialists who understand both the philosophical movements of structuralism 
and poststructuralism, as well as the obscure nature of  “movement-encounters”, 
have come to scrutinize what lies in between the use of words as they are viewed at 
that time, and the use of movement, as it has impacted on its agent at that time. 
Grasping the physical consequences of engaging in PE enterprises, I have argued, 
is only part way to becoming a movement-educator. It is by venturing into the 
personal agent encounters  and interpreting the potential meaning of their 
commentaries that allows a movement teacher to become a pedagogue to learners 
who wish to  learn from movement.  
Key premise 
 
Contemporary PE’s delivery, I argue, is not about interpreting the learner outsider’s 
laser version or her or his physical experiences. Rather, it is about analysing the 
manner in which that enactment is conveyed in the words of its beholder, whose 
presence is touched in the process of describing the insider’s actions [movement’s 
lived-through experiences]. In the use of language and in the use of movement, 
words and movement come into interplay; they both contribute to the surfacing of a 
meaning. Both movement and language, in their usage, hold the capacity to 
generate meaning in their combined synthesis by its user/speaker/author. If this is 
the case, then, my ML thesis proposes that PE is designed to immerse its “movers” 
in certain forms of experiences, during which occurs the removal of the self from the 
beginning of knowledge. Encountering the transient removal of the “self” is made 
necessary in this dissertation so as to return it in an enriched and more completed 
form at the end. 
 
At the heart of poststructuralism’s linguistically informed educational learning-to-learn 
strategy lies the dismantling or the deconstruction of stable conceptions of 
subjectivity, identity, and truth. Subjectivity means that one needs to be as 
perceptive, insightful, and discerning as one can be in order to show or disclose the 
object [movement] in its full richness and in its greatest depth. Subjectivity means 
that we are “strongly-committed” in our re-orientation to movement as the object of 
study in a unique and personal way, while avoiding the danger of becoming arbitrary, 
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self-indulgent, or carried away by our unreflected preconceptions when we language 
movement.  
 
“Languaging” movement in this thesis refers to the act of transposing silent 
movement into words, followed by the raising of questions about communication, 
about the taken-for-granted ways in which we attempt to make sense of the world, as 
posited by Sparkes (1992: 273). Languaging movement holds the potential to 
provide us with insights into our own engagement in the learning process because in 
its wording, what is foregrounded is its speaker’s and listener’s raw, unhindered 
human relationship. It is a relationship which hovers in between their own discrete 
embodied resourced language, its surfaced meaning and the realization of one’s 
power to influence the interpretation of any text. 
 
In effect, poststructuralism comprises a body of work that has developed from 
Saussure’s move to prise the signifier away from direct reference to the world, 
investing language with its own momentum, in its independent determinations. 
Countering this stance, poststructuralism argues that one cannot lay claim to a 
single, authorized meaning based on an ultimate reality of truth. Poststructuralism, is 
a kind of double- edged sword. On the one hand, it questions the view that 
consciousness is an origin, treating it rather as an “effect” of signification. In short, 
one of poststructurailism’s key messages to the PE profession is its radical claim that 
in the composition and understanding of my ever emerging “I”, it is an “I” which is 
owed and attributed to the “Big Other” [other people and nature]: the meanings and 
differences that permit me to think at all.  
 
Unveiling PE’s grounding principles 
 
To unveil the nature of movement-pedagogy’s grounding principles, then, I have 
adopted the combination of both phenomenological descriptions and those of 
hermeneuticism’s critically interpreted and informed understanding of a human 
expression. I am trying to profile the manner in which certain insights which befall us 
in movement are impressive. But, in their transformation into words their finer details 
slip out of the focus of our immediate concern.  
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I want to nurture a refreshingly playful mode of movement conceived as a kind of bio- 
or eco-pedagogy. ML orientates its corresponding practitioners towards an eco-
pedagogy because of its interdisciplinary nature. Discretely, it advances an ethical 
and critical temperament in its purposeful praxis to better understand what we need 
to do to enhance our bodily health, and simultaneously, to become more robustly 
decisive when it comes to coping more comfortably with the unpredictable relations 
that constitute our human affairs. Most of the time, a movement educator needs to 
be very subtle in the way one conducts one’s mode of speech, since humans can 
often hurt other human beings simply by means of their deliberated or, more usually, 
their unthinking use of words. It is about bringing movement into one’s daily life, in a 
way that its movers can begin to appreciate what movement can reveal to us about 
ourselves, and in its ostensible social, psychological and science-bound benefits. 
 
PE brought to life 
 
I hope Movement Literacy can become the metaphorical lodestone between the 
physical and the educational.  I want learners to create their own version of 
themselves, and PE’s professionals to perceive themselves as movement 
interpreters and counsellors able to engage in a dialogue-upon-dialogue.  I am trying 
to encourage PE institutions to prepare their novice “educators” to be able to move 
beyond the point of movement-performance criticism, beyond the level of knowledge 
which allows them to point out their learner’s technical restrictions. My ambition for 
ML is to prepare its graduate scholars to be able to reach beyond the level of 
conducting a critique, beyond merely pointing out to its incumbent mover one’s 
physical–body limitations [segregating, or alienating body from self] into that of 
wanting to understand the essential nature of movement and language, in a way that 
“Iago” could not.  I present a form of PE dialogue, which is not opposed to an 
“objective” scrutiny of movement, but one which, paradoxically, encourages a special 
form of “disinterest”, a kind of “emptying” of the mind in its correspondents. I am 
trying to expose how one either comes to depend upon, adapt to, or initiate and 
indulge in a non-equivocal, conversational dialogue where neither of its interlocutors’ 
vantage points is held over another listener.  
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Habermas communication 
 
Habermas’s critical theory of communication is recruited into this PE thesis which 
answers the question “Critique in the name of what?”  For instance, he developed a 
theory of “communicative action” and an accompanying “discourse ethics”. In 
conjunction, these theories allow a critique of ideology a fuller scope of investigation 
into the underlying dogma, unveiling the hidden creed that underpins certain 
ideologies, e.g. PE’s scientism – and thus open discussion on its wider, more 
panoramic scope of potential meanings. In effect, Habermas’s critical philosophy 
[which he did not relate to human movement] was an attempt to restore and redeem 
the basic worthiness to the lost practice [a feature of language and of education]; of 
consensual agreement. This is a practice which inherently seeks to combine those 
dignified of features in a philosophical account that offers an emancipatory mode of 
human action. In short, he attempted to distinguish the rationality which characterizes 
emancipatory action from the rationality of technical control.  
 
Borrowing such liberating features from Habermas’s work (1975; 1993) helps to put 
forward the case for advancing this thesis’s core conception: to exercise and 
incorporate the principle of communicative-reasoning into all pedagogic acts. It is an 
extension from that of an instrumental or technical reasoning to what can be 
imagined as reasonable. Habermas proposed that the following four requirements 
must be present in any serious attempt to communicate in a way that might alleviate 
misrepresentation; (i) comprehensibility - that the articulations of each communicant 
are understandable [made lucid] in the language being used, (ii) truth – that what is 
articulated corresponds to what is the case, according to the best available criteria of 
evidence, (iii) truthfulness – that each participant reign sincere in making one’s own 
and in responding to another’s contribution; and (iv)  righteousness – that the 
contribution of each is in accord with the norms of moral righteousness held by each 
dialogical partner, each respectfully inquiring from and seeking to understand the 
other correspondent. 
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Morality relates to Rhetoric   
 
Rhetoric is the art of “discourse”, the study of how to discretely use language well or 
judiciously [in contrast to grammar]. It aims to improve the facility of speakers who 
attempt to inform, persuade, or motivate particular listeners in specific situations like 
PE. Roughly described, rhetoric is the faculty of observing in any given case the 
available means of inviting others to begin to acknowledge differences in its 
correspondents’ understanding by following certain [often undeclared] rules. 
 
If any genuine attempt to reach a working level of understanding is to be achieved, 
disciplining oneself to follow these unwritten “rules” of procedure is necessarily 
personified in material form. In the pursuit for social emancipation, Habermas, for 
example, wanted to make these “rules” as core features for the “transitional-link” from 
philosophy which stops short of critique [assessing critically] to one that not only  
includes a constructive practical dimension, but also incorporates some substantive 
virtues in the form of procedural requirements. In the context of teaching movement, 
what Habermas was asking for from its communicating participants was that their 
uttered interchanges were pursued in a way that sheds light on the virtues of the 
good qualities of life and that in our speech we should be alert to and try to convey 
and spread a communal sense of understanding.  
 
Furthermore, he distinguished between the soundness or accuracy of validity claims 
as related to the above four requirements, and those claims embodied in less 
transparent kinds of communication. For PE teachers, this would imply that the 
professional proponent should be involved in explaining not merely what PE is, but 
also why it is beneficial to its movers.  
 
Prejudice 
 
Primarily concerned with developing a “social critique” of repressive ideology through 
a public critical-discourse ethics, Habermas believed we can reason in order to 
understand each other. However, he also singled out the notion of prejudice as 
something to which we are all vulnerable, but should be made aware of. Prejudice, 
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Habermas maintained, is ineliminable. Hence, objective truth is attainable only 
through rational debate. Indeed, realizing and acknowledging one’s prejudicial point 
of view constitutes a process and signifies a transformation in the landscape of one’s 
learning. It is particularly interesting, for example, and praiseworthy to note that 
Mosston and Ashworth (1999) made public that his and her prejudices caused them 
to overlook the primary point that teaching and learning constitutes a distinct human-
communicative practice. and it is in this uniquely sentient, communicative practice, 
rather than in any battle of social forces, or the micro-categorizing of pre-planned 
lesson organizations, that the source of meaning is generated and that the very 
integrity of education and its sincere claims of sharing a sense of ownership to 
learning eventually comes, to be located.   
 
Gadamer: PE’s early communicating collaborator 
 
For Gadamer (1960), two quintessential hermeneutic themes centre on language and 
play. He introduces play as the concept which, he argues, can most deeply subvert 
the instrumentalist bias of modernism’s thought-process. Here, I hold modern PE’s 
professional consciousness to think of movement-learners in the strict, singular term 
of an “ego-subject.”  That is to say, each PE learner came to be perceived as 
capable of achieving his or her own pre-planned “ends” through the exclusive 
efficacy of methodological “means” which they, the learners themselves, are able to 
put at their disposal. Feed the mover with technical information, and that individual 
will then process the information as she or he will “automatically” be able to interpret 
and utilize that information without question, just like the “teacher”. 
 
Furthermore, hermeneutics, for Gadamer (1977), is more than merely the gathering 
together of a set of techniques for interpreting another’s written or articulated 
transcripts.  Hermeneutics, rather, is concerned with the deeper issue of how human 
understanding is made possible. In Chapter 7, I show that hermeneutics has 
something in common with Aristotle’s concept of practical deliberation or “phronesis”, 
and that “phronesis” refers to such human characteristics as wisdom, good sense, or 
good judgment, as well as prudence which are the four cardinal virtues one is either 
blessed with, or can, to some extent, be nurtured into, but which modern PE largely 
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left aside: the ability to make the right decision in difficult circumstances. Educators 
learn to educate partly by learning from experiencing their learners’ own 
unpredictable modes of behaviour and gestured actions, when it comes to 
transforming enhancing, and applying one’s abstract [textbook-bound] theory of 
teaching to the more practical realm of learning-to-learn, that is, of learning about 
different forms of knowledge which shed light on one’s hoped-for style and quality of 
life, just as movement-learners learn by doing movement.  
 
Gadamer (1992) sees language as an exceptionally absorbent and all-encompassing 
“reality” which, to the extent that we succeed in reflecting on it, demonstrates more 
deeply and with more universal import than anything else the limits of all 
instrumentalist or method-based rationality. In the use of language, and especially in 
the distracting context of play, he maintains, neither activities may seem to be central 
issues in Aristotle’s work. But the perspective which Gadamer (1997; 2001) develops 
through his own reflection of them has a great deal of affinity with Aristotle and 
Ricoeur (cited in Hahn 1995, Chapter 7), focusing on one’s personalized, subjective 
“effect” and “affect” of transformation to coexist with embodied awareness.  
 
Gadamer (1984) elaborates the conscious sense of one’s awareness emanating 
from the process of engagement in what is called a “hermeneutic rhetoric”. He 
concedes to the ideas that each of us undergo: a personally-felt way of seeking 
understanding into what forms the basis of our own interest in a text, or in what 
another says. For example, when we want to elucidate a relatively familiar but also 
stubborn kind of knowledge that remains embedded in one’s practice of reading or 
listening to another speaker, we engage our thoughts in a hermeneutic circle. 
Crudely expressed, we put ourselves through the recurring process of posing 
questions upon questions, and continue until we have lost touch with the very reason 
of why are asking ourselves such questions in the first place. For example, when 
asked to rephrase a question, we seem to call upon ourselves to begin to detect 
some resonating inner-signals, some signs, which also serve the dual purpose of 
pointing to what was previously unconscious testimony of ourselves.  
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Gadamer (1997) forwards the notion that, in the manner in which we pose the 
questions themselves, we tend to excentrate: we point out something that is drawn 
deep from something that has long resided within us. When we are invited to conduct 
ourselves in a conversation, for Gadamer this participant act of ours, [when we need 
to be flexible and alert in our thinking and choice of words] switches from a collective 
and co-participant “we” to that of a singular reception of an “I” unwittingly.  One 
allows oneself to be conducted by the object to which the correspondent is directed 
[by a significant other]. In conversation with a significant other, the PE teacher, the 
polarity of subject and object is not clearly underlined, or made distinct. This 
subject/object differentiation that featured in modern PE is one of many conceptual 
gaps that I aspire to make more transparent as a professional issue in this thesis.  
 
I want movement advocates to be educators, to make it clear that in his or her PE 
role, one moment he or she is occupying that of a technical-instructor role, or a sport-
coaching role, the next, a counseling role, and at another time, becomes the 
learners’ “life-coach”. And that when the PE professional communicates with a 
learner, that  learner is being treated not at an objective level, but as an other 
person, respected democratically in one’s own human-rights. I want to focus the 
attention of future PE apprenticing career-professionals to the unwritten, undeclared, 
and indirect mode of addressing their learners, checking, comparing and relating 
each other’s comments set in detail against their own personal experiences.  
 
Transformation 
 
Pedagogy, I argue, is a reciprocal interchange of suggestive ideas as one thinks of 
what one hears in words. It is a praxis, the practice or the doing of a field of study [as 
opposed to the theory], something occupying one’s entire being,  “absorbed” into a 
word game, during which a kind of ecstatic self-forgetting is experienced. It is not a 
loss of self-possession, of which “Iago” was fearful.  Rather, it is a freed sense of 
enthusiasm: a stimulating, thrilling encounter which serves to alert one’s awareness 
with a vigorous sense of eagerness. The latter, in turn, serves to elevate and 
transpose one’s stale sense of self into a more invigorating and refreshed self 
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outlook. Such transformative change holds equal relevance for engagement in a 
conversation. As Gadamer (1986: 57) comments: 
 
               …it cannot be denied…something of the character of accident, favour and surprise – and in 
                  the end of buoyancy, indeed, of elevation – that belong to the game is present. 
                                                                                                                            [my emphasis] (1986:57) 
 
 
Tracing this “presence” which belongs to the act of participating in a play or a game 
is what eventually ML is about. On the other hand, vis-a-vis the teaching profession, 
Gadamer’s hermeneutic view calls for one to decipher one’s own pre-
understandings, prejudices, effective historical consciousness, the ignorance of 
which serves only to limit possible meanings.   
 
As Gadamer insists, one’s understanding involves mediation between the 
interpreter’s immediate and emerging horizons [one’s inner theatre of knowledge], 
and this in turn requires the interpreter to “distance” himself from the text. What 
Ricoeur (1992) does is to adopt a stance of “critical self-understanding” similar to that 
proposed by Habermas’s critique of ideology. At the same time, he thinks that the 
critique of ideology cannot be separated from tradition.  
 
Gadamer’s view that the process of understanding [learning] is limited because we 
cannot transcend established information is countered by Ricoeur (1992) who 
maintains that to create new concepts we rely on not setting aside a human-devised 
ontology of tradition of knowledge.  We need to be familiar with our past linguistic 
history, its roots and routes of linguistic growth, to be more open to possible ways we 
can develop our understanding of how meaning emerges and be significant in 
shaping and reshaping our knowledge and guiding our lives. We are tied for ever to 
our past; our past knowledge determines our ways of understanding, and cannot be 
distanced and separated from us.  Habermas (1993) argues that these constraints of 
tradition can be transcended [a view with which Ricoeur agrees] and perceives 
understanding as involving the process of mediation between the interpreter’s 
immediate and emerging horizon of knowledge.  We need to have our subjective 
thoughts carried into the written and spoken text, and yet we need to be able to step 
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outside of the text so that we can be unbiased and objective in our evaluating the 
credibility and quality of that text. 
 
Summary 
 
In this chapter I have argued that it is in the synthesising of critical, hermeneutic 
interpretation with phenomenological descriptions that constitutes the essential 
elements of PL which, in itself, aspires to search for and test the “grounding” of 
intentional meaning.  This shows us that in separating language from speaking, we 
are at the same time separating: (i) what is social from what is individual, and (ii) 
what is essential from what is an accessory and more or less accidental.   
 
The PE specialist is an experienced mover and has lived a certain style of life. The 
mover is inexperienced in movement, and stands at the threshold of life. How the 
professional can share one’s posture to life and the role of movement to that life can 
be partially achieved in two ways. One is by trying to place the mover by way of 
similar experiences which the “expert” has already encountered, by climbing, 
parachuting, sailing or dancing. In spite of this, there is no degree of certainty that 
the mover will, indeed, be capable of replicating another’s experience. The other 
alternative is to phenomenologically create a vocal and articulated image of one’s 
experiences, which then become the manifested testimony that its listener makes 
available for hermeneutic treatment. And, here in the exchanging of one’s meaningful 
word for another’s meaningful version of that same word, lie a number of inherently 
operative but immanent issues which need to be made public. And this is where my 
three rhetoricians come to my aid: Habermas (1975; 1993), Gadamer (1960; 2003) 
and Ricoeur (1965; 1992; 2002).  
 
We must be wary of models 
 
Importantly, in the next chapter, I concur with Wittgenstein’s (1953, 2001) mistrust of 
deceptively clear “models”. This is especially the case when it comes to the multiple 
acts of teaching. For example, Waismann (1994: 134) also expressed concern that 
any psychological explanation is ambiguous, cryptic, and open-ended, because: 
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              … we ourselves are many-layered, contradictory, and incomplete beings, and this 
              complicated structure, which fades away into indeterminacy, is passed into all our actions. 
                
 
In this evolving view of our “being”, our physical and intellectual growth can be seen 
as a “venture” into relatively new territory as time allows us to enter into what has 
never existed until that moment. This poststructural idea of our existing in a constant 
state of change is not our human failure, but an indication of the nature of what we 
are learning to handle better by our living in the realm of language’s movement. 
 
For its most credible and just portrayal as an “educational enterprise, then, and to 
better realize movement’s riddle, its “ludic-Rubicon”, contemporary PE requires a 
profound assimilation of the resources of language. This is essential, because the 
“other-self” within us that “I” am, and as Ricoeur assures me, “we” constantly search 
for can only be expressed in a common language.  And this is what Merleau-Ponty’s 
emerging thoughts about the use of language (1965: 175) were pointing towards. 
Language, he says: 
 
     …is a project, and constitutes an act of pursuit.  
 
Movement, for Merleau-Ponty is an action, and this notion is not difficult to 
appreciate, but to suggest that language is also an action is what I clarify in these 
closing chapters.   
 
Featured in some detail in the next chapter will be one of pedagogy’s most vital of 
foundational stakes, that of the “Verstehen” tradition. Verstehen deals with matters 
such as pre-judgements and objective-truth as they come to be understood from 
within our own view-points. It refers to a kind of knowledge we come by, by means 
that are opposed to knowing something by objective observation, or by placing it in a 
network of scientific regularites but, then, the exactness of this difference between 
internalized intuition [empathic understanding] and externalized factual information 
[rational understanding] remains constroversial. 
 
We need to be able to let ourselves go, to be carried away, to allow movement, to 
allow language, to allow learning to carry us into this strange realm that I have 
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labeled PE’s “ludic-Rubicon”, its “locale of tranquility”, in order to be able to study the 
“subject” of moving. In the next chapter, I offer the case that language and 
movement, in their experiencing, in their usage, share their similar features, such as 
their co-adherence to rule systems and signs which are read as visible gestured 
meanings, in addition to its user having the option [power] to voluntarily enter or 
withhold oneself from particular games or from employing a certain form of language.  
 
To quote Gadamer (1960; 1975: 93):  
 
                …all playing is being played…The real subject of the game…is not the player but instead the 
                   game itself. The game is what holds the player in its spell, draws him into play and keeps him 
                   there”                                                                                                                  [my emphasis]  
 
 
Gadamer’s most telling of messages is that all communication practices should call 
on the speaker’s responsibility to converse with judiciousness and care.  Speech, 
after all, is an action usually carrying human significance and consequences. And, it 
is through action, all our actions, including speaking, listening, and moving, as 
Ricoeur makes clear in the next chapter, that a person discloses “who” rather than 
“what” he or she is.  He suggests that the very structures and content of thought itself 
exits in the body prior to their utterance in language.  
 
Communicative meaning, as Ricoeur (1992) will show us in Chapter 7, is always in 
its depths, affective. It remains rooted in the sensual dimension of experience, born 
of the body’s organic capacity to resonate with other bodies and with the ecological 
landscape as a whole. In other words, linguistic meaning is not some ideal and 
bodiless essence that we arbitrarily assign to a physical sound or word and then 
pitch into the “external” world. Rather, meaning sprouts in the very depths of the 
sensory world, in the unpredictable dynamism and emanates from the very heart of 
the sensory world. 
 
To harmonise contemporary PE’s professional practices by identifying its educational 
credibility in Chapters 4 – 6, the study’s PE language focussed roadmap is described 
by referring to its three critical phases. They are re-profiled to that of (i) an initiation 
into teaching, a class addressing act which only fragmentarily and obliquely deals 
with the issue of education; (ii) a pedagogy which attends to small group gatherings 
 166
and constitutes a dramatic performance which is called upon by PL’s 
phenomenological descriptions by giving voice to all its correspondents, and (iii) 
andragogy which is richly interpreted via exposing resident commentator’s described 
comments about movement to hermeneutic treatment [a way of talking about and 
being talked about]. 
 
What is brought to attention in ML is what has been made noticeable by 
hermeneutics’ critical interpretive practice, when we all need to capture and cherish 
impressively beautiful moments. For example, a nod of approval from a significant 
other [PE professional, a colleague, or an adversary] implies we are sharing what 
words cannot express: a sense of “fellowship”. 
 
In this chapter, a hermeneutic engagement has been shown to deal with bringing 
clarity to indirect, tangential, or immanent communicated meaning. It is meaning 
which the speaker may not be aware of, nor would its listener be able to share 
unless both its correspondents are sensitised to hermeneutics. Importantly, in 
phenomenology’s existential mode of thought, embracing knowledge is founded on 
experience rather than on reason. As Merleau-Ponty stressed, it initiates responsible 
demands on the individual. 
 
PE’s emerging PL culture of dialogic discourse is of a nature that begins to root out 
hermeneuticism’s original study of human behaviour. Hermeneutics involves 
discussing the diverse purposes of life. It uses a language which shapes emotions 
we experience and through which we learn to express a person’s hidden reservoir of 
human attributes. PL, via ML’s reflective and reflexive praxis, [eliciting non-
instrumental acts and enticing post decision making,] is shown in the closing chapter 
to create a professional PE “nous” conveying PE’s later schooling concerns about 
self learning.  
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Chapter Seven      Hermeneutics as the Foundation for Pedagogy     
 
Introduction  
 
A code of practice has ethical and moral principles that need to be preserved, 
respected and refined constantly; may it be pedagogy, the practice of justice, or 
medicine. They also need to be spelled out. A jury’s code of duty, for instance, will be 
explained to them before they enter court. When the law becomes an obscure and 
complex issue, calling for a clearer interpretation for the jury, the presiding judge will 
take responsibility to unravel the intricacies and consequences of law for both 
prosecuting and defending counsels, and the jury. By the same token, PE learners 
find themselves wondering about what they are expected to do and to learn; then it is 
their PE mentor who is invested with the responsibility to invite them to “dwell in” and 
“inhabit” movement experiences. In diverse situations, in the public arena as well as 
on the playing fields, the relation of thought to word is a process and an unending 
interplay emphasising that there is nothing else which has the “inwardness” that 
consciousness has. 
 
In Chapter 6, I explained the purpose of hermeneutics is that of a radically 
interpretive gesture. It consists not in finding meaning but in dealing with the 
breakdown of meaning. Indeed, what attracts me to Ricoeur’s way of thinking about 
language and its users is the fact that, in his writing he aspires compassionately to 
accompany his reader through the thicket of language. His endeavour is to qualify 
the worthwhileness, to identify, preserve and acknowledge respect for the human 
appeal that befalls us all in our particular [private] and universal [global] efforts to 
search for meaning, whatever this might be. 
 
Hermeneutics can not finally convey “fixed meaning” and “truth” once and for all. 
Neither of these phenomena is of a nature that can be “pinned down”. Ricoeur’s 
(1975; 1992) altruistic inspired hermeneutic, however, is fired by his sense of 
conviction. He maintains that we cannot deny or ignore the dissemination and 
trembling of meaning, and the notion that its speaker is somehow clearing the way 
toward nearing somewhere closer to “truth”. A truth that allows its corresponding 
speaker / listener to express their venture into different modes of meaning and even 
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into the realm of movement, and in so doing, expresses hidden aspects of one’s self. 
A shared meaning becomes apparent to its conversing participants when they 
become mutually engaged in the élan vital, the vital force or fermenting impetus of a 
conversation. 
 
Ricoeur’s modern work on hermeneutics encompasses his insightful understanding 
of interpersonal relationships that are immanently created during dialogical 
interchange. This embraces everything in the interpretive process including verbal 
and non-verbal forms of communication, such as presuppositions, pre-
understanding, the meaning and philosophy of language, and semiotics. Semiotics 
(Chapter 5) was explained as the study of “signs” and sign processes indication 
[suggestive clues], designation [described terms], likeness, analogy, metaphor, 
signification, and communication. In “Oneself as Another” he, like Merleau-Ponty, 
qualifies his understanding of the body as both a “fact” belonging to the world and 
the “organ” that does not belong to the objects of which it speaks. Essentially, 
Ricoeur maintains the tenuous understanding of our embodied existence, the 
bridging of the many gulfs that exist between subjectivity and objectivity, between 
referencing and explaining and appreciating one’s own capacity to differentiate from 
another’s viewpoint and accommodate another’s mode of understanding, comes to 
rest largely on our use of “word”.  
 
Ricoeur’s tenth study in his text “Oneself as Another”, in which he poses the question 
“What Ontology in View?”, qualifies especially the distinction and inevitable tension 
that exists [and must necessarily be sustained] between one’s familiar self identity 
and the novel understanding of one’s self. It is a conscious self which can be played 
out against the emerging backcloth of one’s awareness of an emerging self: the “free 
floating”, “unconscious stranger”, the “other than self” that lurks within me.  
 
In effect, I transpose and re-contextualise his questions about the construct of one’s 
selfhood by asking PE educators the most crucial of all professional and 
philosophical of questions, “Which self is in your speaking: the coach, the counsellor, 
the educator, the therapist?” Indeed, the list of such roles continues almost endlessly 
because they are related to the matter of enhancing another’s mode of learning. 
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What ML aspires towards is for the PE missionary to keep in mind the learner’s 
awareness of one’s own and others’ commended qualities of our humanity.  
Importantly, PE encounters should not leave its learners in a vacuous state of 
austere loneliness. 
 
Ricoeur (1975; 1978) shows how contradiction facilitates meaning. He points out 
that, in the speech-making or posing questions, both correspondents initially take 
their own meaning of the “word” as its anchored unit of reference. Metaphor, 
following Ricoeur, is therefore classed among the single-word “figures of speech”, a 
subtle kind of linguistic cross-over device. A metaphor is conceived as a “trope”, an 
indicator turning towards something or a suggested developmental affinity in the 
direction of something with which it resonates or resembles. As figure, metaphor 
constitutes a displacement and an extension of the meaning of word, its explanation 
is grounded in the “theory of substitution”. This theory sets out the idea that if we 
cannot understand one complex concept, then its explanation can be deconstructed 
and retraced by offering other explanations as an atonement, a satisfied substitution, 
an instead of  analogy of what we cannot otherwise understand.  
 
Ricoeur is concerned with an explanation of intent in word and deed. His famous 
phrase “the symbol gives rise to thought” becomes the basic premise of 
hermeneutics, meaning symbols carry messages which may be uncovered by 
philosophic interpretation - deciphers indirect meaning - a reflective practice of 
unmasking hidden meanings beneath apparent ones. Ricoeur claims meaning is 
always mediated through culture, linguistics and social signs. 
 
For Ricoeur, objective reality is the contemporary equivalent of Kantian noumena: 
although it can never itself become an object of knowledge, it is a kind of necessary 
thought, a limiting concept, implied in objects of knowledge. His hermeneutical 
analysis of history, of ideology, of language and action is a rigorous science that can 
be applied equally to good science. First, Ricoeur sets out to understand the nature 
of selfhood: to understand the being whose nature it is to enquire into itself. In this 
endeavour, his philosophy is driven by the desire to provide an account that will do 
justice to the tensions and ambiguities which make us human, and which underpin 
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our fallibility. He attends to the “Ambiguity of my Body”: embodied subjectivity. As an 
embodied person in action it is in and through my kinaesthetic feelings that I live, 
move and have my being. ‘Whatever my being may be’, says Ricoeur (1965:156), 
‘feeling attests that we are part of it.’   
 
Arrogance of critique 
 
Like Gadamer, Ricoeur upholds the view that human understanding is inescapably 
“interpretive” in nature. But as against Gadamer, he seeks to establish that any 
understanding is also possible and can arise independent of presuppositions or 
preconceptions. Ricoeur believes that absolute meaning cannot possibly be attained 
by humans. He emphasizes that the failure to make the acknowledgement, the 
unattainable of certainty, gives an unwarranted scope to critical enquiry’s faith in its 
own ability to surmount limitations of perspective and to provide the autonomous 
critiques and commanding overviews. In this connection he speaks of the “arrogance 
of critique”, and of the necessity of renouncing such arrogance in favour of an 
enquiry characterized by more modest aspirations, by more self-criticism, and by 
more joint endeavors (1981: 244-6). In an important way, then, my student “Iago” 
could be said to have been leaning heavily towards this uncritical posture. “Iago” was 
unable to “step” outside of himself, to see himself as others did. He was unaware 
that he isolated and absented his presence from his pupils, who perceived him as, in 
their words, “conceited”, “egotistical”, and “unapproachable”. 
 
What Ricoeur points out is that rather than relying on an objective truth or method to 
prove certain claims, philosophers tend to legitimize their truths by reference to a 
story about the world which is inseparable from the age and system the stories 
belong to. In this instance, he endorses Gadamer’s view (1986) that we cannot gain 
access to any truth since we are tied to the unreachable realms of our past, thus, 
stuck to our fixed traditions and conventions. His contribution for the PE profession is 
that when one is engaged in rhetoric, the essence of posing a question, is the 
opening-up, and keeping open, of possibiliites (1975: 266). But, we can only do this if 
we can keep ourselves open in such a way that in this abiding concern of our 
questioning we find ourselves deeply interested, as standing in the midst of 
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something, in that it makes the question possible in the first place. To sincerely 
question something is to interrogate something from the heart of our existence, from 
the centre of our being, we need to live, as it were, and  become this question. The 
professional must be able to invite, or even evoke the learner into questioning their 
own questions, to align the very thing that is being questioned within the question, 
nurturing the art of thinking. Contemplation is to be silenced by the stillness of 
reflection, the art of testing.  
 
Ricoeur’s (1967; 1981; 1992) panoramic treatment of language, however, addresses 
its ambiguous nature in which he widens notions of “textuality” to any human action 
or situation. “Textuality” is a concept in linguistics and literary theory that refers to the 
attributes that distinguish the text [a technical term indicating any communicative 
content under analysis] as an object of study in those fields, and associated with 
structuralism and poststructuralism, but which seriously influence the manner in 
which the act of teaching can be elevated to that of a pedagogy.   
 
Fragile and fallible 
 
Ricoeur’s favourite themes are the “fragility” and “fallible” nature of each human. We 
struggle to find meaning in past action, current state and future options. We also 
reflect on the terrible tragedies of history. Knowing our history makes available a rich 
vein of practical knowledge that is found in the moment between the memory and the 
intent, expectation and outcome, what we know and what we hope for. Explaining 
and understanding, according to Ricoeur, are vital features of our human conduct ‘It 
is at the very heart of reading that Explanation and Understanding are indefinitely 
opposed and reconciled’ (1981:164). He perceives explanation and understanding 
not as friction, but as areas for increasing mutual understanding, as commentaries 
on the multiplicities of meaning believing ‘we should explain more in order to 
understand better’ (Hahn 1995: 31). 
 
Importantly for this thesis, Ricoeur brings verbal presence to our attention. He views 
the generative power of the symbol as originating from its nature as an opaque “sign” 
whose first literal meaning evokes further meanings by analogy. Unlike a technical 
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“cipher” the meaning of which remains fixed and thus transparent, the true symbol 
expands enigmatically in meaning. This multiplicity allows the symbol to 
communicate all the ambiguity of a “living-experience” or “avowal” of reality; it also 
charges the symbol with creative power. For as one meaning gives way to another, 
the mind is led to more abstract levels of thought. Thus Ricoeur calls attention to 
those “primary symbols” of thought which, after first thickening into myth through 
narrative, may have ultimately flowered into abstract philosophy. 
 
What movement interpreters need to search for is the objective process of the 
agent’s descriptive text of the movement, which would be the act of the text [the 
words]. This goes beyond the subjective process of interpretation as an act on the 
text (Ricoeur 1981:165). A professional discourse is strong in its silent 
persuasiveness which does not make unbridgeable distinctions between explicit 
issues from implicit concerns. It makes discerning use of metaphor as the inherently 
hermeneutical character of the psychoanalytic interactions.  According to Ricoeur, 
the central argument of Max Black's (1962) thesis on “Models and Metaphors” is that, 
with respect to the relation to reality, metaphor is to poetic language what the model 
is to scientific language. Commenting on one’s inexhaustibility of knowledge and its 
relations to the limitations of human understanding, Ricoeur (1981:197) remarks:  
 
                              …It is because absolute knowledge is impossible that the conflict of interpretations is 
insurmountable and inescapable.   
  
Ricoeur (1975) frequently uses the mute power of metaphor to re-describe the world, 
a prime way to “weave”, “tissue”, “strand”, “affiliate”, and “fabricate” when talking 
about the structure of texts. Both Ricoeur, and Merleau-Ponty suggest that 
manifested “text” can be thought of as an intermediary which the mover is plunged 
into. Describing the event encounter is resurfaced by its agent so that the PE 
interpreter can examine diligently over the mover’s text. They both believe that 
meaning emerges in a number of ways that the text itself permits. Ricoeur argues 
that it is ultimately poetics [exemplified in narrative] rather than philosophy that 
provides the structures and synthetic strategies by which understanding and a 
coherent sense of self and life is possible. “Let the word flower to perfume its fullest 
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meaning” this is the kind of metaphor that, according to Ricoeur, is a process to 
liberate the capacity of fiction to re-describe the reality.  
 
In oblique ways, PE’s curriculum movement disciplines symbolize or make a 
metaphor of essential life skills. They prefigure the shape of social and personal life. 
It is not quite enough to say PE is a “metaphor” for life; narrowly taken, a metaphor 
signifies a linguistic gesture in which properties not usually ascribed to certain things 
are so ascribed either in order to give concrete life to what is normally abstract [an 
idea or feeling, for instance] or in order to change our perception of something whose 
special details we would never have seen without the metaphor. For example, boxing 
is a metaphor for the reality of aggression, a realization for the master-symbols of 
courage, endurance, quickness, grace, and victoriousness. Tennis is a metaphor for 
many of the same values. But both activities also enact in their gestures these 
values. They give them real life, and hence move from metaphor to immediate 
experience; the actual and the desired come together.   
 
Ricoeur develops the concepts of ‘appropriation’ [aneignung] that allows the reader 
to follow the ‘direction’ – sens – as well as – sens meaning (sense) and thereby 
distance themselves and draw closer to the meaning of the text (1981: 161). 
Similarly, in the context of movement, I have argued that when one is immersed in 
the play attitude, or encounters supreme moments called “peak experiences”, its 
resident agent is granted either a “locale of tranquility” or epiphanic elation, during 
which the self is temporarily “lost” in awe. During these “loss of self” moments, what 
“befalls” us, as Ricoeur suggests, is a blending of our sedimented conscious state of 
being with that of our unconscious, immanent and inner state of existence. This can 
be either a temporarily tense moment of disturbing “insecurity”, but it can also be a 
“haptic”, harmonising incident of touching something and being touched.  
 
The tensive style is in keeping with what Ricoeur regards as basic, ontological 
tensions inherent in the peculiar being that is human existence, namely, the 
ambiguity of belonging to both the natural world and the world of action [through 
freedom of the will]. We necessarily regard ourselves from two perspectives: as the 
author of our actions in the practical world, and as part of, or passive to, cause and 
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effect in the natural world. Ricoeur places “ethics, at the heart of learning, at the 
heart of pedagogy.  
 
Along with Gadamer, Ricoeur is a hermeneutic phenomenologist calling for non-
manipulative concerns, concerns which one is made aware of, and thus, begins to 
celebrate the recognition of similarities and especially of differences between oneself 
and another.  Both search for meanings hidden under the surface as subversive 
influences. Also, both agree that these influences are not innocuous because they 
reflect hidden drives and affinities. Ricoeur is faithful to an open-ended ‘conflict of 
interpretations’. Ricoeur (1981: 203) concluded that ‘action’ itself, action as 
meaningful, may be an object of science, without losing its character of 
meaningfulness, through a kind of objectification, similar to the fixation which occurs 
in writing’s meaning: the texts which we hermeneutically interpret may be either 
written or cultural.  
 
Meaning in intention 
  
The intentional nature of posture and body use is significant to us because intentions 
and posture have meaning. They are philosophic statements. On a gross level, it is 
obvious that a given posture will be better or worse as a starting place for a particular 
action. If I am kneeling I am in a better position to talk with my six year old grandson 
than I am to another adult. On a subtle level, given ways of carrying oneself will be 
more or less appropriate as starting places for different kinds of interactions with 
oneself, other people and the world;  this constitutes the meaning in body use. 
Posture is really a manifestation and transmission of an intention to relate to life in a 
given way, and that is exactly what a philosophy is.   
 
ML’s evolving story is that of shaping the contours of PE. However, its purpose, 
agenda, and its mode of delivery were and continue to be formally governed via 
ministerial policies. This official “menu” can only be read as an edict, or an 
announcement for its PE institutions to follow. In turn, each institution is assumed to 
be equipped with professional expertise to identify the curriculum subject’s more 
refined academic/professional categories, or “recipe” for preparing its movement-
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education professionals. Each institution follows the prevalent political line, and each 
identifies their version of PE’s essential ingredients, in terms of its content and its 
manner of communication. Set against this political scenario, what I have argued is 
that institutions have not yet reached a consensual stage of agreement about what 
constitutes the difference between analytic teaching and its excellence; between 
dissecting the body and disseminating its bodily sensuousness via the implicit art of 
eco-pedagogy. I maintain that these programmes have been too sport-orientated, 
and competitive. They are indifferent to perception and embodied action which form 
the basis of meaning (Burkitt, 1999), failing to address the intricate circular 
processes of “learning”, synergising the elusive body with language’s illusion and 
fallibility. 
 
I advance the notion of an eco-pedagogy, an understanding which allows one to 
become an indulgent educator when one is well versed in the philosophy of 
language and familiar in critical hermeneutic interpretation of which Zaner (1964) 
was first suspicious, referring to it as the “revenge of the intellect upon arts”.  Vitally, 
what we must bear in mind is the crucial fact that interpretation is not an isolated 
activity but the basic structure of experience. Experience is inserted into the history 
and ideology of a specific moment, and carries with it our unaware meeting with 
traces of residual images of past realities. Experience stirs our conscious subjectivity 
and touches our sub-consciousness [which, unwittingly, modern PE has held under 
siege.]  Ricoeur aspires to “pool” together the transient revelations glimpsed at 
during experiential enactment, by combining the fuller resources of language with 
those of phenomenological insights. Constantly, however, he is concerned about 
doubt and suspicion over the imprecise manner in which we seek understanding 
when we are actively engaged in the use of language.  
 
In his earlier work, for example, Ricoeur was concerned particularly with the notions 
of freedom and nature and with their “descriptive phenomenology” which would 
partially resolve the seeming oppositions between that of a participant’s “inhabited-
perspective in movement” and that of another’s “observed-action”.  Ricoeur 
distinguishes the notion of “intent” in one’s use of considerate language. He 
maintains that the speaker is exercising a morally delicate balance in their 
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conversation. Hence its participants are made aware of and can detect critical 
differences between a language which expresses one’s freedom of the will and those 
features of human nature which appear to constrict or condition our state of 
willingness or otherwise.  
 
Mindful engagement 
 
Ricoeur plays a key role in this thesis because he addresses many linguistic issues 
to demonstrate his committed care for others. What and how Ricoeur conveys in his 
writing is evidence of his own reconciliatory nature towards others and the world. 
Constantly, Ricoeur (1992) seeks to resolve the seeming opposition between 
“incidental movement” and “action-with-intent”, or wilful “intent”.  Interminably, he 
treads a fine line, as should all educators, to distinguish between discourse [written 
text] and dialogue [spoken and heard]. In short, what Ricoeur brings to life in his 
thoughts and in his writing are the very characteristics that I am campaigning for and 
that PE specialists should adopt into their own practices of educating learners in their 
own understanding of movement. PE specialists should revere movement’s value in 
order to better cope with their understanding of themselves throughout their lives.  
 
Professional pedagogues require a hermeneutic ability to make interpretive sense of 
the phenomena of the lifeworld: (1) to allow for textual reflection, (2) to contribute to 
one’s pedagogic deliberations and practical tact as the purposeful activity of 
teaching, and (3) to describe how one interprets the “texts” of life. Modern 
conceptions of PE’s theorizing were more often guided by the useful, the 
manageable, the pragmatic and the efficacious, whereas, Heidegger (1968) and 
Ricoeur (1992) show us that our conception of knowledge and rational thinking has 
been detached from its traditional affiliation with the conception of the “good”. PE’s 
educator needs to enter into each learner’s life, and eventually, must be held 
accountable amongst educators for prompting, fostering and guiding the learner’s 
emancipatory growth into selfhood; the essential qualities that makes one person 
distinct from all other. 
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In a pedagogic context, subjectivity means that one needs to be as perceptive, 
insightful and discerning as one can be in order to disclose the object [movement] in 
its full richness and in its greatest depth. Subjectivity means that we are “strongly 
committed” in our reorientation to movement as the object of study in a unique and 
personal way, while avoiding the danger of becoming arbitrary, self-indulgent or of 
getting captivated and carried away by our unreflected preconceptions. Sometimes, 
we need to speak more pointedly of theorizing when the main aim is to bring our 
reflective understanding of movement to our speaking; at other times the emphasis is 
on gathering the mover’s internalized “impressions”, now made public in order to 
create a sketch of that person’s situated disposition towards the world at that 
moment. For both correspondents it is a situation that is less susceptible to the 
effective management of control of the professional operating on the principle of 
recognition of the existence of freedom in human life. It is under such circumstances 
that the PE advocate becomes an interpreter who is consciously participating in 
one’s own action-senstitive field of professional knowledge.  
 
Perhaps in the end, PE’s most compelling of passions that are never satisfied, is the 
desire for knowledge; the longing to push back the limits imposed by the symbolic 
order of our structured language and our structured movement disciplines. This 
reciprocity, the circular manner in which a nuanced sense of self emerges can only 
occur through a deepening relation with other beings, a relation that is acknowledged 
in Buddhism as the “dependent co-arising of self and other”. 
 
Movement and language can be studied separately. But, it is in synergizing their 
usage that their consequential significance, their leaven of learning is fermented for 
its user only if its correspondents can mutually arrange to meet each other’s 
meanings in their respective use of words. Both correspondents need to share some 
alignment between their silent meanings. The overall movement of thought can then 
be conceived as interplay between spoken and unspoken “conversation”. A 
movement literate is called upon to commentate on an interminable shifting notion of 
meaning that ferments a “communicative action”. Meaning is recovered from one’s 
experiential background by qualifying and re-qualifying one’s habituated cognitive 
distinctions. Discovering new meanings serve to reform problems and refocus on 
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inter as well as intra-personal relations and identity. Interminably, this process 
implies that pedagogy is a performed “act”, and following Husserl (1969), that one’s 
identity is a difference between perspective levels [indicative sign] and an expressive 
level [expressive sign] in states of consciousness. 
 
If education occurs when the speaker is related to the speaking, the messenger with 
the message, then what is to be established is that what we feel to be our true self 
needs the constant endorsement [affirmation] of significant others in order for us to 
continue to esteem that self, then educational communication implies imparting and 
exchanging information, ideas or feelings. This why pedagogy has the task of 
integrating the monologic language of the natural sciences into the communicative 
consciousness of movement’s missionaries and their followers, of embracing the 
task of exercising and vindicating practical knowledge, personal identities, social 
concerns and political reasonableness of emerging ideas; semi law-like conditions 
which do not cease to be constitutive of our human mode of being. The fact remains 
that language is like picking up the norms of a game whilst not being aware of the 
rules which enshrine moral values. The critical theme I have been enlarging upon 
through this thesis is that we rely on the others to know ourselves. 
 
Pedagogy to Andragogy 
 
In effect, when applied to the widening remit of contemporary PE, under the 
sponsorship of its meaning, ML can come to be re-labelled as “andragogy”. Leading 
into andragogy, ML consists of employing specific learning strategies focused on 
mature learners or young adults. Andragogy is often interpreted as the process of 
engaging experienced learners with the “structure”, or conditions, which apply to 
animate learning experience. Being experienced, of course, is a wisdom of the 
practice of the living which results from having lived life at a profound, indeed a 
scintillating [sporting life] or deeply contemplative [Buddhist / Christian / Muslim / 
Hindu, and also atheism] level of understanding.  Introduced by Kapp, a German 
educator in 1833, “andragogy” was developed into a theory of adult education by the 
American educator Knowles (2005). Knowles asserted that andragogy [Greek: “man-
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leading”] should be distinguished from the more commonly used pedagogy [Greek: 
“child-leading”].  
As applied to ML, Knowles' theory can be stated with six assumptions related to 
motivation of accomplished movement learners who wish to pursue a career in 
movement-education:  
1. Senior pupils need to know the reason for learning something and come to 
experience an astute feeling of  needing to know. 
2. Experience, including mishaps and errors, provide the basis for learning 
activities; their enactment provides the foundational points of contact upon 
which learning is energized. 
3. Senior PE schooling learners need to be more responsible for their decisions on 
education; to become more directly involved in the planning and evaluation of 
their own learning-experiences, hence, become more immersed in outing, or 
“eventing” their emerging bricolage of “self-concepts”; to know how to listen to 
the descriptions of their own embodied experiences [which is exercised daily by 
the specialist movement-interpreter].  
4. Accomplished movement-experiencers are most interested in learning about 
academic disciplines which have immediate and life-long relevance to their 
work and hence their personal lives and well-being and to appreciate the 
readiness of being able to apply this new knowledge to their daily lives. 
5. This reflexively thoughtful mode of learning is problem-centred rather than 
content-oriented and thus, helps to map out the different forms of knowledge 
required for the sake of composing a holistic approach to their professional 
practices and growing posture towards life.  
6. Mature learners respond better to internal rather than external motivators.  
In effect, andragogy’s, or ML’s, eventual practices allow discussion of the contrast 
between self-directed and  “other-directed” education to surface, in order for self-and 
other-directed learning to be made distinct. In an important sense, it is here in 
dialogue that the very kernel of conversation is located and from which pedagogy 
emerges. This is because there is no unmediated experience, neither can there be 
any form of interpretation taken to be a politically neutral act.   
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A guardianship, not a custodial learning          
Knowing ourselves implies that we aspire to that of a protective guardianship about 
different modes of knowledge. Knowledge is not custodial conception of learning. It 
involves a “code” of learning about conventions and policies, all of which require 
deciphering and translation. We wish to garner and embrace significant others’ 
profound experience of life by being placed in touch with their presence, their voice 
and their thoughts. Learning is about being placed by the way others have coped 
with their lives. What lies in this hidden code are the following features, which have 
already been referred to are “Techne,” “Lebenswelt,” “Verstehen” and “Phronesis”, to 
which I now add the notion “Alterity”.  
“Alterity” is a philosophical term meaning “otherness”, strictly being in the sense of 
the other of two [Latin: alter]. “Alterity” is basically synonymous with “otherness”. It 
deals with radical differences between a conscious “self” and an unconscious “other”. 
I maintain that there can be no self-enclosed “now” moment because “temporal-time” 
always has a reflexive aspect that is aware of itself, and that opens us to experiences 
beyond our particular horizons of significance. It is because of the temporal nature of 
“Alterity” that Merleau-Ponty (1968) claims that we humanize our location. He 
emphasises the role of the body in one’s power of communication, claiming that we 
contextualise our relations with our environment by coating it with dimensions of our 
“Selves”. Reciprocally, we are enveloped by the ‘world.’ Radically, his project, that of 
a persuasively embodied-reliant means, accounts for how we come to perceive multi-
versions, and an ensemble of our “Selves”, but always in relation to the “otherness” 
of another person. Merleau-Ponty’s thoughts, however, anticipated 
poststructuralism’s radical linguistic revelations about the possible existence of a 
“bricolage of selves”, and his philosophical principle of exchanging one’s perspective 
for that of the “other” did not come to fruition.  
What ML brings to the “structure” of experience is the advantage of postructuralism 
under critical consideration. Experience’s initial aim (Weber, 1958) was to reach at 
the deeper acquaintance in understanding or “Verstehen”, which is an interpretive or 
participatory examination of social phenomena. More recently, Dilthey (1985) 
interpretes experience as a concept and a method central to the rejection of 
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positivistic social science. Experience, for Dilthey, endeavours to bridge the gap 
between theory and practice in the immanent textured framework of the lifeworld or 
“Lebenswelt”.  Lebenswelt may be conceived as a universe of what is self-evident, 
what is “given” or “befalls” us in a world that subjects may experience together. 
 
The concept of “Lebenswelt” is another cardinal imperative of pedagogy. This is the 
concept which emphasizes a “state of affairs” in which the world is experienced, the 
world is lived [German: erlebt]. The lifeworld is a pre-epistemological stepping stone 
for phenomenological analysis in the Husserlian tradition. “Lebenswelt” or lifeworld 
may be conceived as a universe of what is self-evident or given, a world that adheres 
many experiences together.  
 
Merleau-Ponty emphasises the way in which our experiences do not form a shut off, 
private domain, but a way of being-in-the-world, emphasizing that we live our lives in 
a particular milieu of a human world, or “Lebenswelt”, but for him, “Lebenswelt” is 
irreducible to pure or private consciousness. The life world comprises the world of 
objects around us as we perceive them and our experience of our “Self”, through our 
embodied encounters and relationships.  For Merleau-Ponty, this lived world is pre-
reflective: it takes place before we think about it, and, before we put it into language. 
The very idea of “life world” is that we exist in a day-to-day world that is filled with 
complex meanings which form the backdrop of our everyday actions and 
interactions. According to Merleau-Ponty, the term life-world immanently, directs 
attention to the individual’s lived situation and social world rather than some inner 
world of introspection.  After all, “There is no inner man [sic],” Merleau-Ponty 
famously explains, “man is in the world, and only in the world does he know himself.” 
(1962: xi).  His thoughts replicate those of Zen Buddhism. 
 
Pedagogy’s indispensable ingredients 
 
What these indispensable components contribute to the act of pedagogy becomes 
clearer in a moment.  Activating such components serves to incorporate these 
essential ingredients. These ingredients are profoundly immersed in a language 
endowed with learning’s enabling and inescapable features, or in the invariant 
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aspects of what I shall refer to as an “eco-pedagogic” conversation. Eco-pedagogy is 
the exercise of these necessary features which constitute a panorama or 
“perspectival thinking” mode of understanding. This professional vision is versatile, 
and can accommodate different temperaments which include the universal principles 
of dialogic conduct or key notions such as “Verstehen”, [the procedure by which we 
infer something internal from external signs.] “Verstehen” is an “attributive noun” 
identified as the understanding of intentional meanings, values and purposes; a 
grasping of, or noting anew, the sense of what is going on in human activities which, 
when seen through the refraction of many prisms, can only be partially expressed in 
word-bound thoughts. 
“Verstehen” was introduced into philosophy and the human sciences 
[Geisteswissenschaften] by Dilthey (1978) to describe the first-person participatory 
perspective that agents have on their individual experience as well as their culture, 
history, and society. In this sense, it is developed in the context of the theory and 
practice of interpretation [hermeneutics] and contrasted with the external 
objectivating third-person perspective of explanation [Erklärung] in which human 
agency, subjectivity and its products are analyzed as effects of impersonal natural 
forces in the natural sciences and social structures in sociology. In other words, 
interpersonal understanding is attained through a process of interpreting the 
“objectificiations of life”, the external expressions of human or gestural manifestaions 
of thought and action. Understanding is shared through these common 
“objectifications” and not, as was widely believed, through empathy. Moreover, to 
fully understand myself I must analyse the expressions of my life in the same way 
that I analyse the expression of others. Our reflective expressions about ourselves 
and about life, receive their fullest expression in world-views, which are overall 
perspectives on life encompassing the way we perceive and conceive the world, 
evaluate it aesthetically and respond to it in action. 
“Verstehen” holds a visionary [and missionary] mode of understanding which takes 
as its source of information – its data – all the languages, myths and traditions that 
are handed down, interpreted not in terms of a fixed idea of a universal human 
nature, but by that which is granted by an imaginative capacity for re-entering the 
manner of thought, the modes of consciousness that they represent. 
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For instance, if it is phenomenologically plausible that in practical situations theory 
always arrives late, too late to inform praxis in a technical or instrumental way, then 
in the daily practice of living we are for ever at a loss for theory. Yet in another less 
technical sense we are usually not really so helpless because theory has already 
seeped into our primitive experiences to help prepare our bodies or “Being” to act, so 
to speak. And this is the unseen, un-thought of preparation referred to as the process 
of “Bildung”. The concern of “Bildung”, a German term, that Dilthey (1978; 1985) 
spans a range of meanings including “acculturation” and is the equivalent of the 
English term “formation” or “upbringing” concerned with “the properly human way of 
developing one’s natural talents and capacities” (Gadamer 1960: 8), refers to 
“education” in its broadest sense. It points out any act or experience that has a 
formative effect on the mind, character or physical ability of an individual. In its 
technical sense “education” is the process by which society deliberately transmits its 
accumulated knowledge, skills and values from one generation to another.  
 
Phronesis 
 
Crucial also amongst the bare essentials of pedagogy is the notion of “Phronesis”. 
Phronesis is concerned with the uncertainties of human circumstances with what 
Aristotle (1941) calls the “variable”, to distinguish it from the “unvariable” with which 
science episteme deals. Phronesis can be described as the act of judicious 
deliberation over alternatives with a view to practical action. But, gaining Phronesis 
requires maturation. It is linked to the predisposed and/or nurtured excellence of 
character since its principles are in accordance with the moral excellences and 
rightness in the moral character.  
 
The essential point here lies in the implication that the mover or agent will always be 
the vehicle of form which, when it acts, will be the life-giving, vitalizing, or animating 
source of the change. From this it follows that whenever it is true to say that a certain 
universal form exists potentially, there must have been an earlier exemplification of 
the same universal actually existing. The point here is that during the experience of 
change, a reordering of one’s emotions is involved when recurrent perceptions and 
actions consolidate into dispositions of character. It does so in the sense that the 
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specifically ethical knowledge acquired through this development i.e., Phronesis can 
be brought into play not only in situations in which one has to act oneself, but also in 
situations in which “others” have to act (Dunne 1985; 1988; 1993). 
 
Aristotle’s (1941) unifying vision of moral virtue as an overall view of human 
judgment [from particularity to generality of theory as deliberated pedagogy], in 
effect, speaks about dimensions of “Phronesis” and rhetoric primarily in terms of 
“collaborative activity”. Pedagogy, as Aristotle would have it, is a rhetorical form of 
deliberation which is “brought to life” by the twin roles of “desire” and “display”.  
“Phronesis” implies one’s capacity to be prudent, concerned with particulars as well 
as universals, and particulars become known from experience. But, a young person, 
like “Iago” lacks experience, since some length of time is needed to produce and 
sensitively become aware of it.  
 
We are accustomed to looking at “Phronesis” as knowledge that will guide action; but 
what phenomenological hermeneutics has shown us is that it is a kind of cyclic 
process that resides in the fact that “Phronesis” also arises from sound action. It is 
something to which we are already habituated, but may not have realized its process 
or its consequences. In other words, we cannot have the knowledge to help us 
become good pedagogues unless we are already fully aware of what is happening 
in-situ; in a pedagogical communicative praxis, where practical wisdom is called 
upon to reconcile knowledge with moral gestures guiding judgment and decision-
making as intended actions all of which carry meaning, value and purposes, and help 
to make visible the bridging relationship between experience, judgment and 
character of its correspondents. But then, what has the wisdom of Phronesis to do 
with PE? 
 
Clearly we need to differentiate between the patterns of decision-making within a 
teaching episode. We need to be concerned with replication and reliance, extending 
to creating new conditions and being versatile to call upon one’s reservoir of lived 
interrelations. We need to interact with care. Phronesis is a knowledge of one who 
knows how to live well. It is acquired and deployed not in the making of any product 
separate from oneself but rather in one’s actions with one’s fellows; it is an inimately 
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personal knowledge in that it characterises and expresses the kind of person one is, 
in the living of one’s life. Deprived of Phronesis’s insight, which views knowledge as 
both the means and the product of human  endeavour, it is not possible to be 
virtuous, nor without virtue to be phronetic. Aristotle held the belief that gifted with 
innate endowment, or nurtured in the course of experience, we build our character 
not merely through knowledge but through action, through exercising a virtue, rather 
than simply possessing a theoretical construct of it.  
 
Citing what is ex-citing                   
 
What I find exciting is something to which I respond. What I have suggested is that 
perhaps it is my inner-most fibers and floating facets of my unconscious self that 
comes into being, into my conscious sense of awareness, by seeping into the many 
“gaps” in which my unknown, sub-liminal self, can be surfaced from within PE’s 
multitude of gaps, in its “ludic-Rubicon” but only made manifest in the moment of 
entry into language’s symbolic order. The genus of language is created in the tension 
between the interchanges of signs and signals. But, these signs and signals are 
themselves resourced from within our embodied state of being. They come from our 
raw [impulsive] emotions which are then, subjected to, infused in, and become 
seriously diluted from their embodied values. These signs and signals are 
transplanted into a symbolic linguistic system of words. Their living nature is 
transformed into that of a mere kernel of their encountered personal meanings. 
Hence, the lived and meaningful experiences are left behind and only their remnant 
worded images are carried over to another. Like the use of internet, one creates a 
“virtual” synthetic event removed from the directly lived process.  
 
Interminably, ML searches to identify all available but covert messages about 
movement’s messenger in order to reinforce our resonance and reverberation with 
others and to avoid weakening each other’s interoceptive senses, senses which 
inform individuals of the “state” of their own embodied dimensions and which, I 
maintain, are linked to moral judgement.  We forget that we have to learn our 
emotions through sharing cultured forms of social behaviour, and that behaving 
socially is something that the whole body takes part in, with all its senses. To “act” for 
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example, is to go through the motions of behaviour without really feeling it, lacking 
the appropriate experience. Furthermore, “literature” we must remind ourselves is not 
a constructed institution but an expression of the way the world is perceived and 
interpreted, offering possible images of reality into life’s understanding. 
 
For both Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur, “reading” into physical action and hearing 
spoken words are complimentary ways, each inviting a better understanding of 
possible meaning. Both philosophical thinkers emphasise the importance of recalling 
experiential outcomes which enables one to anticipate a better course of action. 
Reading is a reflexive processing of thoughtful decision making, a literary feature 
which is again raised on pages 215-219. 
 
By applying hermeneutics to spoken language, we interweave our comprehension 
between formal text and its informal texture through understanding the structure of 
one form of experience in terms of another of a different kind. A serene crossing over 
happens possibly from a forgotten state of harmonious self to that of a vibrantly novel 
state of existence, when it seems our embodied being [mind in synchrony with body] 
encounters an existence; when neither dominates nor distracts from the other. 
 
 I and otherness 
 
In poststructuralism’s linguistic analysis, Ricoeur, inspired by his own sense of  
humbleness, humility and modesty, (1981; 1992) shows the individual person is not 
taken to be, in reality, the harmonious and coherent totality of technicism’s 
misrecognition of an ego-self. The entry of an “I” into language necessitates a 
division which reinforces a split between the “I” of discourse, the subject of the 
utterance, and the “I” who speaks, the subject of the enunciation. There is thus a 
contradiction between the conscious self, the self which appears in its own 
discourse, and the self which is only partly represented there, the self which speaks. 
In other words, the subject is, in the first instance the subject of a sentence, the 
agent of a verb, and the figure that says “I”. I reproduce [or challenge] the ruling 
ideology when I speak or write, and I am in that sense a source of initiatives, actions, 
decisions, choices. But, at the same time, the subject is subjected to the meanings 
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and sentence structures that language permits. As a movement-learner I 
communicate subject to my reproductions of my accepted signifier, my PE mentor. 
The nature of my learner-existence in PE lessons is dependent upon the manner in 
which my significant-advocate, the PE teacher, decides to conduct his lessons, 
during which my personal experiences are either positively or negatively affected.  
 
The “I-lessness” of language means that language is never “mine” and yet this very 
fact allows me to share the boundless expansiveness of this “we” to whom the world, 
in language, is ever disclosing itself. “We” meet our subjectivity, literally by bringing 
life to the role that one has created for one’s “self”. I have willed something vague 
and abstract, and which appeals to me, and with which I want to be associated, to 
become part of my public image. I begin to speak about what I hope will also become 
a part of me, and for others to be able to take note of, as an integral part of my 
desired public image.  
 
However, what is felt and meaningfully constituted, though sometimes hinted at in 
words like ephemeral, and evocative, or sad and anaesthetizing are not reducible to 
words. Movement’s meaning remains immanent in the act which creates it, in its 
undergoing; in the pursuit of its objectivity, transiently glimpsed at during 
quintessential moments. PE, if it is to be understood through the spectral lenses of 
ML, through its multiple disciplined treatment, holds the potential to suspend the 
habituated identification of ourselves. In movement, and in language, in their 
respective usage, “I” am rendered capable of encountering experiences which are of 
a different nature to that “I” have previously encountered. “I” identify something that 
offers me glimpses of something different from my “self”, and, a difference with my 
“self”.  If this is the case, then, I have the capacity to deconstruct conceptions of my 
“self” as one with another phenomenon, volitionally, to be embraced by, and 
resonate with it, or to dismiss it and prefer to be without it. In addition, my “self” can 
adopt the position of being excepted [set aside] from my conscious and conscience 
awareness. As physical movers we need to accept the notion that we both act upon 
and are acted upon at the one and the same time.  
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The “knowing” pedagogue, the fit, experienced pedagogue, however, can never quite 
catch up with how he or she “knows”. In the thesis opening phase, I explain that in 
gaining knowledge one is always beholden or indebted not only to assumptions, but 
also to antecedent interests and tacit procedures which are not in themselves known. 
To be known as a person, as an educator, as a role model means PE proponents 
need to make themselves fully available for their learners’ quizzical rhetoric. 
Interminably, they must pose questions and monitor their own changing state of 
“personhood” [next chapter]. 
 
PE is the inevitable creativeness of ordinary everyday life.  At its greatest moments, 
like a linguistic creation, a dance movement, a stage of a game, or a run across the 
sand-dunes, human movement dramatizes the continuing elements of real social, 
personal life and beliefs in such a way as to present themselves and change 
themselves. And, if we can come to see PE not in its ordinariness but rather in its 
extraordinariness, then we have to talk about it differently. It is important to 
appreciate that PL’s new modes of professional thinking and practices promote a 
broader conception of physical activity as “unrelated to ability”. I repeat my claim in 
Chapter 3 that ML is called for to clarify the complex relation between language and 
personal identity, in order to give refuge to those movers who encounter withdrawal 
symptoms from PE’s playful world. ML is intended to gently foreground the self “out” 
of their “unexplained” encounters in movement. Alternatively, skilled movers might 
encounter something like an overwhelming sense of ecstasy in movement. And it is 
with trying to account for this “unexplained gap” between conscious and unconscious 
embodied sensation that Movement Literacy is also concerned with; that is, with 
making some meaningful sense of PE. 
 
Summary   
 
In closing Chapter 7, pedagogy’s core ingredients render public and transpose the 
private features encountered in the acting of the event by conveying words which 
tangentially relay aspects of the inner self or serve to extrapolate evidence which the 
listener, the significant other in the conversation can detect. Pedagogy aspires to 
connect the manner of movement with the moral behaviour evidenced in one’s 
 189
actions, with one’s “floating-self”. The latter is partially surfaced and gently introduced 
to its agent mover. One’s ontological stance is composed by a kind ML synthesis via 
a range of educational traditions. ML is intended to compose a micro-political 
understanding of one’s learners and or one’s self as a person and an educator, an 
experiential process which is pedagogical or tutorial in its doing.   
 
In Chapters 6 and 7, I have explained that language is possible only because each 
speaker sets oneself up as subject by referring to oneself as I in one’s discourse, 
that human understanding cannot escape the network bounds of perspectives and 
interpretation, and that the “art” of pedagogy is to conceal “teaching” in the learning, 
in the unforced engagement of the self. 
 
Founding my thesis is the premise that critical, transformative education can begin to 
be nourished in the disciplined praxis of ML. The true burden of teaching, I maintain, 
lies with what passes [unquestioned, and unchallenged] between the signified 
knower and the to-be-made significant listener. This process stresses the need to 
develop a sense of intimate familiarity to the deep kind of shivering, vibratory 
essence that puts the world of sound into motion. ML reminds us that we are alive, 
sentient, and experiencing the world and other in the “bloom” of each individual’s 
entire corpus. ML is a sound that is etched in the voice. It is a voice that is able to 
convey overt and covert meanings with an assured fluency and sense of conviction 
in its belief.   
 
ML is a versatile and flexible voice, and can be finely adjusted to the ensemble of the 
circumstances, a ministering to the spontaneity with cognitive-based thoughtfulness 
and manifested in the practical act of tactful humility. It cultivates trust and maintains 
a shared sense of dignity. Significantly it is a voice which carries a moral force by 
always trying to acknowledge the fullness of the “otherness of the other”, and in the 
process may come across insights to one’s own “other” “Self”.  We all learn to teach 
as we teach.   
 
In an important sense, through a disciplined discourse of dialogue [strongly 
interlaced with the concerns of “Techne”, “Lebenswelt” and “Phronesis”], ML employs 
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a kind of technology of the “self”, by being given license to sketch, weave, interlace 
and embroider words into the texture of the PE interpreter’s voice. And, herein lies 
the irony of a profound contradiction. The language with which teachers are 
encouraged to interpret themselves and reflect on their daily lives with children is 
thoroughly imbued by hope. And yet, it has been almost exclusively a language of 
doing; it lacks “being”. This lack of “being” is what ML attempts to counter, a subtle 
strategy which is further explored in the final chapter and in the study’s closing but 
unfinished remarks. 
 
Pedagogy flourishes only when it can filter through the sieve-like network of 
language to reach beyond the fixed boundaries of Techne and only when it begins to 
rely on certain experiential flexible features that emerge in the exercise of Phronesis, 
Lebenswelt, and Verstehen which constitute pedagogy’s unifying principles, to 
engage its interlocuters to prepare for change in the understanding of experiences 
which may be recruited and preferably applied to change their own lives. This is 
because life is about change. Understanding PE also should be all about 
understanding change since we all need to be able to cope with change by 
exercising the full potential of our human resources. 
 
The unfinished remarks about pedagogy’s kernel, its unfathomed but creative “ludic 
Rubicon” should not remain a solitary journey.  The process of education itself is 
shown to be generated between what can be described as “terminal references” 
[formal teaching] and “interminable differences” [andragogy]. The link between the 
former and the latter is pedagogy, and the link between pedagogy and the latter is 
addressed by its interlocutors being able to engage in ML.  Whilst non-coercive, non-
tormenting, and non-repressive, ML is yet to be tested out.   
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Chapter Eight      Pedagogy Cannot Be Understood in a Propositional Sense     
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter qualifies how ML might have helped “Iago” to appreciate the complexity 
of both teaching and learning, to openly educate rather than covertly manipulate 
others. ML sets the ultimate tone of PE’s professional institutional programmes as a 
sustained effort to infuse the meaning of movement by identifying its learning virtues. 
Whilst PL identifies how teaching becomes pedagogy, ML communicates pedagogy 
into androgogy. “Metaphorically” ML contrasts pedagogy’s core ingredients techne 
with phronesis.  The pedagogue’s “teaching” experience enables him/her to proceed 
from the impediment of using a fixed perception of teaching to begin to practice 
pedagogy’s hidden ethics designed to manifest movement’s human “contract”.  
Ethics, we remind ourselves, involves experiences but its procedure is not put to 
words. PE’s pedagogy is a hidden code of values intended to guide actions in a 
fascinating way. Pedagogy is a drama in which movement, our thoughts and feelings 
of ourselves and of others are first objectified and then partially returned to us afresh 
via language’s slippery nature.   
 
ML is orientated to learn how to interrelate practices from across the entire schooling 
curriculum with the world of exercise, health and physical leisure. Its eventual hope is 
that novice movers can be informed to recognize the art of understanding playful 
leisure as the very serious basis of understanding one’s culture and themselves. 
Movement advocates need to know and appreciate movement from the “inside”, to 
be familiar with its ritualised sources inspired by our ancestors. Many generations 
have toiled with idea of trying to “know” what learning and education might “look like”. 
Words and their floating meaning have proven to be inadequate to resolve this 
dilemma.  Knowledge can be contextually and appropriately understood and applied 
as well as misinterpreted, distorted, and applied erroneously or painfully, yet no 
knowledge can be supported or “carried forward” by one alone. Language can both 
inform and misinform its users and receptors. Certain facets and features of human 
movement however, can be interpreted almost universally. The exchanging of one’s 
smile in response to another’s smile, for instance, suggests a moment of shared 
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cordiality. A smile is a gestured, silent deed. And it is with revealing this kind of 
immanent message that PE can offer to its mover learners. It can offer a lodestone 
connection between the naiveté of youthfulness, and the wisdom of adulthood. 
 
Coping with this crossing-over or bridging PE’s unexplained gaps in schooling’s 
education to apply new knowledge to their lives is what I see as PE’s profound 
mission. It is so important that I have claimed it should “orientate” its epistemologies 
and professional approaches, not the other way round. This is because learning is 
organized not around PE as a curriculum subject, a matter of units and modules, and 
the consequences of failure, which deconstructs the self, but around life/work 
situations praising what reconstructs the self image, like initiating one’s belief, self-
reliance, and self- assurance [confidence] in public. The point here is that without 
understanding the possibilities of deriving the deeper, affective meaning from 
movement, it is difficult to construct a meaningful curriculum where the act of running 
is only marginally about exercise, as Boyer (1989: 20) well recognised. 
 
Pedagogy itself is a way of exposing hidden hegemonic ideology by attending to that 
of emancipation. It is not knowledge of ethical ideas as such, but rather a 
resourcefulness of mind that is called into play in, and responds uniquely to, the 
classroom situation in which these ideas are to be realized. Professional educators 
are required to know what is prudent, just and trusting in one’s call to another, and 
render this deliberated thinking in a way that its listener may be placed in touch with 
the humane feeling of one’s collegial being for another’s. Pedagogy, when 
understood in terms of its non-instrumental character emerges in its mediation of 
Techne with Phronesis [in the universal and the particular]. It puts a premium on 
Merleau-Ponty’s inspired call for phenomenological description of one’s experience 
and perceptiveness, which can then be subjected to Ricoeur’s hermeneutic 
interpretive critique or consciousness. The act of interpretive critique has a practical 
interest to act, rather than to address already formulated knowledge. 
 
Techne is teachable in terms of its demonstrable knowledge, but insufficiently 
dialogical. It imprisons us within a monologic tradition, because its universal [others’] 
knowledge is already enshrined, and its best laws have been repeatedly tried and 
tested in it. It cannot leap over the interpreter’s relationship to tradition nor that of its 
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listener’s. The need to affirm further judgment has been satisfied, whereas it is the 
cultivation of rational and moral judgment as understood by another that pedagogy is 
concerned with.  
 
Pedagogy requires its advocate to lay the seedbed foundation of judgment not 
through theoretical reason, but rather through benign jousting of words in the 
sincerity and the dynamism with which one searches for “meanings” that freely come 
and go and may be rooted in its agent’s lived experiences. In a sense, the 
relationship between experience, judgment, and character take precedence over, 
and necessarily replace “pure” theory when it comes to the realm of playful 
pedagogy [the life breath of culture when the certainty of the unexpected always 
lurks] as it emerges into andragogy - not orphaned from each other’s learning. The 
real deficiency of theory is that it brings no profit with respect to the formation of 
character. 
 
Healing encounter 
 
In examining the content of PE’s movement lifeworld, its participants are compelled 
to reflect on one’s own and others’ commentaries upon the event and one’s 
occupancy as its agent. ML’s eventual ambition is to enable novice PE advocates to 
create movement as a healing encounter. PE’s human movement carries meaning 
which has been driven out of their more central embodiment and realizations; out of 
the tradition containing transcendental meanings such as heroic exhaustion, 
honourable continuity of ritual, style, grace and truthfulness, which are gathered into 
the web of PE’s authentic form of life. It is PE’s delicate membrane, its in-between 
“gaps” that ML haptically aspires to touch.  
 
Social and personal identity 
 
With the advent of postmodernism / poststructuralism, there followed a pivotal 
change in social and personal identity, a shift from institutional loyalties and 
responsibilities to personal sincerity and authenticity as a focus of allegiance. The 
forms of imaginative and actual “relationships” came to express “individuality” or 
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distinctiveness, rather than collegiality as the core of “being”, where the ideals of 
communal “honour” and “loyalty” have been supplanted by those of “self-integrity” 
and “self-dignity”, where pride out manoeuvres prejudice. This new focus on 
“individuality” however means that one has to assert oneself more as a spectacle. 
PE is the readiest expression of all schooling’s curriculum “disciplines” of individuality 
lived as a spectacle. In other words, I as Ted the “school athlete”, the “soccer 
captain”, the “international rugby” player, the visible resident in the world of 
movement, and portrayed under the conditions of movement, was all too easily 
transformed into a public “representation”  of Ted.  The uncertainty of knowing my 
“self” as an artifice for a popular sport-imaged person, or a Red Coat, contrasted 
sharply and alarmingly with how I directly experienced and lived my life in earnest.   
 
Movement Literacy better than modern PE 
 
Early in the thesis I identify PE as a source of personal struggle, and then portray PE 
and its contemporary mode of communication as a powerful, but benign force for 
change, when the lesson’s entire ambiance, its interpersonal dynamics can be 
tweaked by the professional’s astute use of language communication, thus, changing 
the tenor,  tone, and the timbre of learning. Modern PE (Chapter 1) was guilty of, for 
example, trying to justify its educational status solely on the grounds that it achieved 
the objects of its technical disciplines. Its technical ends were elaborated with 
reference to science-bound fields of study, supposedly as an education encounter. 
The philosophy of education itself however, seeks to guide educational practice 
through examining the assumptions about the structure of specific knowledge 
domains and minds of learners. “Iago’s” self-detachment, his worldly perception 
hermetically sealed, could teach only to the “oppressed”.  
 
Bad old PE 
 
PE’s early prototype teaching models were largely practised as if its agents were 
experiencing a cessation of their vital functions, suspending the self or portraying an 
unoccupied, servile mind. When it comes to the processing of learning, I have 
accused modern PE of treason.  I accuse it of pursuing a scheme of thinking, of 
 195
imposing a conventionally fixed arrangement of thought upon its participating 
correspondents. It cultivates and nurtures the unquestioned acceptance of general 
theoretical assumptions and rigid laws and techniques for their [theory and laws] 
application. It portrayed PE’s movement enterprises as an experience which could 
captivate their [movement disciples] involvement and satiate or even develop a 
reliance on movement’s consumptive and compulsive attraction.  
 
In effect, it left what was assumed to be the “self-sufficient” mind well alone, and 
thus, debilitated movement’s process of learning. It harnessed personal growth 
largely because it inflated one’s conception of the autonomy of consciousness. 
Therefore, modern definitions of its teaching “styles” shifted to mean almost the 
opposite of teaching’s original education conception. The very notion of education to 
learn, of moving PE’s professional practices actually served to move away from the 
individual and towards more objectified and universal claims of what it means to 
educate and be educated. Such practices either denied or excavated the learners’ 
mode of subjective concerns. 
 
Old Cartesian PE 
 
In the absence of embodied concerns, PE’s professional practices were considered 
uncongenial to nurture educational learning (Crum 1993; Schemp 1993; Tinning 
1991). Committed to its technocratic ideology, its practices were shown to be 
recursive and regularized, hence “rule governed” components of human agency 
(Bourdieu, 1976; 1992; Giddens 1979; 1986). PE’s modern consciousness was 
dominated by a Cartesian schizoid dualism, body dislocated from mind. It employed 
teaching styles founded on an ideology immunised against rational critique. Its 
professional onus was placed on the point of the activity; to move effectively. PE was 
an externalized inscription of information. It developed a legion of silent witnesses 
with severed voices. It created movers rendered incidental, perhaps even immunised 
against learning. These are some of the reasons why this thesis is called upon to 
qualify the fact that the process of learning to learn disappears when there is no 
response to it. 
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Iago and Mosston and Ashworth  
 
We cannot afford to view “Iago” independently as an “idiosyncratic being”, as 
Mosston (1966:7) originally conceded. Mosston’s systemic approach required 
teachers to engage in calculative thinking which served to place oneself [the thinker’s 
thoughts] under compulsion to master everything in the logical terms of Mosston’s 
procedure. It was a conception of teaching which Mosston and Ashworth (2002) 
themselves acknowledged to have prevented the construction of a unified and 
universal theory. The methodical “spectrum” did not constitute a: 
 
           …a cohesive framework that can serve as a broad, integrated guide for teaching future  
             teachers  
                                                                                                            [Mosston and Ashworth 1994: vii] 
 
“Iago” was enamored by methods’ routinised and recursive procedures.  Iago is 
neither able to examine his lesson content from a critical perspective, nor call for an 
alternative methodological dimension to his teaching. It was out of the question for 
Iago to entertain notions of democracy and egalitarian relations of power.  The 
pursuit of humanness and emancipation eluded him and the possibility of the movers 
own “authoring” of their learning (Tappan & Brown, 1989) could not be entertained.  
“Iago” did not wish to challenge the “status quo”, but this is exactly what a critical 
pedagogue must risk, they need to be committed to celebrate “communities of 
difference” (Tierney, 1993).  
 
Methodology and methods 
 
ML’s non-assertive and rhetorical praxis can help to guide movement advocate’s 
practical solutions, but does not necessarily resolve classroom “issues”. Rather, it is 
to “awaken” the meaning of the text of movement and language that might not have 
been envisaged by its participants. Under such circumstances, one’s committed 
sense of beliefs, values, and ideas, are called upon to make fluid and subtle the 
abstract determinations of thought. This means dissolving and remoulding logic into 
the procedures of language, and discussing the issue under consideration by means 
of the power of words; words which ask questions and suggest answers.  
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ML is a methodological stance, the inherited or postured attitude towards addressing 
PE’s contemporary rationale that entices its participants to attain a better deliberation 
about one’s self-understanding of the lifeworld [Lebenswelt]. PE’s array of disciplined 
physical activities is intended to put its movers by way of certain forms of lived 
experiences. Understood in this deliberate sense, PE can be conceived as a 
conditioned rehearsal to learn about life, when the themes of play, of games, of 
meditation and of language, are transformed into the self-presentation of one’s 
being. PE seeks an engagement of the self with others and the surrounding 
landscape. It seeks a reaction, a response. It is a process of learning in the company 
of others. It evokes talk with one’s embodied words, language and movement as two 
prime vehicles of unconscious knowledge when learning is conceived as a way to 
know oneself and the letting of oneself be educated. 
 
If this eventual aspiration is what PE advocates have in mind, then, the selection of 
one’s planning phases, the choosing of one’s organizational tasks, the application of 
teaching methods, and options of skill techniques can be orientated towards serving 
this ambition; to hone its participant’s life skills. ML embraces the analysed principles 
of educational methods, rules, and postulates employed by a number of disciplines. 
It involves systematic study of methods that may be applied within a number of 
disciplines, as well as the study or description of methods. Nevertheless, ML does 
not describe specific methods despite the attention given to the nature and kinds of 
processes to be followed in a given procedure or in attending to its necessary 
objective targets. 
 
When proper to study alternative methodology, which is what its “professional 
training” institutions were originally set up to do, such programmes were founded on 
constructive generic frameworks, meaning that the so-called programme 
construction was understood as a logical arrangement of connected elements. 
Because of the very complexities which all apprenticing PE interpreters encounter 
during their education careers, and currently, in view of drastic reduction to their 
professional study times, the life shaping philosophy of PL can be conceived as a 
connecting leitmotif, linking what are disparate module structured programmes.  
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In Mosston and Ashworth’s 1976-2002 series of “method teaching”, teaching’s 
cardinal practices were well defined. But this was because teaching was conceived 
as a “telling” mode. It was an administrative craft, a recipe for technical “grip” makers 
designed to control skill, to mould bodies into behavioural performances following the 
logic of a linear method of development. Its autocracy and tyranny camouflaged a 
mode of coercive teaching. Modern PE’s practices conformed its learners to a public 
procedure, that of memorising knowledge. It paraded its results, its data, its most 
distanced, fastest and most impressive of achievements ever known to human kind, 
as believable evidence to its record of progress. Modern PE nurtured a conforming 
creed for technical perfection by enforcing allegiance to imposed knowledge (Kirk, 
1993). It introduced well grounded theory and applied it unchallenged with regard to 
enhancing the efficiency of the body, but with disregard to the knowledge of “human” 
condition. It first dislodged, and then annexed the ensemble notion of selfhood. 
Attention to the “self” was uncared for. “Self” became subdued knowledge, feeble 
and deserted. Self concerns became marginalized and left as redundant issues 
when it came to professionally conducting a lesson (Maude, 2001).   Self resists its 
location and identity in any “methodology”, as I shall further explain.   
 
Put differently, contemporary PE’s practices involve processing the principled 
conditions of learning. It attends to personal development, nurtures motivation, and 
cares about the nature and manner of its communication and acquisition of 
knowledge and understanding (Goodland 1992; Fernandez-Balboa & Marshall I994). 
Currently, its practices take as its point of departure the lived experiences and the 
declared and felt needs of its upper schooling’s movers. Philosophy of science and 
mathematics first informed the design of PE’s curriculum, as well as its teaching and 
evaluation in the “education” of movement (Kleinig, 1982). Philosophy of mind, of 
language and of psychology then began to bear on the contractual foundations of 
PE’s understanding in how learning occurs, and thus how innovative professional 
practices may best promote it.  Education, under these new transformative 
perspectives, came to be understood as what distinguishes other words for wisdom, 
such as insight, perception, astuteness and acumen, as the virtue of “practical 
wisdom” or “prudence”, as well as loyalty and ethical decisions. Movement Education 
becomes a matter of attuning universal knowledge to particular situations and 
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particular beings. It holds the potential to extend its agent’s thinking into movement 
by dwelling in it, not as visitors, but as activists (Hellison 1988; Hellison & Templin 
1991). 
 
Movement missionaries do need to dedicate their vocational commitments to caring 
for the fragile, fallible, and sometimes desolate nature of each human, each 
struggling but ever unable fully to understand themselves. This is because each one 
of us balances on the brink of what we confidently claim to “know” and what we 
aspire for which may blend or reciprocate together and initiate one to adopt a 
practical position a practical knowledge for which science cannot be held 
accountable. This is why phenomenology has a vitalizing part to play in PE’s future 
professional praxis. 
 
Phenomenology and structuralism revisited 
 
With the introduction of the phenomenological “movement” into the teaching of PE, 
its professional efforts came to attune one’s self with one’s conscious attitude, and 
heralded a search to collapse the dualistic distinctions between subjective concerns 
and objective issues. Relativity physics shifted descriptive emphasis from “reality” to 
measurement. The arts moved away from realism. Consensus politics confronted 
totalitarianism and genocide. These and related cultural and technological events 
arose from seismic changes in the way we register the world and communicate with 
each other, orally or digitally. Phenomenology, when thought of as a current in 
philosophy, takes intuitive “experience” [what presents itself to us in conscious 
experience] as its starting point and tries to extract the essential features of 
experience and essence of what we experience. The task of PE’s philosophy came 
to describing a phenomenon of captured moments in movement, the objects of 
experience, accurately and independently of all assumptions derived from science, 
yet craving knowledge also through science’s many lenses (Davis 1994; Davidson 
2002; Fahlberg & Falhberg 1994).   
 
Phenomenology teases its agent commentator to point out what was encountered 
within the act of moving, in order to be able to “think aloud” to make public one’s 
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private enactment. Phenomenological description of movement is an attempt to 
translate sensuous seamless experiences from the inside out, but in the unaware 
authoring of our own sayings, we offer an “entrée”; an unfettered description as a 
way of coping with our doubts about the “human condition”: we implicate ourselves in 
our own sayings. Engaging in this philosophical movement grants license to the 
learner [participant-commentator] to word-sketch, to represent or symbolize 
something of what a particular lived-through exercise is “like”. Such a description is 
not a tenuous account. On the contrary (see Chapters 5-7), it is an elevated gripping 
feeling urged in a heightened sense of alertness, un-distracted by the “self” which 
modern PE conceived as a biased and inhibiting impediment to learning.  
 
More recently, “heterophenomenology”, which implies “phenomenology” of another, 
not oneself, is a term coined by Dennet (1996) to describe the explicitly third-person 
scientific approach to the study of consciousness and other mental phenomena. It 
consists of applying the scientific method with an anthropological bent, combining the 
subject’s self-report with all other available evidence to determine the speaking 
subject’s mental “state”. The goal is to see how the subject sees the world around 
him / herself without taking the accuracy of the subject’s view for granted, or 
considers the subjects authoritative only about how things seem to be. 
Heterophenomenology opens possibilities to identify different categories of minds, 
and further differentiate multiple kinds of subjective “I” interpretations.  
 
Ego-centred, “Iago” could not see himself as confirmed from outside, by others, by 
his learners, or his fellow teachers. He was intransigent, a dictator to himself 
because he was closed and eclipsed within the confines of his own narcissistic 
futility. Under the new perspectives of ML’s principled guidance, his vision of 
independence might take on a pivotal change and be transformed and understood as 
one’s ability to think of others whilst being critical but humble in mentoring  one’s self, 
yet be careful not to become overwhelmed by too much Derridian-like  (1984) 
tendency of personal deconstruction. “Iago’s” self-detachment, unable to manage his 
“pride” by acknowledging his “prejudices”, inevitably, pursued a unilinear approach to 
his lesson planning, its exercise, and thus, evaluated lessons by means of what was 
achieved from an objective viewpoint.  “Poor” consumers of information, “Iago” 
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pointed to his “weak” learners as the major, causal consequence to his lesson 
“breakdown”.   
 
The thesis accounts for pedagogy as a special way one talks about the world which 
involves ontological commitments, such that talking is one way of acting in the world, 
whilst learning and practicing, a physical activity is another way of acting in the world.  
Chapter 5 onwards trace a relational shift from PE’s “structuralist language”. It was a 
language which systematically “removed” the subjective “I” and prioritised the “third-
person” in its objective directives. It was a PE language not conversant with its 
current “semiological” meanings and insights. A semiological approach was 
explained as the study of relations between signs and things to which they refer: their 
meaning, and sign processes, indication, designation, analogy metaphor and 
symbolism, or relations among signs in formal structures. In addition, a semiological 
approach involves the analysis of pragmatics, the relation between signs and the 
“effects” they have on people who use them; their rhetorical signification, 
expectation, and communication consequences.    
 
Significantly, what follows from Saussure’s theory of language as a system of 
“differences” is that the world is intelligible only in discourse; hence, according to 
Saussure, there is no unmediated experience, no access to the raw reality of self 
and others. Saussure’s structuralist’s position holds that if the subject [the incumbent 
speaker/writer] was constructed in language and in discourse, and since the 
symbolic order in one’s discourse was closely related to ideology, one’s subjective 
construct emanated from within the dominant ideology shaping that person’s 
schooling, community or culture. It is in this sense that ideology [PE’s technicism] 
has the imposing effect of constituting individuals as subjects. Saussurian linguistics 
insisted on the arbitrary nature of language’s signs, a fascinating and counterintuitive 
move, designed to emphasise the “freedom” of language as far as possible from the 
trammels of the body and of the ecological world it describes. 
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Poststructuralism refreshes language’s world-weariness                
 
For PE’s education practices, adopting poststructuralist’s language served to activate 
a language more as a form of social networking. PE’s communication practices came 
to be one which was politically more sensitive to transforming and transcending 
social class into individual concerns in motion, in commonality of tasks and in 
movement boundaries. As a form of social networking PE’s language also began to 
attend to diverse practices at group level of focus and individual personal concerns 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).  Sparkes, Nigels, Swan, and Dowling (2003), for example, 
by turning to poststructuralism’s language, believe that the movement profession’s 
“conscious temperament” experienced a massive shift in its conception of where and 
how people, culture and beliefs are produced. 
 
To grasp what is at stake in postmodernism’s PE it is necessary to think historically 
and broadly, in the kind of complex terms that inevitably involve multidisciplinary 
effort. This multilingual impetus, this bringing together of “methods”  and ideas long 
segregated both in academic disciplines and in practical life, particularly 
characterises postmodernism and largely accounts for such resistance it has 
generated (Harvey, 1992). Diverse in its searches, and eclectic in its concerns, 
postmodernism can be recognized by two key assumptions. First, the assumption 
that there is no common denominator in “nature” or “truth”, in “God” or the “future”, 
guarantees neither the Oneness of the world nor the possibility of neutral or objective 
thought. Second, the assumption that all human systems operate like language, 
being self-reflexive rather than referential systems: systems of differential function 
are powerfully finite, but construct and maintain meaning and value, misleads us to 
think in set ways. The exercise of reflexivity significantly puts within the concept of 
dialogue the possibility of renegotiating, and acknowledges that silence and 
withdrawal from dialogue are possible moves within it in the sense that they may 
constitute necessary steps for extending dialogue. 
 
From a postmodern point of view pedagogy is neither the theory we have of teaching 
nor is it its application. Theoretical scholarship does not vouch for pedagogical 
fitness. One may be steeped in education theories and yet be a poor educator. The 
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meaning [essence] of pedagogy does not reside in theory. But neither is pedagogy 
located in the application of theory. One may be an expert on translating learning 
theory into particular curriculum modules. By contrast, the inanimate curriculum 
cannot possibly be sensitive to the way a particular person learns. Modernist PE 
specialists equated the meaning of pedagogy with the aims of teaching or with the 
activity of teaching. But the postmodernist, or poststructuralist informed advocate 
would say that pedagogy can be neither the intention nor the action. Pedagogy, as 
Ricoeur emphasises, operates “in between” its correspondents’ respective intention 
and action.  And, as Ricoeur also clarifies, there can be no “absolute” exchange of 
meanings between one person and another.  
 
If there has to be a “linear” process for novice PE teachers to follow, then as far as 
possible the way to deal with it is to catch a portion of one’s experience, and then 
create an episode in that experience, which can then become a dialogical 
“conversational event”. But the whole nature of such a dialogue is that in this shared 
corner of each other’s experience the world is interpreted through the temperament 
of the personalities, one of the many “selves” that reside in movement at that present 
moment.   
 
Conciliation 
 
Maintaining a temporary conciliation between physical posture and personal poise is 
one the underlying themes of this thesis.  Importantly, this is why ML is to be thought 
of in terms of a pro-active process. An “action” involves a broad field of philosophy 
concerned with the processes causing intentional human movement. ML is 
concerned with the conditioned processes causing wilful human bodily movement of 
more or less complex kind. For example, Habermas used one version of an “action 
theory” to describe cooperative action undertaken by individuals based upon mutual 
deliberation and argument. ML embraces a kind of “construct theory”; it employs a 
psychological approach to make good predictions about what learners and others will 
do when confronted by new situations. 
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Pedagogues must think of themselves in a monistic way, as knowing bodies and 
moving minds, as one in interplay with the other interminably rehearsing and 
reinvigorating the act of thinking. Movement pedagogues need to become immersed 
in their own professional and embodied text. They need to become good storytellers, 
to make public their own and their learners’ movement inspired surprises. 
 
This thesis does not give detailed prescriptions about how future human movement 
“specialists” are “compelled” to conduct themselves as educators, therapists, 
counsellors, and guides. Rather, it explains that when phenomenology philosophises 
from action to agent with the body, paradoxically, the self is “lost” from the beginning 
of knowledge in movement, but is then retrieved anew by the subtle use of 
hermeneutics’ ethical and metaphorical linguistic interplay between its 
correspondents. Hermeneutics unpacks the weight bearing characteristics of 
language’s medium. In other words, Hermeneutics’ critical interpretive practice brings 
its telling “movers” out of the shadows of tacit knowledge into the public arena, thus, 
retrieves the silent, disenfranchised voices of others by acknowledging others’ 
“otherness” and their own self designation.   
 
ML acknowledges that when we interpret systematic or regulated human behaviour, 
we do so by adjusting and extending our descriptions of what we say, and this 
applies to our movement descriptions. At the same time, these descriptions take in 
judgments of value, as our description implies approval and criticism. The more we 
try our description for accuracy and agreement, the more we give the behaviour an 
“interpretation”. We try to “make sense” of what is going on. Here, making sense 
“means” something like “meeting the coherence of” the process whereby in the name 
of pattern and order, we interpret the life around us. In a sentimental kind of 
education, what one learns in one’s movement description is what one’s private 
sensibility looks like when spelled out externally in a collective text. A text in which its 
texture can be read into so that all can listen more closely to what PE can tell us, a 
text in which its texture is created in the high tension of its languaging commentary. 
This languaging process does not suggest a passivity of natural sciences rather it is 
to embrace the latter as a co-conduit in the formation of creating knowledge. 
Interpreting enacted movement means attending closely to what it (movement) says 
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to us. Tangentially, PE’s discipline movement manifests some of the key meanings 
that are available to us, and at a time of deep moral confusion, it may, at best, permit 
a clash of moralities, the contradiction of moral imperatives, to be known and 
understood and balanced.  
 
The old opposition between subjective concerns and objective issues, these 
irreconcilables, rather than remaining as polemic oppositions, can live in the 
spontaneous ebb and flow, the high tension of creative imagination and engage in 
new potentialities in the playful mind. We come to see ourselves “clearer”, as 
measured against different frames of consciousness, enticed in different moods and 
evoked within transient temperaments; temperaments which fluctuate freely between 
being touched by one’s novelty of imagination and yet, also harnessed by the 
mystique of tension created by the unknown. 
 
What is highlighted in the thesis’s closing phase is the phenomenon of “transiency”, 
which I take to mean the “quality” of being. When one does something, if one fixes 
one’s mind on the activity with some confidence, the quality of that state of mind is 
the activity itself. When one is concentrated on the quality of one’s being, one is 
prepared for the activity. There is harmony in our activity, and where there is 
harmony, when there exists an undivided “self” there is calmness.  PE comes to be 
located between Eastern meditation and Western mediation, and which can be seen 
as the history of successive periods of Western humanity’s cultivation of its own 
“mind” and thus, bodies became submerged as the Western mode of thought 
developed. 
 
Western mediation implies that its speakers must weave the material tissue of words 
with the meanings hanging on to their edges. PE specialists are also movement 
translators, voicing movement into life. They need to know how to exercise PE’s 
hidden “protocol” its silent deed, its pedagogical arts to open out an elaborate 
cognitive and emotional mapping practice which are concerned with issues of 
sovereignty and kinship, alienation and emancipation  
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PE’s pedagogue must deal with embodied minds by using language in ways which 
the professional advocate is familiar with, and simultaneously maximises its effects 
and affects. For example, we turn the tenor of life into experience by giving it names. 
However, language is not just names-for-things; it is a porous membrane filtering the 
meaningless torrent of life. Before life is named, it is vast, potential, and inane. We 
name it, we seek to command it. We utter spells to tame it and bring it under our 
reach and grip of our imagination. Language is gesture which seeks to order chaos 
and command vacancy. Gesture transiently defines and gives meaning to “space”, to 
“silence”. But gesture is not impromptu. It takes its meaning from the dense, 
compacted rituals of a long history. In some cases, as in PE, the longer the history, 
the more sacred will be its ritual meaning.   
 
Teaching via pedagogy into andragogy  
 
Importantly, I have argued that ML’s pedagogy actually stems from its confrontation 
with the impossibility of teaching. But the shift from modern teaching via pedagogy to 
contemporary PE’s practices [andragogy] is complex and yet to be more fully 
realised. Much is involved when changes are required in its teaching transfer from 
“habituated” or “domesticated” participation to pedagogical “transformation”, from 
superimposed functional directives to expressive implications. To become 
pedagogically “fit” PE’s prospective, professionals and movement believers must be 
able to communicate in the idiom of  both movement’s and language’s tacit nature.  
 
Play transforms teaching into pedagogy. PE professionals’ modus operandi must be 
both serious and yet playful. Play, after all, is “the life breaths of culture” (Pieper 
1952; 1965). We all need play both to keep the world fresh and interesting and to 
keep ourselves unique and unpredictable. It produces “givers” and allows people to 
reap many benefits of uncalculated, spontaneous commitment. It preserves human 
creativity; most important of all, play allows meaning to count. Playfulness with words 
underpins the way of ML. These deliberated words are intended to be radically 
disruptive, and reinforce Chapter Two’s message: pedagogy is instituted on rhetoric. 
Rhetoric helps to make understanding a playful way to pose new modes of 
questioning [intended to subvert the most fundamental structures of seriousness] 
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that are also a new relation to language and tradition, a new “affirmation” and new, 
just  ways of giving and taking responsibility between its interlocutors. 
 
The point I have pressed on in this thesis is that if movement learning enterprises 
can be rendered as commensurate with the meanings of life, then, PE must come to 
terms with the dynamics or force of suggestive dialogue. Expression differs from 
description in that it is never a repetition nor a rehearsal but always in itself a real 
actualization, both of a new meaning and rooted in the person’s sense of “Being” in a 
new way. When the learner is in a position to describe movement there is no work for 
the imagination to do; relationships are being formulated between ideas which are 
already clear to the mind of its interlocuters. What occurs is that in probing the 
descriptive statements, each correspondent will express an inner-felt emotional 
dimension, and, in the normal sense this will be the emotion attendant precisely on 
performing an intellectual operation for that which one has routine competence. 
Crucially, however, what each is trying to capture is the “aboutness” of the presence 
of the indicating statements as they impresses themselves upon the agent-speaker, 
and this “capturing” would be the latter’s becoming conscious of, and at the same 
time expressing both one’s impression and the emotion engendered in the learner by 
it.  
 
Progressive sequences  
 
The thesis has attempted to link 19th and 20th century’s “physical training” with what 
evolved into “physical instruction”. The latter was then labeled as “physical 
education”, which presented its professionals with a recipe to teach, to inscribe a 
muscular memory upon each learner’s body. Though granted license to “educate”, 
modern PE deluded itself [and its movers] in its efforts to initiate learning. Education, 
I have argued, arises only when there is a strong and collaborated testimony and a 
sharing of tacit processing in the hidden act of learning. The transparent and the 
most abiding qualities of learning (Chapter 7) are those that are encountered in 
movement’s “ludic Rubicon”, its unexplained theoretical and pragmatic gaps, linking 
knowledge, morality, and traditions into life, but does so only through semantic 
tensions in the linguistic “net”, when self-cultivation  changes as we talk.  
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What PL achieves is the gathering in of different disciplined routes of human 
movement’s tradition: its continuity of friendship, its relation to historical rituals, its 
admiration for grace and courage.  These and many other meanings are gathered 
into the web of PL’s many “gaps”. And it is this delicate membrane I try to touch, to 
render PE in its transition to PL as significantly meaningful to all its learners’ lives 
through engaging in ML, because meanings live in movement transformed 
[transmuted] into language as a form of poetry which may function to produce 
equilibrium among painfully conflicting impulses and thereby provide fictive solutions 
to real psychological problems.  
   
ML attains an elemental basis with the “ministering” responsibility inherent to all 
pedagogic actions. Pedagogy is not a single art. Rather, it is the cohesion of different 
art forms. It assimilates different perspectives. It is not what PE institutions can 
provide for its clients. This is because pedagogy requires an educator to be 
experienced in many encountered classroom situations and to accumulate a 
seasoned gestation to be versatile and flexible. In addition, pedagogy needs to be 
able to borrow insights from others, and to become a connoisseur performer turning 
from movement agent to performer analyst, to therapist or counselor, without 
declaring one’s role.   
 
To become pedagogically “fit”, one must be devoted to PE’s original stance, that of 
tracing its mover’s effort to ascribe subjective concerns. Pedagogy emerges and 
transpires into “andragogy” only when its interlocutors, its partnering enquirers 
become familiar with and able to adjust and assimilate with their own experiential 
ensemble of self, clinging to their own cluster of selves [different roles] bound 
together with the most impressive string of memories. Under these settled and 
mature personal “conditions”, what is made understood is not clarified out of fear but 
by falling into trust in others. This is why life is, in good part, about trust and the 
retaining of an interest in the self and one’s otherness. Modern PE compelled an air 
of seduction under its worldless appeal. Nevertheless, one must also more fully 
acknowledge that science is the art of the soluable but without any egoistic idea. The 
conditioned process of learning-to-learn is not just a detached matter of intellectual 
understanding. Our understanding arises from within reflection on the act of thinking, 
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and thinking again, or in Eastern philosophy, “non-thinking”. Revelation comes to us. 
We do not go to it.  
 
Transience comes when we find perfect existence or “tranquility” through imperfect 
existence (Suzuki 2006: 102), not by reading or contemplating philosophy, but only 
through practicing meditation itself. Inherent in this andragogical approach is its 
conversational focus to enhance both the movement potential of individuals and their 
understanding of the enacted [tried and tested] medical, psychologically personal, 
and social political implications for wanting to move. 
 
This thesis does not provide the answers, but attempts to facilitate new questions, 
such as: “How can language and movement communicate?” ML opens new ways in 
how professional relations and meanings can be constructed within a benign realm 
of justice, freedom and equity when its advocates and practitioners discuss the 
personal, professional and civic principles to which the PE, its personal epiphanies 
and its activities were originally dedicated. It helps to shift PE concerns from an 
“event” analysis and portraying a single lens perception of an ego-self, when our 
unconscious inner being remain as strangers to ourselves, to its resident agent’s 
“identity”, to meet that which is “other” than self as perceived by  others.  ML voices 
our reading of moving actions from the “inside-dweller’s” viewpoint.   
 
It is pedagogy that invites the transformation of PE experiences by disclosing 
movement’s generic source and meaning in a carnal field of participation and thus 
presenting movement as a valued gestural deed that is made known tangentially 
through its metaphorically rich and playful words.  PE offers many lateral signs which 
are hinted at in the flowing dynamics of dialogue. Following its PL philosophy, ML 
seeks and voices shared-meaning by using ethical and imaginative language. 
 
In essence, ML is a concentration on key pedagogical facets linking experiences to 
life. It draws from a range of disciplines and is applied in a finely nuanced evocative 
manner.  Pedagogy needs to be clarified in terms of the distinct differences that exist 
between “techne” and “phronesis”, when phronesis is animated in the doing of each 
movement learner’s own sense of life world. An educator is thus required to be 
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committed to inviting, orientating and trekking others’ personal posture to their own 
lived enterprises, and attuning to that of others’ state of well-being. In its emotionally 
“moving” encounters, its agent can reveal hidden aspects of themselves, their 
“otherness” which significant others like movement literates can detect, interpret, and 
encode their possible meanings better than its occupant agent can. 
 
Becoming philosophical 
 
When one pursues the wisdom of altruistic love, then one realizes that self-identity is 
resisted when it comes to applying systemic methodology. ML is not a matter of one 
person validating what another says. Initiating dialogue, as Ricoeur explains (1992), 
serves as a mapping out of the individualizing or alienating nature of language. The 
understanding of language as a dialogue helps the PE profession to unharness the 
concealed “conditions” under which we learn-to-learn, and also brings into better 
focus the distinction between notions of “self” and “other than self”. 
 
Ricoeur’s missionary call for the PE profession would be that for a collegial sense of 
humility in relation to communicating knowledge, where he argues, the use of 
metaphor is an example of an example. A metaphor offers its speaker a generous 
allowance of deviation from the “norm”, yet suggestive enough to maintain its original 
“gesture”.  Ricoeur maintains that the unattainability of certainty is an inescapable 
feature of human experience and that the failure to make this acknowledgement 
gives an unwarranted scope to critical enquiry’s faith in its own ability to surmount 
the limitations of perspective and to provide autonomous critiques and commanding 
overviews. Rightly, his plea in clarifying meaning via language communication is for 
more joint endeavours, which, like movement, takes the form of a performative art 
capable of connecting the intricate woven web that corroborates to mutually 
compose a consensus of meaning. 
 
His version of “teaching” is that it can only be understood as an immeasurable task,                  
interminably held between immanence and transcendence. Thinking about the most 
appropriate styles of communication can be seen to be similar to the P.E. advocate 
trying to place the learner by way of some designed “experiences” with a view to 
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eliciting what is perhaps the most altruistic parts of us. When addressing the human 
concerns of the learner, as opposed to the technical issues of one’s movement, a 
sensitive language is called for. This is because the mover’s internalized concepts of 
movement are brought into account in terms of the making or the neglect of a human 
kindness.  
 
Hermeneutics, an unending process of revisiting 
 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics searches for intelligible clarity of meaning; the art of finding 
something in the text that is not there; messages hidden under the surface. He 
clarifies the intricate problem of getting beyond the letter to the spirit interpretation of 
all bearers of meaning. He points out the innocuous but subversive tendencies such 
as those of the speaker’s psychic drives or social interests need to be brought into 
consideration if we are to offer each other trustworthy interpretations of meaning. 
Educators need to have the capacity to detect and demystify searches for underlying 
motivations. 
 
Neither teaching nor pedagogy, however, is a measured task. Rather teaching is an 
impossible task, whilst pedagogy is a more a matter of being encouraged to 
“confess”, of being encouraged to “invite”, to share common criteria to “authenticate” 
the ambivalent nature of movement, and “endorse” what movement and its education 
is like for others. 
 
What ML hopes to provide is an account of the importance of our intuition and our 
emotion. It acknowledges that we are the authors of our moral decisions. It brings out 
the multiplicity of decisions that encircle our moral stance and suggest that in many 
cases we are capable of accepting the responsibilities in view of unforeseen but 
anticipated eventualities.  In authoring our own sayings, we offer the listener an 
“entrée”; an unfettered description as a way we cope with our doubts about or fail to 
appropriate the understanding of our own “human condition”. 
 
Words and metaphors assert a common life that is experienced in the body of the 
one who makes it, and the separation is only present at the linguistic level. The gap 
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across which the metaphor carries us is one that language itself creates. Metaphor 
which designates relations not objects is language’s cure for the ills and the 
revelations entailed on us by language. If the body/mind separation exists at the 
level of language, it is not at the level of embodied experience. Metaphors derive 
from our experience of living as embodied creatures in the everyday world. The body 
is, in other words, the necessary context for all human experience. 
 
All humans must listen to an echo of themselves before he or she may hear or come 
to know hidden aspects about themselves.  And all humans must listen with a sense 
of commitment to the words others use in their exchanged meaning in conversation 
with us. This attentiveness is called for because in their utterances they open out 
their version of the world with us, and shower us with hints and clues about how they 
feel they can treat us, confide in us, press their views onto us, or leave us exhausted 
and inadequate in their presence by their  absence of our presence. Language and 
movement, as all PE missionaries must remind themselves, are used as signs of 
duration and continuity. Both time and a false but comforting sense of permanence 
can commemorate and express our present actions which have purpose and 
possibility into the future. The process of learning how to educate unveils itself when 
pedagogy’s silent coded protocol bares its essential features [techne and phronesis] 
when each feature interchanges tension for a fluent relation between fixed and 
mobile points, between actuality and possibilities. That which we admire most, we 
move towards. That which we abhor, we condemn.  
 
Personhood 
 
Personhood is the status of being a person. Defining personhood is a controversial 
topic in philosophy, education, and law, and as Ricoeur makes clear, is intimately 
tied to legal and political concepts of citizenship, equality, and liberty. As Frankfurt 
claimed, the criteria for being a person are designed to:  
 
           … “capture” those attributes which are the subject of our most humane concerns with 
             ourselves and the source of what we regard as most important and most ambiguous  
             in our lives.                                                                                                     (1971: 5-7) 
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Ricoeur, however, qualifies the more subtle distinction between “selfhood” and 
“otherness” which have personal identity, or “ontological” awareness at stake (1992: 
317), and which he contrasts with “selfhood” and “sameness” (1992: 36). Our 
“otherness” Ricoeur maintains, is not something added on to selfhood from an 
externalised source. Our “otherness” is something inherent to us, and which belongs 
to the tenor of, and cross-fertilizes our understanding another’s and one’s own 
meaning. Selfhood and “sameness”, he argues, maintains an “annexed”, 
“disjunctive” character. Although it is impossible to consider what it means to be a 
“conventional” person, as qualified by (Braddon-Mitchell & Miller, 2004), PE’s silent 
human relational “deeds” need to be made more specific and highlighted as a means 
of personally supportive educational strategies (McNamee, 1992).  
 
Educators are not only lovers of wisdom but also ones who value the love of wisdom. 
They need to have passion to share the world not only as they see it, but to be able 
to share what others have come to understand about their life world. All PE’s 
participants need to be able to experience “losing” one’s “self” in the “selfless” realm 
of play, as we do when we become immersed in games, or consumed in the reading 
of a narrative which shed insights into another’s world. Or similarly we may delve 
further into our own mode of existence when we can indulge in deep East Asian like 
contemplation.  Following such encounters, we all need to be accompanied out of 
these “selfless” experiences in a way that does not leave us in a state of 
helplessness. 
  
As a movement specialist, I need to meet my learner in his or her weakness, 
vulnerability or innocence, when we both experience an undeniable presence of a 
mutually-felt caring responsibility: a responsibility which calls upon me to act only in 
the behest of my learner. To become immersed in pedagogy is to construct a partially 
interpretive description of some aspects of the life-world, and yet remains aware that 
lived life is always more complex than any explication of meaning can reveal. “Iago” 
denied himself the privilege to learn from his learners. 
 
Both subjectively concerned and orientated to objective issues, ML constantly moves 
towards and in between what actually happens in the PE lesson and not towards the 
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aspirations hidden in the systemic methods constructed and generalised 
prescriptions or dictums of official curriculum declarations. Declarative language is 
where the pedagogic act to learn is neglected and the process of teaching as well as 
the curriculum content becomes an instrument of surveillance. Ostensibly, it 
assumes its applicant exists in a state of “absolute knowledge”. However, 
repeatedly, I contend that any “teaching” or any “model” that attempts to universalise 
and objectify will necessarily have to separate personhood from pedagogy, and 
thereby devalue and suppress the important issue of subjectivity. 
 
This final chapter qualifies PE’s “meaning” and its experiences no longer remain 
one’s own. It not only acknowledges one’s distinct nature, but also aligns one to 
similarities with which others interpret the world.  Like Eastern contemplation, it also 
provides for its participants the confirmation and forgetfulness of self which is the 
experience of value. Value or meaning, that is, is the ultimate justification of activity. 
ML is an activity which ventures to get “in touch”, or relate with the effect of our 
consciousness [and our unconscious] not upon our bodies, nor on the effect of 
discourse; but with our whole self “immersion”, the core of our dwelling. ML offers a 
possible solution to an impoverished self alienation and an acceptance of an ever 
divergent, palpitating sense of being. This is because the lacunae in experience can 
only be understood from one’s lived embodied conjunction, not in body and mind 
disjunction.  
 
“But then, can Movement Literacy qualify PE’s meaning?” 
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Movement Literacy: Tentative Promises and Visions                       
 
Throughout the thesis I have shown that what is at stake in PE’s dialogue is not 
performance discourse anchoring learning through inhibiting and applying raw force, 
but rather by mediating an openness to thoughtful exploration of affective harmony 
and embodied enervated meaning. Meaning that is, which links the broader 
collective meaning of life with social bonding, with cultural appreciation, with 
challenge, and with the fine grained detail of self expression. I have maintained that 
the education of circumstances remains “superior” to tuition. My premise is that 
students can evolve a deep sense of empathy and a rapport with movement if PE 
educationalists detect and utilize another individual’s immanent movement 
testimony. This testimony is not a spurious assertion. It constitutes spontaneous 
“languaging” of movement from a private account to what can be publicly scrutinised 
and supported. Languaging movement is a way to account for one’s movement 
encounter which may be more substantial, sophisticated and richer in terms of 
offering a wide range of meaning for the listener to corroborate, align with, be 
indifferent to, or reject. Languaging movement is when the utterer and listener both 
perform in a speech act which is a subtle way one may come to understand 
discourse as a form of power.  
ML’s benign aspiration may entice movers/speakers into a sublime, communicative 
site of intelligible feelings and a potential way to open a deliberated commitment 
towards exercise for a more “hopeful”, “fit” and “fitting life”. It is not only conveyed 
tangentially in post-structuralism’s posturing, probing and righteous language but ML 
is also validated socially and personally, while participating in a historical, dialectic 
and respectful oral tradition. ML’s basic ambition is to collate PE’s enterprises by 
tactfully employing creative and “synesthetic metaphors” [stirring a visual hearing as 
antedating language] and “synaesthetic metaphors” [replicating our neurological, 
tactile, sensory, and embodied modes] by which we live. The professional’s astute 
arranged usage of both forms of metaphors may possibly evoke learners to articulate 
what their innate sense of being is “like”. 
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ML’s representation 
 
I next highlight the gist of PL and andragogy.  Each phase is linked by ML’s practice 
as represented in table 1. Here I feature their discrete and allied educational 
conditions as a potentially restorative therapy. ML may enable PE’s interminable 
learners to better "cope” with the ambiguity involved in understanding the "self” and 
“other-than-self" that may befall us in movement, alongside cultivating a more 
positive commitment to exercise through life. 
 
Mapping PE’s Communicative Evolution 
 
Phase 1  
 
Teaching, a speech act, via phenomenology is a transiting and transposing of shared 
meaning which grounds PL. PL is the professional catalyst which can lead to 
pedagogy as interplay of relationships. 
 
Pivotal Phase 2  
 
Pedagogy, when interpreted via hermeneutic phenomenology animates ML which 
may become capable of inaugurating andragogy’s intended orientation towards 
epistemological understanding and ontological transformation. Via ML’s transactions 
andragogy helps to clarify the essential differences and eventual synthesis between 
techne and phronesis. Andragogy is the mutual exercise to accept a working 
agreement.  
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TABLE   1 
The following table identifies PE’s potential educational progression through its three 
communication phases, and some of ML’s key potential claims. 
Physical Literacy Movement Literacy Andragogy 
 Age Group  
inferred meaning 
up to c.14 years old 
 
young (15yrs+) adults 
need to look back over 
their life experience 
presupposes adult  
experience  
 
 Philosophical Movement  
phenomenological 
description 
 
vividly dramatises 
movement encounters 
 
 
subjected to hermeneutic 
treatment, rigor of 
critique 
 
personalises PL and 
generates altruistic 
commitment 
 
concerns agent-mover 
rather than movement 
Synthesises 
phenomenology with 
hermeneutics 
  Role of Language  
initiates language use as 
dialogue involving more 
than one person 
 
needs more subtle 
language  
 
Vigilant about non-
neutral features of 
dominant discourse 
 
compares,contrasts, 
analyses, synthesises 
and applies divergent 
thinking 
 
alludes to speech acts  
 
links acted movement to 
worded language 
entertains tangential, 
unexpected outcomes of 
discursive thought 
 
acknowledges first 
person claims  
 
awakens selfhood 
 
 Pedagogy  
initiates communal 
praxis 
 
non-intrusive, non-
doctrinal, non-impulsive  
 
understands movement 
as a language  
 
transposes familiar 
experience into 
unfamiliar novelty 
reveals pedagogy’s 
hidden protocol  
 
 
 Potential Learning 
Consequence 
 
reciprocates philosophy 
of PE’s meaning as a 
lifetime commitment 
 
 
 
invites self constructed 
knowledge 
 
qualifies signifier and 
signified learner 
 
brings PE into life  
 
potential leitmotif for 
career programme 
planning 
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Physical Literacy Movement Literacy Andragogy 
 
Potential Learning 
Consequence 
 
   
mutual negotiation  
 
self-therapeutic 
restoration 
 
attends to self 
implication in knowledge 
construct 
 
identifies hallmark of 
personhood 
 
evolves kinship through 
sensing humility, honour, 
equanimity and 
compassion 
 
blends pragmatism with 
nature-nurture 
 
accrues life-skills by not 
dislocating learning 
traditions 
 
advocates education as 
an unending quest  
 
acknowledges dynamics 
of learning as politics of 
knowledge with no 
closure, whilst learning 
“itself” has no term 
 
deliberates on 
experience to anticipate 
potential  consequences 
for learning 
 
conceives literature’s 
goal as putting 
“meaning” into the world, 
but not “a” meaning 
 
views PE as human 
laboratory of moral 
judgment 
 
adverts literacy by 
encouraging impromptu, 
conjectural dialogue  
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Interminably, andragogy evolves as the unpacking of Merleau-Ponty’s and Ricoeur’s 
seminal message to PE’s interpreters and educationalists. That is, both movement 
and language complement each other because they can be interpreted as actions, 
and can be read as forms of communication and self-expression. The coalescent act 
of “languaging movement” depicts PE’s core value as “a game of relationships”, or 
even “a journey into life”, and qualifies PE as (i) a musing praxis ever seeking to 
motion the illusive self and (ii) the learning of this ambiguity of “selflessness” is when 
we realise that we can only partially understand ourselves as another being. As 
praxis ML reconstitutes the subject-object relationship within a dialectical rather than 
a dualistic framework. It alleviates some potential confusion between the dualistic 
interplay in “conversation” and the “monist” reception of theory.  
Having explored the inherent relationships between human emotion [necessarily 
subject-referring and thus implies profoundly ethical concerns] and bio-technology 
[scientific objectivism], I have advanced ML as a way to help others to transform their 
bodies from the textbook of anatomy and physiology into a cultural creation 
appropriating a body as one’s own, nurturing a positive physical and emotional 
posture. ML deliberates on collating self identity and restoring self confidence of 
those who may have suffered PE enterprises in their lonely silence, or become better 
acquainted with the obscure nature of one’s self.  Furthermore, ML offers to make 
tenable distinguishing the dancer in the dance and the mover from the movement. 
Significantly, ML may reinforce claims that an embodied philosophy can be 
sensuously conveyed by means of post-structuralism’s “telling” messages, messages 
which sometimes require an overt political stance professionally and personally; 
issues which, prima facie, are educational. 
 
Radically, via ML’s praxis, what is revealed is that it is the “participant-mover” who 
eventually creates a self-constructed case for engaging in movement, for engaging in 
the act of tolerance and respect for others, and in sabotaging one’s self denial or 
subscribe to self awareness. Movement Literacy may foster one’s ability to “read” 
movement and do things with words, both conceived as human resourced acts. Such 
acts operate in language as complementary forms of communication and self-
expression, thus help covey PE as a curative encounter.  
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Proposals for the future of Movement Literacy 
 
In view of current (2012) drastic financial cuts in university funding, and the likely 
reduction of study time at PE teacher initiation programmes, I envision less time for 
apprenticing movement educators to be initiated into this profession. Learning about 
movement can be studied from outside resources, written/digital information. 
Learning from movement, however, calls on the knowledge and insight from its agent 
mover’s account of the event, which needs to be communicated to a significant other 
who has both observed and listened to the performer’s comments.  The relational 
connection between speaker and listener needs to be conducted at a sensitive and 
intricately complicated level of dialogue. ML aspires to qualify the fundamental 
differences that arise between the field of epistemology [public knowledge and 
responsibilities] and that of ontology [private concerns and responses]. 
 
To philosophize with the body, which is what ML offers us, is a voicing of 
connections, a freedom to characterize human life, an unwritten covenant of hope. 
ML is an act of meeting a meaning in PE’s encounter. It is meeting with a “presence” 
that can never coincide with our own, the confrontation with an enigma that can not 
be dispelled by thought, an otherness that can never be overcome. However, in 
movement we do not act out of character. In the silence of our actions we express 
the belongingness to ourselves as we wish to express to others. We express our 
human condition not from uttering arresting words but rather, from our 
unencumbered, undisturbed, calm sense of embodiment.  
 
ML is about sharing those murmurs transiently caught in the margins of one’s own 
musings and, subsequently, in the joy of sharing with each other a critique of 
thoughts, ideas and beliefs, as is the way in andragogy, in order to (i) motion 
compassionately another’s “otherness”, and (ii) appreciate the need to acknowledge 
our own implication in the construct of knowledge and meaning. ML is about inviting 
others to emulate the people and the world we love, and the making of ourselves as 
an infinite student of the other’s knowledge. ML holds that an action is social in virtue 
of its intrinsic character, and the alleged interactive affinities between nature and 
convention occur to those who think about humankind and its development. Thus, 
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ML’s reflective praxis unveils, presents and then, re-presents PE under its original 
auspices, as that of a human laboratory of moral judgment. 
 
ML is a vocation; it tries to avoid self-enclosure.  It is about helping each other to 
better realise that we all are a versatile self ensemble, a floating signifier. PE’s 
pedagogy is not a matter of expressing a value, as such. It is a pedagogy which 
offers a sense of concern from its speaker who knows when to leave space and time 
to contemplate about meaning and life, in what exceeds expression in a constantly 
changing life. What have changed during my lifetime are the unquestioned 
assumptions about our bodily “structure”. Questions have arisen about our identity, 
about our dispositional nature, about transcendence and particularity, about the 
nature of time and space, and recognition of our human possibilities. From physics to 
philosophy, from politics to art, the description of the word has changed in ways that 
upset some basic beliefs of modernity. For example, in the opening chapters, the 
advent of phenomenology saw a search to collapse the dualistic distinctions between 
subjective concerns and objective issues. Relativity physics shifted descriptive 
emphasis from “reality” to measurement. The arts moved away from realism. 
Consensus politics confronted totalitarianism and genocide. These and related 
cultural and technological events arose from seismic changes in the way we register 
the world and communicate with each other gesturally, orally or digitally.  
 
To grasp what is at stake in postmodernism’s PE it is necessary to think historically 
and broadly, in the kind of complex terms that inevitably involve multidisciplinary 
effort. This multilingual impetus, this bringing together of “methods”  and ideas long 
segregated both in academic disciplines and in practical life, particularly 
characterises postmodernism and largely accounts for such resistance it has 
generated (Harvey 1992). Diverse in its searches, and eclectic in its concerns, 
postmodernism can be recognized by two key assumptions. First, the assumption 
that there is no common denominator in “nature” or “truth” , in “God” or the “future”, 
that guarantees either the Oneness of the world or the possibility of neutral or 
objective thought. Second, the assumption that all human systems operate like 
language, being self-reflexive rather than referential systems; systems of differential 
function which are powerfully finite, but construct and maintain meaning and value.  
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Tactfully, I predict that ML treats learners as individuals and allows learning to 
happen by its addressing, guiding, and testing the meaning of PE subjectively in the 
“labor improbus” of discursive thought. ML’s prospective professionals need to lend 
their lives to pupils, since it is well versed in pedagogy’s unifying principles that are 
conducive to become acquainted with the “moral skills” of a good life. ML traces 
one’s strong commitment to professional and personal journey into educating an 
understanding of movement whilst educating the undivided self. It is a pedagogy 
which aspires to invest movement’s significant ontological revelations into life, from 
the viewpoint of those who have lived through them. Importantly, it places a strong 
sense of self-conviction in its resident movers, enabling movement literates and their 
learners to place themselves and their knowledge at risk in unfinished remarks in 
what PE does to us. 
 
All language originates as an embodied expression of emotion that is communicated 
by one individual “inhabiting” the body, and therefore, can be conceived in shared or 
assimilated terms partly aligned with the emotional world of another. Language is a 
bodily “skill” that is acquired by each of us through imitation, by the emotional 
identification and intuitive harmonisation of the bodily states of the one who learns 
with the one from whom it is learnt. ML’s language is a means of reaching out to 
another’s “otherness” distinguishing the humanness of each other’s characteristics, 
not the other way round. This is why ML looks to “minister” responsibility inherent to 
all pedagogic actions. In its benign “ministering”, ML “reconnoiters” for the values 
and attitudes which touch upon the sort of person one is. It traces (i) the sort of 
outlook one takes towards life and its possibilities; (ii) personal qualities that are 
shaped much more by one’s experiences in reading literature or history; by looking at 
art; by learning a language; and by encountering the act of moving. In short, ML 
informs physical educationalists of how to use literature as a kind of “equipment” for 
living. It can help its correspondents to recognize the boundaries around which one 
takes for granted, and to see what lies beyond them. It helps prepare a person to 
accept the difficulty, and the fallibility of human practices. It assists movement 
specialists to better cope with the unpredictability of educational settings, where 
there will always be the residue of the unsolved, the curious accepting of the 
perpetually unlearned and flawed states of one’s own understanding. ML can 
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heighten one’s appreciation of human “differences”. It fosters a broader 
understanding of the social, cultural and political contexts of one’s actions. And 
finally, it perceives one’s position within these contexts as an ethical/political agent-
deliverer and interminable student receptor of learning.  
 
PE specialists need to protect the pilgrimage of their learner’s sense of “otherness”.  
Whilst movement study is an etymological issue, its encountered ontological 
concerns need to be surmounted by counselling because movement is no longer the 
simple “object” of teaching; rather, it is our pedagogical and andragogical [subjective] 
reading of it.  Physical activities are valued and made intelligible to the work they do 
and the effects they have on those who participate in them. 
 
ML’s mission is to extend PL to nurture and develop our compassionate, boundless 
minds as ever open to others. ML retains a connection between its authentic genesis 
and the route of its professional practice, that is, to direct expression of our true 
nature. Strictly speaking, each of us is both a dependent and an independent being. 
To become human, we must continually try to change our domesticated and all too 
familiar posture with that of others, who are unfamiliar to us.  There is no other 
practice to being human than to examining one’s self in comparison with those whom 
you consider to be both significant and insignificant. This is life’s existence. One can 
not simply practice life. There is no other way of learning about life than to live it and 
engage oneself in each other’s world upon whom, eventually, we have to rely for 
their meanings and world views.  
 
Movement’s residents need to appreciate that language and movement are very 
different forms of knowledge and hold different hierarchical values. Both forms of 
action convey self-expression, but they need to be brought into some sort of dialogue 
in order to facilitate real innovation in the PE world. Clearly, this thesis does not 
provide the answers, but attempts to facilitate new questions, such as: “How can 
language and movement communicate?” Indeed, without the possibilities of deriving 
meaning from movement, it is difficult to delve into PE’s juncture, its “unsolved gaps”, 
let alone construct an intersection between movement and that of a meaningful 
curriculum. 
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The significance of ML’s pedagogic insight is that today’s movement proponents may 
become more aware of the experienced conditions of effective learning-to-learn and 
be held accountable for the education of critical thinking. ML also carries a warning 
that professionals should metaphorically try to stand in the midst of the learner’s 
activity and call upon their own ability to respond to what they see, and hear what is 
happening. Future PE professionals are expected to interpret not only the language 
of behaviour, but also the behaviour of the listener to language which is not judged 
against some “external” criterion, but rather, as a function of the learner’s intensity of 
activity. 
Rather than experience solitude, ML seeks meaning that palpitates or murmurs from 
the creative pulse following embodied experiences. It offers solace to its learners 
who have encountered PE’s as yet unravelled and deep labyrinth of connections, 
thus, exercising one’s responsibility to bring PE into life. This is because in the 
austere but temporary loss of self, a self and the “other than self” are neither exiled 
nor neglected. One’s learners’ corporate shifting “I’s” are not left out of their own 
cited account of moving enterprises. ML may help each movement participant to 
better realize the importance of being more than one “I”.  
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